

Sociology of Literature & Feminist Sociological Theory

By
Sylvie Meiliana



PUSTAKA MANDIRI
Penerbit Buku Super

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&
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Isi buku ini, baik sebagian maupun seluruhnya, dilarang diperbanyak dalam bentuk apa pun tanpa izin tertulis dari penerbit, kecuali dalam hal pengutipan untuk keperluan artikel atau karangan ilmiah.

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To the Students, this book is written for you and is based on the teaching and research experience of numerous researchers, writers, and critics. In today's global socially networked world, the topic is relevant than ever before. We hope that through this book, you will learn the role of literary work, especially related to sociology of literature and feminism that can change the world. In this book, you will find applications of concepts that are relevant, current, and balanced.

To the instructors, this text is intended for a one-semester introductory course. Since current events influence our social perspectives and the field in general, so that students and instructors around the country can relate and engage in fruitful discussions.

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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF LITERATURE

Literature is the expression of human's feelings, ideas, imaginations, thoughts, experiences, and emotions which are applied in beautiful language whose purpose is to entertain. Literature can be expressed by language, both oral and written. In other word, the medium of literature is language. The genres of literature are poetry, prose, and drama.

Literature is used when human use language in their communication. Its mean that the literature is used since Adam is created. Literature is the product of language. Without language we don't know about literature. It is because the expression of language produce literature.

Literature is different from scientific work. They can differentiate based on the purpose in making them. While the function of scientific work is to give information, and the literature is to entertain the reader.

Literature can be defined as an expression of human feelings, thoughts, and ideas whose medium is language, oral and written. Literature is not only about human ideas, thoughts, and feelings but also about experiences of the authors. Literature can be medium for human to communicate what they feel, think, experience to the readers.

There are many ways to define the term literature based on different point of views such as literature is art, literature is language, literature is aesthetic, literature is fictional, literature is expressive, and literature is affective. Literature is everything in print. It means any writing can be categorized as literature. Another way of defining literature is to limit it to 'great books' which are 'notable for literary form or expression'. Ellis (1989:30) defines literature as the verbal expression of human imagination and one of the primary means by which a culture transmits itself. Based on thus definitions, literature contains universal ideas, human imagination, and human interest that written in any writings and use language as medium to express human's ideas and feelings.

In conjunction with literature as art form, it is broken down into imaginative literature and non-imaginative literature. Imaginative literature and non-imaginative literature are

distinguished based on the particular use made of language in literature. Language of imaginative literature is highly 'connotative' and language of non-imaginative literature is purely 'denotative'. The connotative meaning means words that used in literary works have feeling and shades of meaning that words tend to evoke while denotative meaning means that the words refer to meaning in dictionary.

The language that is used by literature differ from ordinary spoken or written language. Literature uses special words, structures, and characteristics. Primarily the language of literature differs from ordinary language in three ways: (1) language is concentrated and meaningful, (2) its purpose is not simply to explain, argue, or make a point but rather to give a sense of pleasure in the discovery of a new experience, and (3) it demands intense concentration from the readers. It indicates that the language of literature has originality, quality, creativity, and pleasure.

In this case, to differentiate between the literary texts and non-literary texts (imaginative and non-imaginative), Kleden (2004:7-8) states that literature can be differentiate based on the kind of meanings that exist in a text. Literary text consists of textual meaning and referential meaning and non-literary text only consists of referential meaning. The textual meaning is the meaning that is produced by the relationship of text itself. While referential meaning is meaning that is produced by the relationship between internal text and external text (world beyond the text).

From the use of language and the existence of meaning in literary works, it can be concluded that poetry, prose and drama are put in literary works article, journalism, news, bibliography, memoir, and so on can be categorized as non-literary works.

The nature of literature is quite an open one. It does many things and accomplishes many purposes. One such end is that it helps to articulate conditions within human beings that can find relation in the lives of others. It seeks to relay such narratives so that bonds can be formed with characters, predicaments, and ideas in the hopes of sensing more about our own senses of self. Literature's nature can take on many forms in the accomplishment of these purposes. Yet, the idea present is that within all literature there is some level of articulation of a predicament that can be appreciated by many and help more to understand more of themselves, their worlds and settings. Sometimes, the nature of literature can have a moral purpose, yet other times it might not. However, its primary nature is to simply connect with others in its attempt to detail more of ourselves and our world.

The nature of literature is very open-ended and could be answered in many different ways. I would say that the difference between literature and writing that is not literature would be the function. Literature functions to entertain and/or education. What I mean is, as opposed to advertising or explaining, good literature stands on its own as a good or great story. It has developed characters and a setting and an identifiable plot. It has a conflict and resolution that is played out in the story line. It tells a story and has a narrator whether it is first person narrator or omniscient narrator. When we read literature we can love it or hate it or whatever because it's not true. We are not expected to believe it as the truth. In the end, however, we can learn a lot about how people interact and how they speak as opposed to how they think. We can learn to examine our own thoughts and actions through comparing them to the literature we read.

One way is to define literature as everything in print. We then shall be able to study the 'medical profession in the fourteenth century' or 'planetary motion in the early Middle Ages' or 'witchcraft in Old and New England'. As Edwin Greenlaw has argued, 'Nothing related to the history of civilization is beyond our province'; we are 'not limited to belles-lettres or even to printed or manuscript records in our effort to understand a period or civilization', and we 'must see our work in the light of its possible contribution to the history of culture. According to Greenlaw's theory, and the practice of many scholars, literary study has thus become not merely closely related to the history of civilization but indeed identical with it. Such study is literary only in the sense that it is occupied with printed or written matter, necessarily the primary source of most history. It can, of course, be argued in defense of such a view that historians neglect these problems, that they are too much preoccupied with diplomatic, military, and economic history, and that thus the literary scholar is justified in invading and taking over a neighboring terrain. Doubtless nobody should be forbidden to enter any area he likes, and doubtless there is much to be said in favor of cultivating the history of civilization in the broadest terms. But still the study ceases to be literary. The objection that this is only a quibble about terminology is not convincing. The study of everything connected with the history of civilization does, as a matter of fact, crowd out strictly literary studies. All distinctions fall; extraneous criteria are introduced into literature; and, by consequence, literature will be judged valuable only so far as it yields results for this or that adjacent discipline. The identification of literature with the history of civilization is a denial of the specific field and the specific methods of literary study.

Another way of defining literature is to limit it to 'great books', books which, whatever their subject, are 'notable for literary form or expression'. Here the criterion is either aesthetic worth alone or aesthetic worth in combination with general intellectual distinction. Within lyric poetry, drama, and fiction, the greatest works are selected on aesthetic grounds; other books are picked for their reputation or intellectual eminence together with aesthetic value of a rather narrow kind: style, composition, general force of presentation are the usual characteristics singled out. This is a common way of distinguishing or speaking of literature. By saying that 'this is not literature', we express such a value judgement; we make the same kind of judgement when we speak of a book on history, philosophy, or science as belonging to 'literature'.

Most literary histories do include treatment of philosophers, historians, theologians, moralists, politicians, and even some scientists. It would, for example, be difficult to imagine a literary history of eighteenth-century England without an extended treatment of Berkeley and Hume, Bishop Butler and Gibbon, Burke and even Adam Smith. The treatment of these authors, though usually much briefer than that of poets, playwrights, and novelists, is rarely limited to their strictly aesthetic merits. In practice, we get perfunctory and inexpert accounts of these authors in terms of their speciality. Quite rightly, Hume cannot be judged except as a philosopher, Gibbon except as a historian, Bishop Butler as a Christian apologist and moralist, and Adam Smith as a moralist and economist. But in most literary histories these thinkers are discussed in a fragmentary fashion without the proper context -- the history of their subject of discourse -- without a real grasp, that is, of the history of philosophy, of ethical theory, of historiography, of economic theory. The literary historian is not automatically transformed into a proper historian of these disciplines. He becomes simply a compiler, a self-conscious intruder.

The study of isolated 'great books' may be highly commendable for pedagogical purposes. We all must approve the idea that students -- and particularly beginning students -- should read great or at least good books rather than compilations or historical curiosities. We may, however, doubt that the principle is worth preserving in its purity for the sciences, history, or any other accumulative and progressing subject. Within the history of imaginative literature, limitation to the great books makes incomprehensible the continuity of literary tradition, the development of literary genres, and indeed the very nature of the literary process, besides obscuring the background of social, linguistic, ideological, and other conditioning circumstances. In history, philosophy, and similar subjects, it actually introduces an excessively 'aesthetic' point

of view. There is obviously no other reason than stress on expository 'style' and organization for singling out Thomas Huxley from all English scientists as the one worth reading. This criterion must, with very few exceptions, favor popularizers over the great originators: it will, and must, prefer Huxley to Darwin, Bergson to Kant.

The term 'literature' seems best if we limit it to the art of literature, that is, to imaginative literature. There are certain difficulties with so employing the term; but, in English, the possible alternatives, such as 'fiction' or 'poetry', are either already pre-empted by narrow meanings or, like 'imaginative literature' or *belles-lettres*, are clumsy and misleading. One of the objections to 'literature' is its suggestion (in its etymology from *litera*) of limitation to written or printed literature; for, clearly, any coherent conception must include 'oral literature'. In this respect, the German term *Wortkunst* and the Russian *slovesnost* have the advantage over their English equivalent.

The simplest way of solving the question is by distinguishing the particular use made of language in literature. Language is the material of literature as stone or bronze is of sculpture, paints of pictures, or sounds of music. But one should realize that language is not mere inert matter like stone but is itself a creation of man and is thus charged with the cultural heritage of a linguistic group.

The main distinctions to be drawn are between the literary, the everyday, and the scientific uses of language. A discussion of this point by Thomas Clark Pollock, *The Nature of Literature?*, though true as far as it goes, seems not entirely satisfactory, especially in defining the distinction between literary and everyday language. The problem is crucial and by no means simple in practice, since literature, in distinction from the other arts, has no medium of its own and since many mixed forms and subtle transitions undoubtedly exist. It is fairly easy to distinguish between the language of science and the language of literature. The mere contrast between 'thought' and 'emotion' or 'feeling' is, however, not sufficient. Literature does contain thought, while emotional language is by no means confined to literature: witness a lovers' conversation or an ordinary quarrel. Still, the ideal scientific language is purely 'denotative': it aims at a one-to-one correspondence between sign and referent. The sign is completely arbitrary, hence it can be replaced by equivalent signs. The sign is also transparent; that is, without drawing attention to itself, it directs us unequivocally to its referent.

Thus scientific language tends towards such a system of signs as mathematics or symbolic logic. Its ideal is such a universal language as the *characteristica universalis* which Leibniz had begun to plan as early as the late seventeenth century. Compared to scientific language, literary language will appear in some ways deficient. It abounds in ambiguities; it is, like every other historical language, full of homonyms, arbitrary or irrational categories such as grammatical gender; it is permeated with historical accidents, memories, and associations. In a word, it is highly 'connotative'. Moreover, literary language is far from merely referential. It has its expressive side; it conveys the tone and attitude of the speaker or writer. And it does not merely state and express what it says; it also wants to influence the attitude of the reader, persuade him, and ultimately change him. There is a further important distinction between literary and scientific language: in the former, the sign itself, the sound symbolism of the word, is stressed. All kinds of techniques have been invented to draw attention to it, such as metre, alliteration, and patterns of sound.

These distinctions from scientific language may be made in different degrees by various works of literary art: for example, the sound pattern will be less important in a novel than in certain lyrical poems, impossible of adequate translation. The expressive element will be far less in an 'objective novel', which may disguise and almost conceal the attitude of the writer, than in a 'personal' lyric. The pragmatic element, slight in 'pure' poetry, may be large in a novel with a purpose or a satirical or didactic poem. Furthermore, the degree to which the language is intellectualized may vary considerably: there are philosophical and didactic poems and problem novels which approximate, at least occasionally, to the scientific use of language. Still, whatever the mixed modes apparent upon an examination of concrete literary works of art, the distinctions between the literary use and the scientific use seem clear: literary language is far more deeply involved in the historical structure of the language; it stresses the awareness of the sign itself; it has its expressive and pragmatic side which scientific language will always want so far as possible to minimize. More difficult to establish is the distinction between everyday and literary language. Everyday language is not a uniform concept: it includes such wide variants as colloquial language, the language of commerce, official language, the language of religion, the slang of students. But obviously much that has been said about literary language holds also for the other uses of language excepting the scientific. Everyday language also has its expressive function, though this varies from a colorless official announcement to the passionate plea roused

by a moment of emotional crisis. Everyday language is full of the irrationalities and contextual changes of historical language, though there are moments when it aims at almost the precision of scientific description. Only occasionally is there awareness of the signs themselves in everyday speech. Yet such awareness does appear - in the sound symbolism of names and actions, or in puns. No doubt, everyday language wants most frequently to achieve results, to influence actions and attitudes. But it would be false to limit it merely to communication. A child's talking for hours without a listener and an adult's almost meaningless social chatter show that there are many uses of language which are not strictly, or at least primarily, communicative.

It is thus quantitatively that literary language is first of all to be differentiated from the varied uses of every day. The resources of language are exploited much more deliberately and systematically. In the work of a subjective poet, we have manifest a 'personality' far more coherent and all-pervasive than that of persons as we see them in everyday situations. Certain types of poetry will use paradox, ambiguity, the contextual change of meaning, even the irrational association of grammatical categories such as gender or tense, quite deliberately. Poetic language organizes, tightens, the resources of everyday language, and sometimes does even violence to them, in an effort to force us into awareness and attention. Many of these resources a writer will find formed, and preformed, by the silent and anonymous workings of many generations. In certain highly developed literatures, and especially in certain epochs, the poet merely uses an established convention: the language, so to speak, poeticizes for him. Still, every work of art imposes an order, an organization, a unity on its materials. This unity sometimes seems very loose, as in many sketches or adventure stories; but it increases to the complex, close-knit organization of certain poems, in which it may be almost impossible to change a word or the position of a word without impairing its total effect.

The pragmatic distinction between literary language and everyday language is much clearer. We reject as poetry or label as mere rhetoric everything which persuades us to a definite outward action. Genuine poetry affects us more subtly. Art imposes some kind of framework which takes the statement of the work out of the world of reality. Into our semantic analysis we thus can reintroduce some of the common conceptions of aesthetics: 'disinterested contemplation', 'aesthetic distance', 'framing'. Again, however, we must realize that the distinction between art and non-art, between Literature and the non-literary linguistic utterance, is fluid. The aesthetic function may extend to linguistic pronouncements of the most various sort.

It would be a narrow conception of literature to exclude all propaganda art or didactic and satirical poetry. We have to recognize transitional forms like the essay, biography, and much rhetorical literature. In different periods of history the realm of the aesthetic function seems to expand or to contract: the personal letter, at times, was an art form, as was the sermon, while today, in agreement with the contemporary tendency against the confusion of genres, there appears a narrowing of the aesthetic function, a marked stress on purity of art, a reaction against pan-aestheticism and its claims as voiced by the aesthetics of the late nineteenth century. It seems, however, best to consider as literature only works in which the aesthetic function is dominant, while we can recognize that there are aesthetic elements, such as style and composition, in works which have a completely different, non-aesthetic purpose, such as scientific treatises, philosophical dissertations, political pamphlets, sermons.

But the nature of literature emerges most clearly under the referential aspects. The centre of literary art is obviously to be found in the traditional genres of the lyric, the epic, the drama. In all of them, the reference is to a world of fiction, of imagination. The statements in a novel, in a poem, or in a drama are not literally true; they are not logical propositions. There is a central and important difference between a statement, even in a historical novel or a novel by Balzac which seems to convey 'information' about actual happenings, and the same information appearing in a book of history or sociology. Even in the subjective lyric, the 'I' of the poet is a fictional, dramatic 'I'. A character in a novel differs from a historical figure or a figure in real life. He is made only of the sentences describing him or put into his mouth by the author. He has no past, no future, and sometimes no continuity of life. This elementary reflection disposes of much criticism devoted to Hamlet in Wittenberg, the influence of Hamlet's father on his son, the slim and young Falstaff, 'the girlhood of Shakespeare's heroines', the question of 'how many children had Lady Macbeth'. Time and space in a novel are not those of real life. Even an apparently most realistic novel, the very 'slice of life' of the naturalist, is constructed according to certain artistic conventions. Especially from a later historical perspective we see how similar are naturalistic novels in choice of theme, type of characterization, events selected or admitted, ways of conducting dialogue. We discern, likewise, the extreme conventionality of even the most naturalistic drama not only in its assumption of a scenic frame but in the way space and time are handled, the way even the supposedly realistic dialogue is steered and conducted, and the way

characters enter and leave the stage. Whatever the distinctions between *The Tempest* and *A Doll's House*, they share in this dramatic conventionality.

If we recognize 'fictionality', 'invention', or 'imagination' as the distinguishing trait of literature, we think thus of literature in terms of Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Balzac, Keats rather than of Cicero or Montaigne, Bossuet, or Emerson. Admittedly, there will be 'boundary' cases, works like Plato's Republic to which it would be difficult to deny, at least in the great myths, passages of 'invention' and 'fictionality', while they are at the same time primarily works of philosophy. This conception of literature is descriptive, not evaluative. No wrong is done to a great and influential work by relegating it to rhetoric, to philosophy, to political pamphleteering, all of which may pose problems of aesthetic analysis, of stylistics and composition, similar or identical to those presented by literature, but where the central quality of fictionality will be absent. This conception will thus include in it all kinds of fiction, even the worst novel, the worst poem, the worst drama. Classification as an should be distinguished from evaluation.

One common misunderstanding must be removed. 'Imaginative' literature need not use images. Poetic language is permeated with imagery, beginning with the simplest figures and culminating in the total all-inclusive mythological systems of a Blake or Yeats. But imagery is not essential to fictional statement and hence to much literature. There are good completely imageless poems; there is even a 'poetry of statement'. Imagery, besides, should not be confused with actual, sensuous, visual image-making. Under the influence of Hegel, nineteenth-century aestheticians such as Vischer and Eduard von Hartmann argued that all art is the 'sensuous shining forth of the idea', while another school (Fiedler, Hildebrand, Riehl) spoke of all art as 'pure visibility'. But much great literature does not evoke sensuous images, or, if it does, it does so only incidentally, occasionally, and intermittently. In the depiction even of a fictional character the writer may not suggest visual images at all. We scarcely can visualize any of Dostoyevsky's or Henry James's characters, while we learn to know their states of mind, their motivations, evaluations, attitudes, and desires very completely.

At the most, a writer suggests some schematized outline or one single physical trait - the frequent practice of Tolstoy or Thomas Mann. The fact that we object to many illustrations, though by good artists and, in some cases (e.g. Thackeray's), even by the author himself, shows that the writer presents us only with such a schematized outline as is not meant to be filled out in detail.

If we had to visualize every metaphor in poetry we would become completely bewildered and confused. While there are readers given to visualizing and there are passages in literature where such imaginings seem required by the text, the psychological question should not be confused with analysis of the poet's metaphorical devices. These devices are largely the organization of mental processes which occur also outside of literature. Thus metaphor is latent in much of our everyday language and overt in slang and popular proverbs. The most abstract terms, by metaphorical transfer, derive from ultimately physical relationships (*comprehend, define, eliminate, substance, subject, hypothesis*). Poetry revives and makes us conscious of this metaphorical character of language, just as it uses the symbols and myths of our civilization: Classical, Teutonic, Celtic, and Christian.

All these distinctions between literature and non-literature which we have discussed - organization, personal expression, realization and exploitation of the medium, lack of practical purpose, and, of course, fictionality - are restatements, within a framework of semantic analysis, of age-old aesthetic terms such as 'unity in variety', 'disinterested contemplation', 'aesthetic distance', 'framing', and 'invention', 'imagination', 'creation'. Each of them describes one aspect of the literary work, one characteristic feature of its semantic directions. None is itself satisfactory. At least one result should emerge: a literary work of art is not a simple object but rather a highly complex organization of a stratified character with multiple meanings and relationships. The usual terminology, which speaks of an 'organism', is somewhat misleading, since it stresses only one aspect, that of 'unity in variety', and leads to biological parallels not always relevant. Furthermore, the 'identity of content and form' in literature, though the phrase draws attention to the close interrelationships within the work of art, is misleading in being overfacile. It encourages the illusion that the analysis of any element of an artefact, whether of content or of technique, must be equally useful, and thus absolves us from the obligation to see the work in its totality. 'Content' and 'form' are terms used in too widely different senses for them to be, merely juxtaposed, helpful; indeed, even after careful definition, they too simply dichotomize the work of art. A modern analysis of the work of art has to begin with more complex questions: its mode of existence, its system of strata?

CHAPTER II

SOCIOLOGY AND LITERATURE

Interest in the relationship between literature and society is hardly a new phenomenon. We still read and refer to the ancient Greeks in this regard. In *The Republic*, for example, Plato presages both Mme.de Staël's treatise of 1800, which was the first to discuss cross-national differences in literature, and later notions of literary reflection with his idea of imitation. What is new, however, is the relative legitimacy of the study of literature within the discipline of sociology. This is due both to the increasing interest in culture in sociology after years of marginalization (Calhoun 1989) and to the increasing influence of cultural studies on sociology and throughout the academy.

A broader interest in and acceptance of cultural sociology has meant that the types of research questions and methods common to sociological studies of literature are now more widely accepted within the field. Sociology has extended its methodological boundaries in response to both attacks on the dominance of positivism and the rising power of alternative stances suggested by postmodernism. At the same time, changes in the goals, and sometimes the methods, of studying literature sociologically have moved the area closer to what is still the

mainstream of the discipline. Thus the sociology of literature has benefited from a twofold movement in which

(1) sociology as a discipline has become more interested in and accepting of research questions pertaining to meaning (cf. Wuthnow 1987, however, for a particularly strong attack on meaning from within the culture camp) and employing qualitative methods; and

(2) the sociology of literature has evolved in the direction of more mainstream sociological areas through the merging of quantitative with qualitative methods and of empirical with hermeneutic research questions.

2.1 Traditional Approaches

As recently as 1993, Wendy Griswold maintained that the sociology of literature was a “nonfield” and “like an amoeba . . . lack[ing] firm structure” (1993, p. 455). Certainly the sociology of literature has been a marginal area in the discipline of sociology. As such, it has generally failed to attract the kind of career-long commitments common to more central areas of the discipline. Many scholars writing on the sociology of literature see the area as a sideline and produce only a single book or article on the subject. This has exacerbated the lack of structure in the development of the field. Even so, it is surprising just how much sociological research has been done on literature and on literature’s relationship to social patterns and processes.

Traditionally, the central perspective for sociologists studying literature has been the use of literature as information about society. To a much lesser degree, traditional work has focused on the effect of literature in shaping and creating social action. The former approach, the idea that literature can be “read” as information about social behavior and values, is generally referred to as reflection theory. Literary texts have been variously described as reflecting the “economics, family relationships, climate and landscapes, attitudes, morals, races, social classes, political events, wars, [and] religion” of the society that produced the texts (Albrecht 1954, p. 426). Most people are familiar with an at least implicit reflection perspective from journalistic social commentary. For instance, when Time magazine put the star of the television show Ally McBeal on its cover, asking “Is Feminism Dead?” (1998), it assumed that a television show could be read as information on Americans’ values and understanding of feminism.

Unfortunately, ‘reflection’ is a metaphor, not a theory. The basic idea behind reflection, that the social context of a cultural work affects the cultural work, is obvious and fundamental to a sociological study of literature. But the metaphor of reflection is misleading. Reflection assumes a simple mimetic theory of literature in which literary works transparently and unproblematically document the social world for the reader. In fact, however, literature is a construct of language; its experience is symbolic and mediating rather than direct. Literary realism in particular ‘effaces its own status as a sign’ (Eagleton 1983, p. 136; see also Candido [1995, p. 149] on the ‘liberty’ of even naturalist authors). Literature draws on the social world, but it does so selectively, magnifying some aspects of reality, misspecifying others, and ignoring most (Desan et al. 1989). The reflection metaphor assumes a single and stable meaning for literary texts. Anyone who has ever argued about what a book ‘really’ meant knows what researchers have worked hard to demonstrate—textual meaning is contingent, created by active readers with their own expectations and life experiences that act in concert with inherent textual features to produce variable meanings (Jauss 1982; Radway 1984; Griswold 1987).

Despite repeated demonstrations of reflection’s myriad failings (e.g., Noble 1976; Griswold 1994; Corse 1997), the idea of literature as a mirror of society still seems a fundamental way of thinking about why sociologists—and indeed many other people as well—are interested in literature. A relatively crude reflection approach remains common for teaching sociology department courses on literature, and also in certain types of journal articles whose main interest is not the sociology of literature per se, but the illumination of some sociological theory or observation through literary ‘evidence’ (e.g., Corbett’s article [1994] advocating the use of novels featuring probation officers to teach courses on the sociology of occupations, or the continuing stream of articles examining gender portrayals in children’s literature [e.g., Grauerholz and Pescosolido 1989]). Convincing research arguing for literary evidence of social patterns now requires the careful specification of how and why certain social patterns are incorporated in literature while others are not (e.g., Lamont 1995), thorough attention to comparative data across either place or time (e.g., Long 1985), and a detailed consideration of the processes that transform the social into the literary (e.g., Corse 1997).

A more sophisticated but still problematic type of reflection argues that it is the form or structure of literary works rather than their content that incorporates the social: ‘successful

works . . . are those in which the form exemplifies the nature of the social phenomenon that furnishes the matter of the fiction” (Candido 1995, p. xiii). The “humanist” Marxist Georg Lukács is perhaps the seminal figure in the development of a Marxist literary sociology. Marxism is the only one of the three major strands of classical theory to have generated a significant body of work on literature. Lukács (1971) argued that it is not the content of literary works but the categories of thought within them that reflect the author’s social world.

Goldmann (1964, 1970), Lukács’s most prominent student and the one most influential for American sociology, proposed the concept of a homologous relationship between the inherent structure of literary works and the key structures of the social context of the author. Goldmann justified his focus on the canonical works he studied by arguing that lesser works fail to achieve the necessary clarity of structure that allows the sociologist to see the homologies present in works by, for example, Racine and Pascal (1964). In the 1960s Louis Althusser challenged the preeminence of Lukács’s tradition through, in part, his emphasis on the autonomy of literature. Thus Goldmann’s work, though it was influential at the time of its publication, has been eclipsed as newer theories have made more problematic the notion that literature embodies a single meaning that is reducible to an expression of class consciousness.

Traditionally in the United States sociologists have left the study of high culture to specialists in literature, art, and music. This attitude was partially a product of sociologists’ discomfort with aesthetic evaluation. Popular culture, on the other hand, was seen as simply unworthy of attention or study. To the extent that sociologists did consider literature, they tended to focus on high-culture literature, in part because of the largely Marxist orientation of many early sociologists of literature. Marxist thought defines literature as part of the ideological superstructure within which the literatures of elites are the ruling ideas since culture serves to legitimate the interests of the ruling class.

The tendency to concentrate on high-culture literature was intensified by the Frankfurt School, which understood “mass” culture as a destructive force, imposed on a passive audience by the machinery of a capitalist culture “industry” (e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). Lowenthal’s ([1961] 1968) analysis of popular magazine biography, for example, stressed the increasing focus on leisure time consumption over production and on personality over business

and political achievement, as the private lives of movie stars and sports figures came to dominate magazine biographies. This approach highlighted the passivity and docility of audiences, tying mass culture to the increasing apathy of the public. Thus this work saw literature both as a reflection of changing social patterns and as a force shaping those patterns. Although researchers now rarely use the term “mass” culture, the Frankfurt School’s critique continues to inform much of current cultural sociology, although often it does so on an implicit level as researchers react either positively or negatively to this understanding of popular culture.

One response to the critique of mass culture was articulated by the scholars of the Birmingham School. This line of research shared earlier understandings of culture as a resource for the powerful, but focused in large part on the potential for active participation on the part of cultural receivers. Work in the Birmingham School tradition drew heavily on feminist approaches and demonstrated how “mass” audiences of popular cultural forms might engage in resistance, undermining earlier arguments of cultural hegemony and of passive cultural “dopes” (e.g., Hall et al. 1980; Hebdige 1979). This interest in resistance and the meaning making activity of readers remains an important line of research, particularly for studies of popular culture (e.g., Radway 1984). The continued relevance of the distinction between high and popular culture, however, is now under debate, as some charge that the hierarchical dichotomy is no longer the most powerful conceptualization of cultural differences (e.g., Crane 1992; DiMaggio 1987).

2.2 Sociology through Literature

A final type of traditional sociological interest in literature also stems from an implicit reflectionist approach. This type of work sees literature as exemplary of sociological concepts and theories or uses literature simply as a type of data like any other. While Coser’s (1972) anthology exemplifies the former tradition, the recent ASA publication *Teaching Sociology with Fiction* demonstrates the persistence of the genre. Examples of the latter are altogether too numerous, including, for example, an article testing recent Afrocentric and feminist claims of differing epistemological stances across genders and races by coding differences in the grounding of knowledge in novels for adolescent readers (Clark and Morris 1995). Such work ignores ignoring the mediated nature of literary “reality.” These discussions, although common, are not properly part of the sociology of literature.

2.3 Sociological Advances

The 1980s saw the institutionalization of sociological studies of cultural objects and processes as most prominently indicated by the establishment of the Culture Section of the American Sociological Association (ASA)—now one of the largest sections of the ASA with over one thousand members. This groundswell of interest in culture did not produce an equally large increase in interest in the sociology of literature, but it certainly created a more favorable climate for such work, as well as reenergizing research within the field.

Wendy Griswold is the key figure in the contemporary sociological study of literature in the United States. Her early research (1981, 1983, 1987) set the stage for a new synthesis that both takes seriously the issue of literary meaning and recognizes the importance of extra textual variables, while deploying the empirical data demanded by much of the discipline. By balancing these often-competing claims, Griswold allows for a study of literature that is sociological in the deepest sense of the word. Her concern for what she has called a “provisional, provincial positivism” (1990, p. 1580) has legitimated the sociology of literature to other sociologists and has articulated to non sociologists the unique power of literary sociology. By publishing repeatedly in *American Journal of Sociology* and in *American Sociological Review*, Griswold made the sociology of literature visible to an extent previously unknown.

Griswold’s work (1981) began with a critique of reflection theory’s exclusive focus on “deep” meaning, demonstrating the importance of production variables such as copyright legislation for explaining the diversity of books available in a market. A second project (1983, 1986) investigated the determinants of cultural revival, arguing that Elizabethan plays are revived most frequently when the social conditions of the day resonate with those the plays originally addressed. In 1987, Griswold published the results of a third project centrally located in the new reception of culture approach. This innovative work used published reviews as data on reception, thus allowing Griswold (1987) to address reception across time and across three very diverse audiences—an impossible strategy in the first instance and a prohibitively expensive strategy in the second when using interviews to gather data on audience interpretation. The 1990s saw Griswold (1992) beginning a large-scale project on the literary world of Nigeria, a project that returned Griswold to her initial interest in nationalism and literature among other

concerns. Griswold's impact on the sociology of literature has been powerful because she has systematically developed a methodological approach to studying literature and other cultural products and because her substantive research integrates a concern for meaning and the unique properties inherent in literary texts with an equal interest in social context, in the actors, institutions, and social behaviors surrounding texts.

Griswold's concern for the integration of literary content with social context is shared by many. Janet Wolff, although she works primarily in visual arts rather than literature, has repeatedly challenged sociological students of culture to take content and aesthetics seriously, allying these concerns with their traditional specialty in social context and history (e.g., 1992; see also Becker in Candido 1995, p. xi). Priscilla Parkhurst Clark/Ferguson (e.g., 1987) has written extensively on the literary culture of France, combining a study of specific works and authors with detailed analyses of literary institutions and social processes, in addition to her normative writings on improving the sociology of literature (1982). Corse (1995, 1997) combines a detailed reading of three types of American and Canadian novels with a historical consideration of the two nations' canon development and a survey of the respective publishing industries to create a full picture of cross-national literary patterns and the explanation thereof. These works draw upon several important new approaches developed in the last twenty years.

2.4 The Production of Culture

The production of culture approach was the earliest of the new paradigms reinvigorating the study of culture in sociology. It stemmed from the growing interest of several prominent organizational sociologists in the sociology of culture (e.g., Hirsch 1972; Peterson 1976). These scholars made the now obvious insight that cultural objects are produced and distributed within a particular set of organizational and institutional arrangements, and that these arrangements mediate between author and audience and influence both the range of cultural products available and their content. Such arguments stand in stark contrast to earlier non sociological conceptions of artistic production that featured artists as romantic loners and inspired geniuses with few ties to the social world. Art, in this view, is the product of a single artist and the content of artistic works and the range of works available are explained by individual artistic vision. Becker's influential *Art Worlds* (1982) effectively refuted such individualistic conceptions of cultural

producers, at least in sociological research. Researchers in the production of culture tradition have showed conclusively that even the most antisocial artistic hermits work within an art world that provides the artistic conventions that allow readers to decode the work. Artists are free to modify or even reject these conventions, but the conventions are a crucial component of the work's context. Art worlds also provide the materials, support personnel, and payment systems artists rely upon to create their works.

The social organization of the literary world and the publishing industry became obvious focuses for sociological investigations, from the production-of-culture approach. Walter W. Powell initiated a major research project with his dissertation, which was followed by his work on *Books: The Culture and Commerce of Publishing* (Cosser et al. 1982) and *Getting into Print* (Powell 1985). This stream of research demonstrates how production variables, such as the degree of competition in the publishing industry, the web of social interactions underlying decisions about publication, and the fundamental embeddedness of publishing in particular historical and social circumstances, affect the diversity of books available to the public.

Peterson (1985) outlines six production factors constraining the publishing industry. Berezin (1991) demonstrates how the Italian fascist regime under Mussolini shaped the theatre through bureaucratic production. Long (1986) situates the concern with economic concentration in the publishing industry in a historical perspective, and argues that a simple relationship between concentration and "massification" is insufficient for understanding contemporary publishing. Similarly, although as part of larger projects, Radway (1984), Long (1985), and Corse (1997) analyze the publishing industry and its changes as a backdrop for an understanding of particular literary characteristics. Radway traces the rise of mass-market paperbacks and the marketing of formulaic fiction to help explain the success of the romance genre (1984; chapter 1). Long (1985; chapter 2) acknowledges the importance of post World War II changes in the publishing houses and authorial demographics in her analysis of the changing visions of success enshrined in best-selling novels, although she grants primary explanatory power to changes in the broader social context. Corse (1997, chapter 6) provides a cross-national study of Canada and the United States, arguing that the publishing industry in the latter dominates the former because of market size and population density. Canada's publishing industry has become largely a distributive arm of the American publishing industry, despite governmental subsidies and other

attempts to bolster Canadian publishing. The result is that American novels dominate the Canadian market (Corse 1997, pp. 145–154).

One important focus of production approaches is gender. Tuchman (1989) analyzes the movement of male authors into the previously female dominated field of British novel publishing during the late 1800s as the field became increasingly remunerative. Rogers (1991), in her ambitious attempt at establishing a phenomenology of literary sociology, notes the gendered construction of both writers and readers. Rosengren's (1983) network analysis of authorial references in book reviewing demonstrates, among other suggestive findings, the persistence of the literary system's under representation of female authors.

2.5 Reception Theory and The Focus on Audience

A second fundamental shift in the sociology of literature occurred as sociologists became familiar with the work of German reception theorists. Reception theory, and several other strains of similar work, shifted scholarly attention to the interaction of text and reader. The central figures in Germany in the late 1960s and 1970s were Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser. In *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception* (1982) Jauss presents his main argument: that literature can be understood only as a dialectical process of production and reception in which equal weight is given to the text and the reader. Iser's (1978) central focus is the act of reading itself.

Janice Radway's (1984) seminal *Reading the Romance* introduced reception theory with its central interest in audience interpretation to many American sociologists, as well as to many scholars in related fields. To those already familiar with the work of reception theorists, Radway's work powerfully demonstrated the potential of reception approaches for the sociology of literature. Radway's interviews with "ordinary" readers of genre romance novels (1984) uncovered multiple interpretations, instances of resistance, and fundamental insights into literary use and gender in a genre previously scorned as unworthy of serious scholarly attention.

Reception theory has generated a fruitful line of research in the sociology of literature. Long (1987) has examined women's reading groups and their acceptance or rejection of traditional cultural authority in the selection and interpretation of book choices. Howard and Allen (1990) compare the interpretations made by male and female readers of two short stories in

an attempt to understand how gender affects reception. Although they find few interpretive differences based solely on gender, they find numerous differences based on “life experience” and argue that gender affects interpretation indirectly through the “pervasive gender-markings of social context” (1990, p. 549). DeVault (1990) compares professional readings to her own reading of a Nadine Gordimer novel to demonstrate both the collective and the gendered nature of reception. Lichterman (1992) interviewed readers of self-help books to understand how such books are used as what he describes as a “thin culture” that helps readers with their personal lives without requiring any deep personal commitment to the book’s advice.

Griswold (1987) innovatively applied the reception perspective to a study of the cross-national range of published reviews of a single author, generating another fruitful line of research. Bayma and Fine (1996) analyze 1950s reviews of Vladimir Nabokov’s *Lolita* to demonstrate how cultural stereotypes of the time constructed reviewers’ understandings of the novel’s protagonist. Corse and Griffin (1997) analyze the history of reception of Zora Neale Hurston’s *Their Eyes Were Watching God*, analyzing the different positionings of the novel over time and detailing how various “interpretive strategies” available to critics construct the novel as more or less powerful.

One final area of growth centers on the relationship between cultural products and stratification systems. Perhaps the central figure is Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1993), whose analyses of class-based differences in taste, concepts of cultural capital and habitus, and examination of the distinction between the fields of “restricted” and “large-scale” production have profoundly affected sociological thinking. Bourdieu (1984) has demonstrated how constructed differences in capacities for aesthetic judgment help reproduce the class structure. This fundamentally affects the conditions under which types of culture are produced, interpreted, and evaluated (1993). Bourdieu’s theoretical insights have inspired many researchers, although few work in literary sociology directly. For example, Corse (1997) examined the use of high-culture literature in elite programs of nation building, Halle (1992) investigated class variations in the display of artistic genres in the home, and DiMaggio and Mohr (1985) correlated cultural capital and marital selection. Cultural consumption and use are also stratified across categories other than class, for example, gender, race, and ethnicity. These categories have received even less attention than

class in the sociology of literature, although some work has been done in gender (e.g., Simonds and Rothman 1992; Wolff 1990; Radway 1984).

Bourdieu, among others, has also highlighted the need for sociological understanding of aesthetic evaluation as a social process and for a recognition of the contested nature of the cultural authority manifested in aesthetic judgments (e.g., DiMaggio 1991). Although this is not a new point (e.g., Noble 1976), sociology is finally coming to terms with literary evaluations and the codified hierarchy of value as objects of sociological attention (Lamont 1987; Corse and Griffin 1997; Corse 1997).

Obviously much of the material discussed so far is international, primarily European, in origin. European social theory has always been part of American sociology—the “fathers” of sociology are, after all, European—but there are cycles of more and less cross fertilization. Historically, European sociologists certainly evinced greater interest in the sociology of literature than did their American counterparts; an example is the ongoing series of articles in *The British Journal of Sociology* debating the state of literary sociology (e.g., Noble 1976). The reasons for European sociology’s greater interest in the sociology of literature are several: the relatively greater influence of Marxist and neo-Marxist traditions; methodological differences that legitimate qualitative and hermeneutic traditions; and the tighter link between sociology and the humanities compared to the “science-envy” and concomitant embrace of positivism characterizing much of American sociology.

These historical differences have at least residual remains. Marxist and hermeneutic approaches and methods more reminiscent of the humanities are still more prevalent in Europe. For example, there is greater acceptance of work looking at a single novel, an approach rarely seen in American sociology (e.g., Wahlforss’s 1989 discussion of the success of a best-selling Finnish love story). Differences have decreased, however, primarily from the American embrace of European theories and methods rather than from the opposite movement.

One important group in the sociology of literature also proves a major exception to the historic differences in method between American and European sociologies of literature. The Marketing and Sociology of Books Group at Tilburg University in the Netherlands specializes in

an institutional approach to understanding “the functioning of literary and cultural institutions . . . [and] the various aspects of consumer behavior towards books and literary magazines” (Verdaasdonk and van Rees 1991, p. 421; see also, for example, Janssen 1997). The group includes Cees van Rees, editor of the journal *Poetics*, which lives up to its subtitle—*Journal of Empirical Research on Literature, the Media and the Arts*. The International Association for the Empirical Study of Literature (IGEL) sponsors an annual conference concentrating on such work (see Ibsch et al. 1995).

The sociology of literature has implications for wider social issues. In the debate over the opening of the canon—the question of what should be considered “great literature” and therefore required in school—people on both sides assume that reading X is different in some important way than reading Y. If not, it wouldn’t matter what was taught. Sociology of literature illuminates the process of canon formation helping to explain why certain books are canonized rather than others (Corse 1997; Corse and Griffin 1997); it sheds analytic light on processes of cultural authority detailing who gets cultural power and how (DiMaggio 1991); and it elucidates the meaning-making activities of readers, showing what different audiences draw from particular texts (Griswold 1987). Sociological studies can help explain why people read, what they make of their reading, and how reading affects their lives. The relevance of literary sociology to the canon debates and its foundational arguments regarding the importance of extra literary processes and structures can be seen in the increasing interest scholars outside sociology are showing in sociological variables and studies of literature (e.g., Tompkins 1985; Lauter 1991).

Similarly, many of the same questions of interest to sociologists of literature inform debates on media effects, debates such as whether watching cartoon violence causes children to act violently. This debate—and similar ones about the danger of rap music lyrics or the value of reading William Bennett’s *Book of Virtues* rather than cyberpunk or social fears about Internet chat rooms—centers on the core question of what effect art and culture have on their audiences. Radway (1984), for example, asks whether reading romance novels teaches women to expect fulfillment only through patriarchal marriage—and demonstrates that the answer is a qualified yes. Corse (1997) argues that reading canonical novels is used to help construct national identities and feelings of solidarity among disparate readers. Griswold (1992) shows how the “village novel” establishes a powerful yet historically suspect sense of Nigerian identity. The

question of the effect of reading—and the related question of literary use—is central to a complete sociology of literature. Although recent developments have moved us closer to answers, these are the key questions the sociology of literature needs to answer in the future.

Interest in the relationship between literature and society is hardly a new phenomenon. We still read and refer to the ancient Greeks in this regard. In *The Republic*, for example, Plato presages both Mme. de Stael's treatise of 1800, which was the first to discuss cross-national differences in literature, and later notions of literary reflection with his idea of imitation. What is new, however, is the relative legitimacy of the study of literature within the discipline of sociology. This is due both to the increasing interest in culture in sociology after years of marginalization (Calhoun 1989) and to the increasing influence of cultural studies on sociology and throughout the academy.

A broader interest in and acceptance of cultural sociology has meant that the types of research questions and methods common to sociological studies of literature are now more widely accepted within the field. Sociology has extended its methodological boundaries in response to both attacks on the dominance of positivism and the rising power of alternative stances suggested by postmodernism. At the same time, changes in the goals, and sometimes the methods, of studying literature sociologically have moved the area closer to what is still the mainstream of the discipline. Thus the sociology of literature has benefited from a twofold movement in which (1) sociology as a discipline has become more interested in and accepting of research questions pertaining to meaning (cf. Wuthnow 1987, however, for a particularly strong attack on meaning from within the culture camp) and employing qualitative methods; and (2) the sociology of literature has evolved in the direction of more mainstream sociological areas through the merging of quantitative with qualitative methods and of empirical with hermeneutic research questions.

.The sociology of literature is a specialized area of study which focuses its attention upon the relation between a literary work and the social structure in which it is created. It reveals that the existence of a literary creation has the determined social situations. As there is a reciprocal relationship between a literary phenomena and social structure, sociological study of literature proves very useful to understand the socio-economic situations, political issues, the world view

and creativity of the writers, the system of the social and political organizations, the relations between certain thoughts and cultural configurations in which they occur and determinants of a literary work. The sociology of literature consists of the nature and scope of sociology and its relationship with literature, the historical development of the sociology literature, the nature of the sociology of literature, its theoretical approaches and methods and the areas and determinants of literature.

2.6 The Nature and Scope of Sociology and Its Relationship with Literature

While introducing the theoretical premises of the sociology of literature, it is felt necessary to discuss the nature and scope of both sociology and literature. Generally, 'sociology' is defined as the scientific study of society, more specifically human society. As the major concern of sociology is society, it is popularly known as the 'science of society' (Shankar Rao 17). Like all other social sciences, it is concerned with the life and activities of man. It also examines the origin, structure, development and functions of human society, scientifically. It also tries to determine the relationship between different elements of social life and discovers the fundamental conditions of social stability and social change. It analyses the influences of economic, political, cultural, artistic, aesthetic, geographical, scientific and other forces and factors on man and his life and throws more light on the various social problems like poverty, education, social class, religion, and others.

Taking into account of all these aspects Alan Swingewood states: "Sociology is essentially the scientific, objective study of man in society, the study of social institutions and of social processes; it seeks to answer the question how society is possible, how it works, why it persists"(1972:11). He further points out that the social structure is constituted through the rigorous examination of the social, political, religious and economic institutions in the society. Lucien Goldman also admits: "sociology is a science based on an aggregation of categories forming an intellectual structure, then these categories and this structure are themselves social facts that sociology brings in to relief" (qtd. in Boelhower 55). In the New Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary sociology is defined as 'a study of human, especially civilized, society; study of social problems, especially with a view to solving them'. Etymologically, the term 'sociology' is derived from the Latin word 'socius' meaning companion or associate and the Greek word

'logos' or 'ology' meaning study or science. According to H. K. Rawat "literally, sociology is the study of companionship, meaning social interaction and its resultant relationship that exists between companions or groups of human beings" Moreover, this view does not make clear the nature of sociology, because the other disciplines such as; anthropology, political science, psychology and economics study society scientifically, focusing its various factors and features. In the same way, the different social thinkers have defined 'sociology' in diverse ways. As a result, the questions such as; 'what is sociology, what is the nature of sociology, what is the function of sociology, what is the relationship between sociology and literature are not answered precisely and comprehensively. For the comprehensive understanding of the nature of sociology, the following definitions of sociology given in H. K. Rawat's Sociology-Basic Concepts(2007) would prove useful and helpful:

1. One of the earliest dictionaries of sociology, edited by H. P. Fairchild (1955), defined sociology as; "the study of the relationships between man and his human environment" (Rawat 3).
2. According to the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (1994), "sociology is the analysis of the structure of social relationships as constituted by social interaction"(4).
3. H. M. Johnson writes: "Sociology is the science that deals with social groups, their internal forms or modes of organizations, the processes that tend to maintain or change these forms of organization and relation between groups" (5).
4. The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology edited by Johnson defined Sociology as; "the study of social life and behaviour, especially in relation to social system, how they work, how they change, the consequences they produce and their complex relation to people's lives"(4).
5. P. A. Sorokin defines: "Sociology is a generalizing science of socio-cultural phenomena viewed in their genetic forms and manifold interconnections" (8).

All the above definitions emphasize that 'sociology' is the scientific study of man and his society, social actions and interactions, social institutions and processes, and the structure and system of society. Sociology is really a long discourse about human society that seeks to answer the questions such as; how society is possible, how it works and why it persists. In fact, the structure of specific society emerges through the rigorous examination of economic, political,

cultural, religious, academic, familial and other social institutions. Man as a social being is conditioned by these social institutions and accepts his respective social role in this social structure. Therefore Emile Durkheim defines sociology as “the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (45).

Sociology as an independent discipline of social science emerged only around the middle of the eighteenth century. Prior to the middle of the eighteenth century, the study of society was dominated by social philosophers rather than social scientists. However, August Comte (1798-1857), a French philosopher, made a systematic attempt to establish ‘sociology’ as the scientific study of society. He introduced the word ‘sociology’ for the first time in his work *Positive Philosophy* (1839) and defined it as the science of social phenomena. Sociology is thus the investigation of the action and reaction of various parts of the social system. Comte concentrated his efforts to determine the nature of human society and the principles underlying its growth and development. In short, Comte gave sociology its name and laid its foundation as “an identical branch of social science” (qtd. in Swingewood, 1972: 40-44). Like Comte, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) contributed a great deal to the establishment of sociology as a systematic discipline. In his *Principles of Sociology* (1877), Spencer explained the major fields of sociology and laid emphasis on the sociological study of community, family, social control, politics and industry. He also mentioned the sociological study of art and aesthetics. His emphasis is mainly on the inter-relations of the different elements and factors of the society.

Karl Marx (1818 -1883), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920) also contributed to the establishment of sociology as a systematic and scientific discipline. Karl Marx placed his emphasis on the economic base of society. According to him, economic base influences the general character of all other aspects of culture and social structure. Emile Durkheim analyzed social life in terms of social facts and claimed that social facts are nothing but collective ways of thinking and feeling about society. For Max Weber, the individual is the base unit of society. He devoted much of his efforts to expound a special method called the method of understanding (*verstehen*) for the study of social phenomena. In addition to these founding fathers, a large number of modern sociologists and thinkers contribute significantly to explain the nature of sociology. Besides these thinkers, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and the intellectual ideologies such as individualism, socialism, positivism, humanitarianism, colonialism, and the growth and developments in modern natural sciences

contribute to the emergence of 'sociology'. However, the credit for establishing sociology as an independent discipline goes to August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber who took a leading role in making sociology a scientific discipline of social science. Therefore, sociology is defined as 'the scientific study of human society' (Rawat 17).

Sociology as the science of social relations studies the society and gets its subject matter from different sources, literature being one of them. As a social product, literature reflects human society, the human relation and the world in which we live, interact and move. Literature like sociology, critically examines the realistic picture of human life. So it has been called as the mirror and controller of the society. Sociology tries to study the literary facts and their impact on social relations. So the sociologists such as M. C. Albrecht, Rene Wellek, and others agree with the argument that literature is an institution, and sociology is the study of this institution. Today, sociology is firmly established as a distinctive discipline. Unlike other social sciences, it is interested in almost all aspects of man's social life. The new generation of thinkers and scholars has invented new concepts and methods of sociological research. As a result, we get new branches of sociology. Sociology of literature which studies literature for understanding society and its forces is one of them.

Like sociology, literature too is pre-eminently concerned with man's social world, his adaptation to it and his desire to change it. In fact, man and his society is the material out of which literature is constructed. So, literature is regarded as the expression or representation of human life through the medium of social creation viz. language (Wellek 94). In the words of W. H. Hudson, "literature is a vital record of what men have seen in life, what they have experienced of it, what they have thought and felt about those aspects of it which have the most immediate and enduring interest for all of us. It is thus fundamentally an expression of life through the medium of language" (10). In short, literature grows out of life, reacts upon life, and is fed by life.

The society and individuals are the materials of literature. The outer world gets transformed within author's mind and heart and these transformed elements become reality in literature and a source of our pleasure. However, it is hardly possible to define literature precisely because the different critics and scholars from Plato down to the present age have defined literature diversely. These diverse views state different theories of literature.

In *Theory of Literature*, Wellek and Warren attempt to focus the several ways of defining literature and finally come to the conclusion that the nature of literature can be understood through the particular use of literary or connotative language. They define literature as the reproduction of life. While defining the nature of literature they remark: "Literature is a social institution, using as its medium language, a social creation . . . literature represents life; and 'life' is, in large measure, a social reality, even though natural world and inner or subjective world of the individual have also been objects of literary imitation" (94). One of the major problems related to literature is its relation with society.

To New Critics, the inner structure of literature is more important than the social structure. They are very hostile to biographical and sociological approach to the study of literature. However, some other modern critics and sociologists have made attempts to explain the correlation between sociology and literature. Men of learning in different countries of the world have talked a lot either in favor or against this issue, but majority of the critics and scholars believe in the reciprocal relationship between literature and society. According to them literature and society are always dependent on each other. The most important reason of this interdependent relationship is that literature is the social institution and it uses the medium of language, a social creation. It depicts life and life is a social reality. In the words of Hudson, "literature grows directly out of life is of course to say that it is in life itself that we have to seek the sources of literature, or, in other words, impulses which have given birth to the various forms of literary expression" (10).

In short, the base of both sociology and literature is alike and their stability is conditioned by the major social institutions. The changes in the form and content of literature are caused by the changes in the society and the society changes due to the current of fresh and new ideas provided by literary works. The sociology of literature studies this correlation between literature and sociology. There are different norms of behavior in different societies and they are reflected in their respective literature. This reflection shows the reciprocal relationship between literature and society. Literature, in fact, is a social phenomena and it differs from one social system to another because social institutions and forces directly influence literary works.

Every society has its own characteristic structure having norms of behavior, values, ideas, and problems. These norms provide different ideas, themes, symbols, images and other aspects of literature. Therefore, a literary work of one country differs from that of other countries. The

root cause of this difference is the impact of the particular social structure. The great literary works contain social, political, environmental, religious, economic and domestic values of the day.

The form and style of literature change with the changes in the temper of the age and society. So literature is regarded as the expression of society. The relationship between literature and society is a two way. It influences society and gets influenced by the society. For instance, the society provides the raw material to the writers, but the same type of raw material does not produce the same type of literary works. In fact, the nature of literary form and style depends upon the worldview and creativity of the writer.

The geographical environment and scientific developments also, in some way, influence literature and determine its shape and character. The geographical environment provides images while scientific inventions provide new thoughts and ideas to literature. The modern scientific inventions have enormously changed the entire social structure and brought about new trends in literature. The twentieth century novel has reflected these changes in cultural practices in society. For instance, the renaissance movement brought humanistic trend in literature where as the industrial revolution in modern age has made literature more inclined towards materialism. As the literary work is the result of the entire social structure and social forces, it can not be excluded from society. Therefore, any attempt to analyze and interpret literature excluding society and life will not give justice to literary works.

The relationship between literature and society has been very close and inseparable from the very beginning. So far as the history of literature is concerned, it is found that the earlier literature was mainly concerned with the conflict between right and wrong or virtue and vice. In fact, god or virtue was at the centre in the literary works of the past. However, such virtue centered literature got changed in later half of the eighteenth century. The place of god or goodness was taken by man and his environment in the romantic age and its credit goes to the French Revolution. With the rise of capitalism and industrialism the place of man was again replaced by the 'base' and 'superstructure'. The contemporary literature has become more reader centered and the emphasis is laid upon economic, material and environmental conditions of man.

Previously, it was believed that the philosophical doctrines supply materials to literature but in the modern age it is considered as an account of the changes in the social structure caused by industrialism, capitalism, communism and totalitarianism. It has become more materialistic in

approach. It reveals human actions in the contexts of economic factors, especially on the mode of production. It also experiments with the surroundings on human mind. The early literature laid emphasis on ethics and believed in the needs of reforming society, but with the development of new scientific ideas, the shape of literature is changed by giving importance to man and his environment. As a result, social order is at the center in modern literature. Therefore its importance can not be ignored while judging literature.

Sociology and literature are quite distinct areas of research. However, at the most basic level, that of content, they share similar conspectus (Swingewood 1972: 11). In sociology, one gets the descriptive and scientific analysis of the entire social structure. As an integral part of the society, literature not only analyses society but also shows the ways in which men and women experience society as feeling. Thus, the novel as the major literary genre of industrial society can be seen as a faithful attempt to recreate the social world of man's relation with his family, with politics and with state. It also delineates man's roles within the family and the other institutions, the conflicts and tensions between groups and social classes. While explaining the reciprocal relationship between literature and society, Swingewood quotes Hoggard as; "without the full literary witness the students of society will be blind to the fullness of a society" (13). This view of Hoggard shows that literature and sociology are complement to each other. Sociology of literature emerged through this complementary relationship between literature and society. The literary critics and social thinkers have focused this complementary relationship in their respective critical works.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The sociology of literature has long and distinguished history. The several critics and scholars from Plato down to the present have discussed the different theories and methods of sociological approach to literature. They believed in the simple conviction that literature is a social product, and thoughts and feelings found in literature are conditioned and shaped by the cultural life created by the society. The early critics did not doubt the reciprocal relationship between literature and society. Plato, who started the discussion of the relationship between literature and society, raised some questions about social implications of literature. However, his concern was primarily for social hygiene. He thought that poetry could make man sentimental and impair his reason. But Aristotle's answer to Plato's objections established the sound ground for the sociological approach to literature.

During the eighteenth century, it became more sound and powerful with the emergence of novel. Accepting de Boland's Maxim that literature is 'an expression of society' the modern social critics and novelists considered the novel as the realistic picture of the society. Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy also extended the fact that literature can not be adequately understood without its cultural and social context. The romantic spirit of the nineteenth century rebelled against the classical aesthetics and paved a more favorable ground to sociological perception of literature. However, it was H. A. Taine who tried to systematize the sociological approach to literature in a scientific way. His History of English Literature (1886) is really the landmark in the history of the sociology of literature.

Karl Marx, Frederic Engels and their followers made the valuable contribution in sociological criticism. They looked at literature as economic infrastructure of society, and gave a new turn to sociology of literature. However, sociology of literature has gained its special place in the history of critical theory in the late twentieth century in the hands of Lucien Goldman, Leo Lowenthal, Robert Escarpit, Alan Swingwood, Diana Laurensen, John Hall and the several social thinkers and critics. The survey of the literary study shows diverse views and theories of literature and its function in society. In order to understand the theoretical perspectives of the sociology of literature, it is necessary to see the historical development of literature through the contribution of the major social critics.

J. C. Herder (1744-1803): Jonathan Herder, a German philosopher and critic, is best known for his contribution to the philosophy of history and culture. In his *Idea for Philosophy of History for Mankind* (1791), he displays ambivalence towards the goals of rationalism and enlightenment. According to him man, as a creature among creatures, plays out his unique destiny in proportion to the 'force' or 'power' resulting from the interaction between individual, institution and environment. He believed that certain social and geographical environment, race and customs, and cultural and political conditions in particular areas are responsible for the emergence and development of literature. His writing is a challenge to the ideas of Immanuel Kant who argues that a sense of beauty could result only from a purely disinterested judgment. He believes in social structure as the base of literature. Kant gives importance to aesthetic qualities of literature where as Herder gives importance to social aspects of literature. Alan Swingewood comments: "Herder argued that each work was rooted in a certain social and geographical environment where it performed specific functions and that there was no need for any judgment of value: everything is as it had to be" (26). In short, Herder's ideas about literature imply that there is the casual connection between literature and culture, race, customs and social institutions.

Madame de Stale (1766-1817): Madame de Stale, a French-Swiss writer and an early champion of women's rights, is considered as the first woman who contributed to infuse new ideas and methods into French literature. Like Herder, she relates literature to climate, geography and social institutions. She examines the influence of social and political institutions on literature.

James H. Bernet observes: The intellectual roots of the sociology of art are to be found in the number of the nineteenth century Europeans. Accounts of the beginning of the social interpretation of art invariably cite the writings of Madame de Stale, especially her *De la literature Considerée dans rapport avec les institutions sociale* (*On Literature Considered in its Relations with Social Institutions*). Published in 1800, this volume discusses the relation of race and climate to literary style and the effects of women and religion on art (621). According to M. C. Albrecht her book influenced the European writers to search for the relationships between art and society (ix). As a result the European scholars developed sociological approach much earlier than their counterparts in America.

Madame de Stale's concept of literature is somewhat broad. According to her, everything that involves the exercise of thought in writing is literature and it is characterized by climatic situations and national character. For example, the novel form does not get popularity in Italy because of its licentious nature and little respect for women. She believes that national character is the result of complex interactions between religious, legal and political institutions. In this context Swingewood writes: "Madame de Stale has an interesting observation here, arguing that the novel form could develop only in those societies where women's status was fairly high and when strong interest in the private life existed" (1972:27). Stale's works show positive sociological insight. Besides the awareness of the role of women, she grasps the importance of a strong middle class for the growth and development of literature. She thinks that both women and middle class produce virtue and liberty, the important pre-requisite of literature. To her literature is the expression of the national character which seems to mean simply 'the spirit of the time'. Her emphasis was mainly on climate and national character. Her ideas about the relation between literature and society are empirical. She wanted that literature should portray important changes in the social order, especially those that indicate movement toward the goals of liberty and justice. According to Barnett "She believed that the rising republican spirit in French politics should be reflected in literature by introducing the figures of citizens and peasants into serious works, such as tragedies, rather than relegating them to comedies (621).

Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893): Hippolyte Taine, who for the first time tried to provide a systematic formula of 'race, milieu and moment' to comprehend and analyze literature in the context of sociology of literature, is regarded as the father of the sociology of literature. He attempted to interpret literature in a rigorously scientific way by the application of his famous formula of 'race, milieu and moment'. His *History of English Literature* (1871) contains an awareness of the basic problems which face any literary sociology. The book begins with the expression: "A literary work was no mere individual play of imagination, the isolated caprice of an excited brain, but a transcript of contemporary manners, a manifestation of a certain kind of mind" (Vol.I:1). Taine regards literature not as the expression of personality, as explained by the romanticists, but the collective expression of society embodying the spirit of the age and formative factors behind the emergence of this expression are 'race, milieu and moment'. The interaction of this triad produces a speculative mental structure which leads to the development of the 'general ideas which find expression in great art and literature. So Alan Swingewood

states: "In the history of the sociology of literature Taine's is the first real theory, far more systematic than those of Madam de Stale and Herder, and constituting rather more than a collection of haphazard and random insight" (33). His method of studying the problems was naturalistic, empirical and rationalistic in its approach. His outlook to literature as the combination of 'race, milieu and moment' is systematic and scientific. He believes that literary works are the national monuments because they represent the consciousness of the society and the spirit of the age. In History of English literature, Taine remarks, "a work of art is determined by an aggregate which is the general state of mind and surrounding circumstances" (Vol. I: 30). Taine defines 'race' in terms of innate and hereditary characteristics and suggests that these characteristics are acquired from the soil, the food and the great events in the society. He calls these events as the original stock which the literature of the day faithfully reflects. By 'milieu' he means the totality of the surrounding, physical environment, social conditions, climatic situations and the like. The next element 'moment' is defined in terms of spirit of the time. There are certain dominant intellectual ideas in each and every age and they are reflected in literary works of the day. For instance, classical spirit was dominant in the age of Dryden and Pope where as the romantic spirit was dominant in the age of Wordsworth. Here the term 'moment' can also mean certain 'literary tradition' and the writers of the age make use of this literary tradition in their works. In order to explain Taine's concept of literature as a social document or national monument, Alan Swingewood says, "Taine wrote that a literary work was no mere individual play of imagination, the isolated caprice of excited brain, but a transcript of contemporary manners a manifestation of a certain kind of mind (32). While explaining Taine's views on the interaction of 'race, milieu and moment', Edward Henning quotes: A race is found which has received its character from the climate, the soil, the elements, and the great events which it underwent at its origin. This character has adapted it and reduced it to the cultivation of a certain spirit as well as to conception of a certain beauty. This is the national soil, very good for certain plants, but very bad for others, unable to bring to maturity the seeds of the neighboring country, but capable of giving its own exquisite sap and perfect efflorescence when the course of the centuries brings about the temperature which they need. Thus was born La Fontaine in France in the seventeenth century, Shakespeare in England Shakespeare in England during Renaissance, Goethe in the Germany of our day. For genius is nothing but a power developed and no power can develop completely, except in the country where it finds itself naturally and completely at

home, where education nourishes it, where examples make it strong, where character sustains it, where the public challenges it (354). Taine categorizes the novel as a portable mirror reflecting all aspects of life and nature. To him novel is the dominant genre of industrial society. His discussion of literature in the History of English literature makes it clear that he gives special importance to the 'milieu' that produces 'the state of mind' necessary for artistic creation. His Lectures on Art lays emphasis on the social conditions of the time. He believed in 'race milieu and moment' as the major determinants of literature. In this regard W. H. Hudson argues, "Taine's interest in reality was not in literature as literature but in literature as a social document in the history of national psychology" (39). Due to this noteworthy contribution, Taine is regarded as the father of the sociology of literature.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820- 1895): With the spread of the ideas of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, the sociological approach became a scientific method of literary interpretation. Taine argues literature as the expression of 'race, milieu and moment', but Marx and Engel view it as epiphenomenon of the social structure. They were more concerned with purely economic factors and the role played by the social class. They thought that the essence, the nature and function of art and literature could be understood by relating it to the prevailing social conditions and by analyzing the social system as the whole. Literature and art, as considered by them, are forms of social France in the seventeenth century, Shakespeare in England Shakespeare in England during Renaissance, Goethe in the Germany of our day. For genius is nothing but a power developed and no power can develop completely, except in the country where it finds itself naturally and completely at home, where education nourishes it, where examples make it strong, where character sustains it, where the public challenges it (354). Taine categorizes the novel as a portable mirror reflecting all aspects of life and nature. To him novel is the dominant genre of industrial society. His discussion of literature in the History of English literature makes it clear that he gives special importance to the 'milieu' that produces 'the state of mind' necessary for artistic creation. His Lectures on Art lays emphasis on the social conditions of the time. He believed in 'race milieu and moment' as the major determinants of literature. In this regard W. H. Hudson argues, "Taine's interest in reality was not in literature as literature but in literature as a social document in the history of national psychology" (39). Due to this noteworthy contribution, Taine is regarded as the father of the sociology of literature.

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a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (363). The influence of Marx and Engels on literature and literary criticism has been tremendous. The major contributions of these scholars in the field of the sociology of literature are: *On Literature and Art*, *Selected Works Vol. I*, *The German Ideology*, and *The Holy Family*. However, there is no fashioned theory of relations of literature with society but some hints or dogmas in their writings. Nevertheless, their followers tried to develop a theory. The scholars who tried to contribute the Marxist approach towards literature are Plekhanov, George Luckacs, Goldman, Terry Eagleton and others. These scholars contributed greatly in the development of the sociology of literature.

George Plekhanov: Plekhanov was highly influenced by Engels' notion of social mirror and the concept of type. His approach towards Marxists was remarkably eclectic. He argues that art figuratively expresses the feelings and ideas developed under the influence of surrounding. He thinks that literature is bound to the means of production and property but at the same time, he is aware of the aesthetic function of literature. Plekhanov introduces the notion of an inborn sense of beauty, which leads man to accept great art, and enjoy it for its own sake. In his *Art and Social Life* (1912), he constantly reiterates literature as the reflection of social life with his nonsocial aesthetic instinct. He argues: "Art has significance only when it depicts or evokes or conveys actions, emotions and events that are of significance to society" (108). Literature to Plekhanov is the reflection of the class struggle. So he remarks: "Cultural history is nothing but the reflection of the history of its classes and their struggle" (164). In order to explain his concept of reflection of the history he gave an example of the eighteenth century French drama. According to him, the French tragedy under Louis XIV stemmed from the demands of the courtly aristocracy introducing the characters from high social status and the dramatists who lacked the conventional dose of aristocratic superiority would never have won applause of the audience of the day, however great his talent. However, with the rise of bourgeois class at the end of the century a new dramatic model viz. 'sentimental comedy' in which an idealized man of the middle class was at the centre made its appearance became very popular among the audience of the day. Therefore, Plekhanov insists that the theatre is the direct expression of the class

struggle. Thus, his concept of literature is that all literature is class bound and great literature is incompatible with bourgeois dominance.

George Luckacs: The most prominent Marxist theoretician of literature after Plekhanov is George Luckacs. He accepts the Plekhanov's concept of literature as the reflection of class struggle. In *The Historical Novel* he writes: "The historical novel in its origin, development, rise and decline follows inevitably upon the great social transformations of modern times" (17). He argues that literature that implies socialist perspective is written from the point of view of a class. He criticizes a literary work which denies socialist perspective, according to him the writer who rejects socialism closes his eyes to the future, gives up any chance of assessing the present correctly, and loses the ability to create other than purely static works of art. (60). This loss of socialism/humanism leads literature to subjectivist outlook in which man depicted as alienated, isolated, and essentially morbid, lacking any meaningful relation with the social world. For example, in the works of Beckett, Joyce, and Proust man is portrayed as fragmented and partial. However, we get perspective of all-sides of man in the works of Balzac and Dickens. So Luckacs admires bourgeois realists or socialists perspective and admits that the great writers are those who, in their works, create 'lasting human types', the real criterion of literary achievement. He argues that the 'type' flows out of the artist's awareness of progressive change. It constitutes the totality of relations in flux (56-57). So like Engels, he insists that all literature must be measured by bourgeois realism. The major contributions of George Luckacs in the history of the sociology of literature are *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* (1963), *The Historical Novel*(1963), *Writer and Critic* (1970), *The Theory of the Novel* (1971), and *Studies in European realism* (1972).

Lucian Goldman: Goldman's contribution in the history of the sociology of literature lies in the introduction of dialectical materialism, the sophisticated method of linking art and society. He borrowed the concepts of 'totality' and 'world view' from Marxists, especially from Luckacs, and argued all great philosophical and literary works embody these concepts. The term 'totality' refers to the entire socio-historical process and offers a critical level of interpretation with respect to the ideological perspectives of plural subjects. 'World view' on the other hand, describes a particular group's projection of this totality as an effort to respond to the problems posed to it by other groups and by the natural environment. The concept of world view explains the documentary level of a literary work and, in doing so, distinguishes the particular task of any

aesthetics having sociological aspirations. It exists not only outside of the work of art, but becomes the very principles of its artistic structuration, and acts upon the reciprocal relations between its components and the global meaning of the artistic sign. In short, Goldman's approach towards the sociology of literature is highly idiosyncratic, fusing structural analysis with historical and dialectical materialism. Goldman evolved his theory of genetic structuralism to analyze literary works. According to genetic structuralism, the literary work is a constitutive element of social consciousness and is less related to the level of real consciousness of trans individual subjects. His essay "The Sociology of Literature: Status and Problems of Method" presents some observations of genetic structuralism. According to him, the first general observation on which genetic structuralist thought based is that 'all reflection on the human sciences is made not from without but from within society'. The second basic idea of genetic sociology is that human facts are responses of an individual or collective subject. He further points out that the essential relationship between the life of society and literary creation is not concerned with the content of these two sectors of human reality but only with the mental structures and those mental structures are not individual phenomena but social phenomena (493-495). Goldman's conception of the sociology of literature is concerned to structure created and transformed by human activity. To him structures were made through the 'praxis' of the human subject. This subject is nothing but a collective category of a social group that constitutes the true source of cultural creation. This collective subject is a significant structure. All major cultural forms embody a significant structure, a worldview that expresses the collective consciousness of a significant social group. The worldview unites the various elements and levels of a cultural form into unity and coherence. He thinks that since the artwork expresses the tendencies, actions and values of the collective subject, it bears a functional relation with it. Thus, to understand the totality of a literary work, it is necessary to explain its historical genesis. His major contributions in the field of the sociology of literature are: *The Hidden God* (1956), *Towards a Sociology of Novel* (1964), *The Sociology of Literature: Status and Problems of Method* (1967), *Cultural Creation in Modern Society* (1976), and *Method in the Sociology of Literature* (1981).

Leo Lowenthal (1900 –1993): Lowenthal was a German-Jewish sociologist usually associated with the Frankfurt School. He became a leading expert of the sociology of literature and mass culture after joining the Institute for Social Research in 1926. He, then, conducted seminar on the sociology of literature and wrote essays and books for the sociological study of

literature. The notable among them are: *Literature and the Image of Man* (1957) and *Literature, Popular Culture, and Society* (1961). In his introduction to *Literature and the Image of Man* he states: Creative literature conveys many levels of meaning, some intended by the author, some quite unintentional. An artist sets out to invent a plot, to describe action, to depict the interrelationships of characters, to emphasize certain values . . . The writer indeed develops believable characters and places them in situations involving interactions with others and with the society in which they live. It is the task of the sociologist of literature to relate the experience of the writer's imaginary characters and situations to the historical climate from which they derive. He has to transform the private equations of themes and stylistic means into social equations(X). James Barnet refers this book as the most stimulating contribution to the sociological study of literature. He further states that Lowenthal's study applies imagination to significant sociological problems and is concerned with the unique and value-relevant rather than with the repetitive and measurable aspects of this art form (629). Such a study is certainly beneficial to the sociologists who try to study novels of any writer. Lowenthal's most inspiring essay "sociology of Literature in Retrospect", published in *Critical Inquiry* throws light on the several aspects of the sociology of literature.

Robert Escarpit (1918 - 2000): Robert Escarpit was a man of many accomplishments comprising an academician, a renowned writer, a professor of comparative literature, a literary historian and a specialist in publishing. He wrote on a variety of topics but his major critical works on the sociology of literature is noteworthy. After the tremendous success of *The Sociology of Literature*, an intentionally provocative book, which exceeded 100,000 copies in France and which was translated into 23 languages, he was interviewed by John and Anne-Marie Deveze Lulan in July 1992. In this interview Robert Escarpit says: A little book I published in 1948 in Mexico, called *History of French Literature*, there is a paragraph in the preface called: the three dimensions of literature, where I say: we know very well, in literature there are writers (there is much talk of their biography), there are the works (there is much talk of works of course) and there is a third character that is never discussed is that the reader (Escarpit interview). Escarpit was of the opinion that the literary act is an act of communication. In order to study the problem of communication through writing the book and its role in communication, he was asked by Julian Behrstock the director of the 'UNESCO Book' to write a book called *The Book Revolution* (1965). This book also has a huge success. Since its publication the book is

translated into twenty languages. His major works in the field of the sociology of literature includes *A Handbook of English Literature* (1953), *The Sociology of Literature* (1958) and *The Book Revolution*(1965). Escarpit's major contribution in the sociology of literature is in production and consumption of literary works. In his famous essay "The Act of Publication: Publication and Creation", he points out the publication system that selects, prints and distributes literary creations is very essential for that the reward of the writer's efforts. By giving the history of the publication and the different roles played by the publishers he states: "Reduced to their material operations, publisher's functions can be summed up in three verbs: choose, manufacture and distribute" (1970:400). In his article "the sociology of literature" published in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* he explains that the sociological approach to literature is by no means an easy one. It conceives the concept of literature first as a socio cultural fact and not an aesthetic one. To the cultured mind the study of the writer as a professional man, of the literary work as a means of communication, and of the reader as a consumer of cultural goods is vaguely mocking. A true sociology of literature appeared only when literary critics and historians, starting from literature as a specific reality, tried to answer sociological questions by using current sociological methods. While explaining the sociology of reading he states that no sociology of literature is therefore possible without sociology of reading and of cultural consumption in general. Much has been done in that direction since Schucking's pioneer work on the sociology of literary taste.

Alan Swingewood is a lecturer in Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. In *Myth of Mass Culture* he points out: "The aristocratic theory of mass society is to be linked to the moral crisis caused by the weakening of traditional centers of authority such as family and religion" (5). Another book *Cultural Theory and the Problem of Modernity* (1998) gives a comprehensive account of different sociological theories of culture. In it he discusses in detail the concepts and theories of culture such as hegemony, force field and cultural materialism. His sociological approach to the study of literature is developed in the social and cultural context. In *The sociology of literature*, the most influential book written with Diana Laurenson, he presents the approaches and method of the sociology of literature. In its "Preface" he writes: "This book has been written in the hope that it may serve to introduce the idea of the sociology of literature both to those who believe that social science is simply the study of facts and to those for whom literature is a unique subjective experience which defies scientific

analysis” (vii). He also applies this theory to the works of Fielding, Sartre, Camus and George Orwell. His *Marx and Modern Social Theory* (1975) offers an account of the rise of sociological thought from its origins in the eighteenth century. It examines the paradigms of functionalism cultural theory and the problem of modernity, critical analysis of the relation between sociological theory and recent debates in cultural studies. In his *A Short History of Sociological Thought* (1984), Swingewood throws light on the several aspects and theories of sociology from its origin to the modern development.

Virtually all of the scholars who contributed to the collection of essays *Die Philosophie der Literaturwissenschaft* (The Philosophy of Literary Studies) are in agreement that a “scientific” approach to the history of literature would lead nowhere. Not only do they believe — and rightly so — that each literary work contains some non rational elements, they also consider any rational approach inadequate with regard to the very nature of the object under investigation. Consequently, the study of literature as it was founded in the nineteenth century is condemned and rejected as “historical pragmatism,” as “historicizing psychologism,” and as “positivistic method.” Certainly, Hermann Hettner’s or Wilhelm Scherer’s works lack absolute validity; indeed, they would never have claimed it. But all attempts to deal with literature which profess to a scholarly character have to draw critically on the scientific methods of the nineteenth century.

Isolation and simplification of a literary historical object is admittedly achieved in an exceedingly sublime process. Author and work become abstracted from the matrix of historical circumstances, and molded into a kind of predictable coalescence from which the diverse manifold of details and dimensions has been drained. Through this reification they acquire a dignity and worthiness which no other cultural phenomenon can boast. “In the history of literature acts and actors are ‘givens,’ whereas in world history we are presented with more or less falsified accounts of mostly shady dealings by rarely identifiable dealers.” True dignity is reserved only for such historical phenomena which are a manifestation of the mind, or may be perceived at least as existing in a unique domain. of course, only when an object of investigation is not considered part of inner and outer nature and its variable conditions, but instead has to be ontologically conceived as a creation of a higher kind, do positivistic methods prove fundamentally insufficient. With the confidence of a philosophical instinct, the concept of structure introduced by Dilthey, which was based on historical contextuality, is abandoned and replaced by the concept of the organic “that clearly, unambiguously and decisively characterizes

the spiritual as the individualization in history determined by unity of meaning." Ambiguous terms such as "work form," "content," proclaim a metaphysically grounded unity of author and work, transcending and negating all diversity. This radical estrangement from historical reality finds its purest expressions in concepts such as "classicism" and "romanticism" which are not only relegated to history, but also metaphysically transfigured. "Like the super ordinate concept of eternity, both the concept of perfection and of infinity are derived from historical and psychological experience as well as from philosophical knowledge."

This rigid and in itself irrational stance on the part of those representing literary scholarship today presumes its legitimation in the fact that the "methods of the natural sciences" analyze their object into bits and pieces, and when attempting to define its 'vital poetic soul," these methods cannot help but miss entirely its "secret." The significance of these statements is hard to grasp. For nobody has ever demonstrated why, and to what extent, an object would be harmed or distorted by a rational approach. Any study of a phenomenon can be mindful of its wholeness, its "Gestalt," while being conscious of a selective methodology. Admittedly, such an analysis will only yield the elements of a mosaic whose sum never represents the whole. But where on earth does scientific analysis exhaust itself in nothing but a summation of fractured parts? And are the methods of the natural sciences exclusively atomistic in nature? Certainly not, and neither do methods of literary analysis have to be, if they are inappropriate to a specific task. On their journey into the vagaries of metaphysics, the literary scholars also appropriated the concept of law. However, rather than to identify law with order and regularity which can be submitted to scrutiny and observation, the concept, from the start, is burdened with a troublesome new and vague meaning. Instead of the search for regularity there appears a "unity of meaning," and the "artistic personality" and the "poetic work" are identified, among others, as the major problems of literary studies, problems which seem to be resolved before they have been investigated. Yet, *personality* and work belong to those conceptual constructs which thwart any theoretical effort precisely because they are opaque and finite.

In as much as these fashionable literary scholars point to the pitfalls involved in seeking to understand the relationship of author and work through, for instance, mere philological data analysis, I have no quarrel with this anti positivistic attitude. But precisely when it comes to an evaluation of a work of art and its qualitative aspects, an understanding of its intrinsic merit and its authenticity — questions so much at the center of the concerns of these scholars — their

methods reveal their utter inadequacy. The question of whether and to what extent the literary artist consciously applies conventions of form, can only be explored by rational means. But the metaphysical mystification so prevalent in contemporary literary studies impedes any sober reflection and scholarship. Its tasks are not only historical in nature; I would like to refer to Dilthey's concept of *Verstehen* (understanding) and its particular emphasis on the relationship between the author and his work. Admittedly, the demystification of investigative approaches to literature cannot be achieved by means of a formal poetics alone. What is needed above all is a psychology of art, i.e. a study of the psychological interaction between artist, artistic creation and reception. What is not needed, however, is a psychology that places the "great work of art" in a mystical relationship "with the people," and that finds the "personal biography of the author . . . interesting and necessary, but unessential with regard to the act of artistic creation."

In contrast to the vague declamatory statements so characteristic of Jungian psychology, the classical Freudian model of psychoanalysis has already made important theoretical contributions to a psychology of art. Some of its proponents have discussed central questions of literature, particularly those dealing with the psychic conditions under which great works of art originate, specifically the origins and structure of artistic imagination, and last not least, the question of the relationship between the artistic work and its reception which so far has been ignored or at least insufficiently explored. Admittedly, some of these psychoanalytic propositions are not yet polished and refined enough and remain somewhat schematic. But to reject the assistance of scientific psychology in the study of art and literature does not provide protection from "a barbarian assault of conquerers," as one contemporary literary mandarin put it, but rather is a "barbarian" argument itself.

Coupled with the condemnation of "historicizing psychologism," which cannot explore the secret of the "authentic poetic soul," is the repudiation of accepted historical methodology and particularly of any theory of historical causality, in short, what in modern literary scholarship is anathematized as "positivistic materialism." But as in the case of psychology, the trend setters take liberties: modern literary scholarship has no qualms and even consistently makes use of grand historical categories such as "folk, society, humanity" or the "pluralistic, aspiring" and the "spiritualizing, articulating experience." There is mention of "associations of essence and fate," of "perfection and infinity" as "conceptual basis" of "historical experience"; while the phraseology of the "age of Homer, Pericles, Augustus, Dante, Goethe" is acceptable, any

historically and sociologically oriented theoretical approach will meet with scorn and contempt when it attempts to understand literature as a social phenomenon in combination with the positivistic and materialistic methods which evolved out of the historical scholarship of the nineteenth century. The bluntly stated objective is “the abandonment of the descriptive vantage point of positivism and the return to a commitment to the metaphysical character of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (humanities).” We shall see that such “abandonment” is demanded with even greater determination once the theory of historical materialism replaces traditional historical description. Even the boundary between scholarship and demagogery is obscured when the anti-historical transfiguration of a work of art has to be maintained: “Historical pragmatism may perhaps conclude that syphilis led to the disappearance of Minnesang and its polygamous convention, or that the currency reform of 1923 gave rise to Expressionism. ... The essence of Minnesang and Expressionism remains unaffected by such findings. The question here is not why is it but what is it? The ‘why’ would simply lead to an infinite regress: Why at the end of the Middle Ages was lues spread, why at the beginning of 1924 was the *Reichsmark* introduced, and so on until the egg of Leda.” This kind of rhetoric makes a caricature of any legitimate scholarly inquiry. By no means do causal questions require infinite regress; clearly stated they can be precisely answered, even if new questions might be posed by this answer. An investigation of the reasons for Goethe’s move to Weimar does not require an investigation of the history of urban development in Germany.

Considering the current situation of literary scholarship as sketched in the preceding outline, its precarious relationship to psychology, history, and social science, the arbitrariness in the selection of its categories, the artificial isolation and scientific alienation of its object, one might agree with a modern literary historian who, dissatisfied with the “metaphysicalization” that has invaded his discipline, calls for the return to strict scientific standards, a passionate devotion to material, a deep concern for pure knowledge; in short, a new “appreciation of knowledge and learning.” If Franz Schultz, however, simultaneously rejects any overarching theory,” he does not have the courage of his own convictions. In fact, it is possible to conceive of a theoretical approach to literature which remains faithful to “knowledge and learning” and interprets literary works historically and sociologically, avoiding the pitfalls of both either descriptive positivism or mere metaphysical speculation.

Such concern with the historical and sociological dimensions of literature requires a theory of history and society. This is not to say that one is limited to vague theorizing about the relationships between literature and society in general, nor that it is necessary to speak in generalities about social conditions which are required for the emergence of literature. Rather, the historical explanation of literature has to address the extent to which particular social structures find expression in individual literary works and what function these works perform in society. Man is involved in specific relations of production throughout his history. These relations present themselves socially as classes in struggle with each other, and the development of their relationship forms the real basis for the various cultural spheres. The specific structure of production, i.e. the economy, is the independent explanatory variable not only for the legal forms of property and organization of state and government but, at the same time, for the shape and quality of human life in each historical epoch. It is illusionary to assume an autonomy of the social superstructure, and this is not altered through the use of a scientific terminology claiming such autonomy. As long as literary history is exclusively conceived as *Geistesgeschichte*, it will remain powerless to make cogent statements, even though in practice the talent and sensibilities of a literary historian may have produced something of interest. A genuine, explanatory history of literature must proceed on materialistic principles. That is to say, it must investigate the economic structures as they present themselves in literature, as well as the impact which the materialistically interpreted work of art has in the economically determined society.

Such a demand along with the social theory which it presupposes, has a dogmatic ring unless it specifies its problematic. This has been achieved to a large extent in the fields of economics and political history, but even in the area of literary studies fledgling attempts have been made. Worthy of mention are Franz Mehring's essays on literary history which, sometimes using a simplified and popular, sometimes a narrowly defined political approach, have for the first time attempted to apply the theory of historical materialism to literature. But as in the case of the aforementioned psychological studies, the work of Mehring and other scholars of his persuasion has either been ignored or even ridiculed by literary historians. A sociologist of culture recently referred to "such a conceptual framework not only as unsociological or incompatible with scientific sociology," but also comparable to "a parasitic plant" that "draws off the healthy sap of a tree."

The materialistic explanation of history cannot afford to proceed in the simplifying and isolating manner so characteristic for the academic establishment of literary history, interpretation, and criticism. Contrary to common assertions, this theory neither postulates that culture in its entirety can be explained in terms of economic relations, nor that specific cultural or psychological phenomena are nothing but reflections of the social substructure. Rather, a materialistic theory places its emphasis on mediation: the mediating processes between a mode of production and the modes of cultural life including literature. Psychology must be considered as one of the principal mediating processes, particularly in the field of literary studies, since it describes the psychic processes by means of which the cultural functions of a work of art reproduce the structures of the societal base. In as much as the basis of each society in history can be seen as the relationship between ruling and ruled classes and is, in fact, a metabolic process between society and nature, literature-like all other cultural phenomena — will make this relationship transparent. For that reason the concept of ideology will be decisive for the social explanation of all phenomena of the superstructure from legal institutions to the arts. Ideology is false consciousness of social contradictions and attempts to replace them with the illusions of social harmony. Indeed, literary studies are largely an investigation of ideologies.

The often-voiced criticism that the theory of historical materialism lacks methodological refinement and possesses a crude conceptual apparatus can easily be countered: the proponents of this theory have never avoided the discussion of its flaws. Its findings and results have always been open to the scrutiny of other scholars, as well as to possible theoretical changes prompted by new experiences in social reality. Historical materialism has certainly not taken refuge in quasi-ontological imagery which, seductive and enchanting as it might be, connotes a spurious philosophy of knowledge. As long as a theory does not consider itself finite but rather continuously sustained and possibly altered by new and different experiences the frequent accusation that historical materialism ultimately contains an element of faith seems of little consequence.

The following examples are intended to illustrate the application of historical materialism to literary studies and will address questions of form, motif, and content. Beginning with the issue of *form* I should like to consider the problem of the encyclopedic novel as it exists in Balzac's *Comédie Humaine* or in Zola's *Les Rougon-Macquart*. Both seek to represent, through

their all-encompassing narratives, the society of their time in its entirety with all its living and dead inventory, occupations, and forms of state, passions, and domestic furnishings. Their aim appears anchored in the bourgeois-rationalist belief that, in principle, it is possible to possess the world through thought and to dominate it through intellectual appropriation. In the case of Balzac, this rationalism is mediated by his adherence to a mercantilist model of the economy which supposedly allows government to regulate society in an orderly fashion — a Balzac anachronism rooted in his peculiar psychological infatuation with the *ancien regime*. In the case of Zola, however, one faces a critical orientation toward the capitalist mode of production and the hope of remedying its deficiencies through a critical analysis of the society it conditions. The breadth of each of these cyclic novels reveals just as much about the author and his place in a class society as it does about the theoretical and moral position he adopts toward the social structure of his time.

Social meanings present themselves in more specific issues as well. The same literary form, for instance, can have a completely different social meaning in different contexts. One example would be the emphasis on dialogue and the resulting limitation of the narrative voice or commentative inserts in the text. The works of Gutzkow and Spielhagen and the impressionist writers are paradigmatic for this style. Gutzkow was probably the first to introduce into German literature the modern bourgeois dialogue. The history of the dialogue in narrative texts is that of a development from a tradition of stiff conventions to the spontaneous, open conversational technique of the present. The dialogue is in reality the criterion of the varying degrees of psychological astuteness which the freely competing members of capitalist society, at least in its liberal epoch, are able to demonstrate. Those who are more adroit and possess superior insight into the response mechanisms of their interlocutors also have superior chances of economic success, so long as the situation is not controlled by crude power relations which would make any discussion impossible in the first place. The function of the conversational form in the literature of the *Junges Deutschland* (Young Germany: the liberal intelligentsia of the 1830s and 1840s), which was almost entirely oblivious of its social context, is only indirectly identifiable, and in Spielhagen appears burdened by a kind of theory. The epic narrative insert has been reduced to a minimum, creating the impression that the author's arrangement of events has been dictated by the demands of reality, i.e. the verbalized interactions of the novel's characters, and

that he has drastically reduced authorial interference through actions, events, and incidents as well as their authorial interpretation. Beginning with the later Fontane and Sudermann up until Arthur Schnitzler's last novellas, the impressionist novella makes extensive use of the uncommented dialogue. But this "renunciation of the privileges of the interpreting and supplementing narrator" has one meaning and function in Spielhagen and another in the German impressionists.

Spielhagen's technique is based on the conviction that through the conversations of people social reality becomes transparent to the reflective reader who then will discover their underlying theory about human and societal relations. A bourgeois idealist, Spielhagen believes in the power of the objective mind which materializes in the articulated thoughts of men so that the free exchange of dialogue can leave no doubt as to the substantive convictions of the author. In contrast, the ascetic absence of commentary characteristic for the impressionists, is an expression of the self-criticism liberal bourgeois society pronounced on itself since the beginning of the twentieth century. The inability to formulate a theory of society, the increasing insecurity, if not helplessness, of the German middle class, resulted in fact in a mentality of relativism, a loss of confidence in the subjective mind which believed in the possibility of universally applicable knowledge. While Gutzkow's groping increments in dialogue reflect the economic gropings of a liberal bourgeoisie in Germany in the first stages of upward mobility and while the novellistic technique of Spielhagen celebrates its social victory, the impressionist style reflects its crisis: it either hides this crisis with an ideological film or admits to it through pointless conversations which lead nowhere.

Other class relationships reveal themselves when one compares the technique of the narrative frame in the novellas of Theodor Storm and C. F. Meyer. This literary device fulfills radically opposed functions in the work of these authors. Storm assumes a posture of resignation, of renunciatory retrospection. He is the weary, petty bourgeois pensioner whose world has collapsed, a world in which he could hope to engage in affairs of social importance. Time has run out; the only sustenance the present still offers are "framed," idealized remembrances of the past. Memory is capable of recovering only those fragments of the past that do not immediately bear on the gloomy present and therefore do not have to be repressed. In the case of Meyer, on the other hand, the narrative frames of his novellas quite literally serve as the magnificent frames

of a glorious painting, and as such function as indicators of the worthiness of the image they enclose and are meant to separate the unique, which is all that matters, from the indifferent diversity of appearances. The same stylistic device which in Storm's world symbolizes the modest, the small and the waning, is used by Meyer as the symbol of vital reality. While the petty bourgeois soul of Storm quietly mourns, Meyer thrusts his characters into a world that corresponds to the feudal daydreams of the German upper classes in the 1870s.

As a final example of the sociological implications in problems of form, I shall briefly consider the use of pictorial imagery. For Lessing the aesthete, the pictorial has no place in literary arts. For Meyer it is a favorite artistic device. The progress of humanity in historical time, the development of mankind are the important issues for Lessing, who was a firm believer in the future. He was an early champion of a rising bourgeois society which saw in the tensions and resolutions of a drama the paradigm for the conflicts and possible resolutions in society. Meyer is the heir to this dramatic tradition, but the surviving victors are now limited to the members of the upper class. Where Lessing is a dramatist, Meyer has become a sculptor. Where the former animates, the latter in fact halts the motion of progress. If for Lessing art expresses a universalist morality binding for all men, a morality which transcends individual idiosyncracies, it is for Meyer the extraordinary and the unique in selected individuals that finds expression in art. Magnificently framed, the infinite diversity of reality is condensed into the great moments of great individuals and eternalized as in a painting, transcending time and place. This ideological position mirrors precisely the self-image of the dominant strata of the bourgeoisie in the last third of the nineteenth century, for which the social world is but an opportunity for the development of the great personality, in short, the social elite. Its members stand aloof from trivial everyday cares and live surrounded by significant people, great ideals and important affairs which all reflect and confirm their uniqueness.

A *motif* that likewise serves to glorify economic power positions is the motif of boredom in the novels of Stendhal. Boredom is as fatal as death for "the happy few" who alone are entitled to read his books and for whom alone he chooses to write. These happy few, far removed from the consequences of an economically limited existence, are entitled to pursue their happiness according to their own autonomous morality. Just as Stendhal is the supreme novelist of the bourgeois aristocracy in the age of Napoleon, so Gustav Freytag sings the praise of the

German mid-nineteenth century bourgeoisie which he transfigures by denying any knowledge of its contradictions that are evident in the division, organization and remuneration of labor. In as much as Freytag applies an undifferentiated concept of “work” to the equally undifferentiated concept of “the people,” (two concepts Stendhal would have never used) he successfully overlooked, in a literal sense, the antagonistic social order with its competing and feuding classes. Ideology comes to the fore at the very beginning of his major work *Soll und Haben* (Debit and Credit) which has as its motto the words of Julian Schmidt: “The novel ought to look for the German people where they are at their virtuous best, that is, at work.”

I should like to touch upon the death motif as it is struck repeatedly in Mörike’s *Maler Nolten* (Painter Nolten) and Meyer’s *Jurg Jenatsch*. Mörike’s world is that of the *Biedermeier* of the honest man, the not yet politically emancipated bourgeois in the period of the *Vormarz*, i.e. in the period between the Vienna Congress and the, in fact, abortive revolutions of 1848-49. In his novels, the death motif may be interpreted as a harbinger of the political defeat of the bourgeoisie in his generation. The motifs of transience, fate, and death serve as ideological metaphors for the political impotence of the middle class in his time of which he himself was a prototype. By contrast, in the stories of Meyer, death takes on the aspect of a highly intensified moment in the fullness of life. When Lucretia kills Jurg Jenatsch this deed marks also the beginning of her own physical destruction. What is in fact a violent double murder is presented as the expression of heroic lifestyles. Only Jurg and Lucretia are worthy of one another, they represent a rare and perfect balance of character and fate; only by virtue of this singular congruity do these two have the right to eliminate each other. The solidarity of the international ruling minority proves itself unto death.

Finally, turning to *content*, I once more refer to Freytag and Meyer. Both wrote historical novels and short stories. Freytag’s collected works might be called the textbook of the conformist middle class, exhorting the virtues and perils of its members. The study of history is not seen as an occasion for intellectual enjoyment for its own sake, but for its pedagogic values. Either for the purpose of warning or emulation, it contains the history of individuals and groups intended to teach future generations lessons of social competence which might help them avoid the dubious fate of the aristocracy or the sordid fate of the lower classes. If this stance toward history is a manifestation of the self-image of a bourgeoisie struggling for its existence with

tenacious diligence, then, by contrast, Meyer's selective approach to history may be dubbed a "historicism of the upper bourgeoisie." When history is constituted randomly from disjoint events, the abundance of historical phenomena is forced into a dim twilight and the chain of diachronic experiences itself has no significance at all. There is no continuum of events of any interpretable character, be it causal, theological or otherwise teleological in nature. Political, economic cultural changes carry no weight and the flow of history is in itself without importance. The historian turns spectator taking pleasure in observing the singular like a magnificent drama. Thus the category of play penetrates real history as much as historical research to the extent that history's diversity and complexity is reduced to a puppet theater of heroes whose lives and activities are reconstituted for the playful enjoyment of the spectator-interpreter. An upper-class bourgeois likes his favorite historian to be an aesthete.

Another example for the exploration of content is the question of politics. In Gottfried Keller we find an almost bold disregard for economic realities, but considerable emphasis is placed on the political sphere, whether in occasional caricaturization of armchair politics or in the informed and competent conversations of the burgher in the *Fahnlein der sieben Aufrechten* (The Seven Upright) on topics of general import. To identify politics as the supreme, if not exclusive arena for the confrontation and final settlement of public affairs, is characteristic for social groups which, on the one hand, experience themselves as economically secure, but whose social mobility, on the other hand, is limited. All through the nineteenth century the middle class is inclined to look at politics as a resource for arbitration between competing groups and individuals, as, literally, a "middle"-way. This notion of the middle station, incidentally, was already fervently glorified in the fictional and pamphlet literature read by the English middle class in the eighteenth century. In the case of Stendhal, politics does not function as an ideological device, rather, consciously or not, he acts as spokesman for the upper class of his time who considered political dealings part of economic transactions and conflicts, and governments nothing more than business partners of big business itself.

It has always been of great interest to me why a task as important as the study of the reception of literature among various social groups has been so utterly neglected even though a vast pool of research material is available in journals and newspapers, in letters and memoirs. A materialistic history of literature, unhampered by the anxious protection of the literary arts by its

self-styled guardians and without fear of getting stranded in a quagmire of routine philology or mindless data collection, is well prepared to tackle this task.

Literature does not only reflect but it also shapes socio-political-economic relations. Literature is more like a mirror which reflects those social, political, and economic issues in any society at any given time. We know, for example, there were too many orphaned children struggling to survive in London in the mid-1800s. Dickens didn't create that truth, but he did reflect it in his novels. Literature is the mirror which reflects the truth of both human nature and the human condition (social, political, economic, religious) in all times and all places.

Just to cite one example that might serve as a way in which literature influences society, postcolonial literature from writers in Africa originally stems from a postcolonial society, of course. But when read by someone from another society, it influences what that someone knows, thinks, understands about the postcolonial world. Even though the literature was reactive to start with, it certainly could be influential later on. And this is really the case in all scenarios. It's hard to believe that literature that reflects society, never gets read by someone who then acts on what they've read to form the future.

Most of the time, literature is a result of what is going on in politics, economics, or society as a whole. People become disenchanted, angry, depressed, whatever emotion you want to name, and they write about it. Take, for instance, Thomas Payne's *Common Sense* written just before the American Revolution. *Les Miserables*, *Fences*, *A Raisin in the Sun*, and *Letters From a Birmingham Jail* are just a few other examples of how people write to react to injustices going on in their lives.

It would be challenging to actually identify literature that does shape sociology, politics, or economics. We can find examples of literature that has had impact on political or world events. Yet, to make the case that literature is the origin of these experiences is quite challenging. Literature is shaped by and reflects the domains of sociology or politics.

Literature to be intelligible and meaningful to reader must have some connection with the reality as it exists. But this does not mean that the literature only reflects the society as it is. Literature may contain many other type of information like, evaluation of what is considered to

be good or bad in the society, causes and possible remedies problems in society, a vision of a different kind of world. This different kind of world may be a vision of a better world or worse world extrapolated from the characteristics of the current world. In this way literature also contributes to bringing about major changes in the society.

Sociology is the study of human societies, English literature reflects or rejects social norms and values of various periods in history and the modern day. The Sociology and English Literature cover the foundations of these two disciplines, giving you a broad and flexible foundation for a career or further study. In the sociology strand, you will learn about a range of concepts, theories and methods. These will be applied to understand social and cultural processes, social diversity and inequality, and the relationship between individuals, groups and institutions. In the English literature strand, you'll develop a critical understanding of the processes and traditions of literature in English. Engaging with a variety of theories, approaches and critical debates, you'll investigate how meaning is constructed through reading and writing, and how these are transformed by different historical, cultural and literary contexts. You'll think critically and creatively, develop detailed methods of analysis and interpretation, and be able to precisely communicate your ideas. These skills are highly sought after in the graduate jobs market, and can be applied to many different career areas including advertising, social work, teaching, publishing and journalism, or provide a solid foundation for further study or research.

The sociology of literature is used to refer to the cluster of intellectual ventures that originate in one overriding conviction: the conviction that literature and society necessarily explain each other. Scholars and critics of all kinds congregate under this outside umbrella only to differ greatly in their sense of what they do and what the sociology of literature does. They subscribe to a wide range of theories and methods. Many would not accept the sociology of literature as an appropriate label for their own work; others would refuse it to their colleagues. Nevertheless, every advocate agrees that a sociological practice is essential to literature. For the sociology of literature does not constitute just one more approach to literature. Because it insists upon a sociology of literary knowledge and literary practice within the study of literature, the sociology of literature raises questions basic to all

intellectual inquiry. The sociology of literature begins in diversity. The way that it combines the ancient traditions of art with the modern practices of social science makes the very term something of an oxymoron. There is not one sociology of literature, there are many sociological practices of literature, each of which operates within a particular intellectual tradition and specific in- Critical Inquiry.

Traditional literary history just like much social science is bound to case studies as predominantly theoretical work can never be. These epistemological differences between American and European intellectual practices reveal the disjunctions and the strains in the many sociological practices of literature on each side of the Atlantic. It is not surprising that the sociology of literature has a greater following in Europe where intellectuals like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Raymond Williams move easily between disciplines and use their work to address issues of broad intellectual and social significance.

The institutional organization of intellectual life accentuates certain of these predispositions and minimizes others. The preponderant American empiricism promotes what seems to be an innate skepticism about "foreign" theoretical perspectives that seem to remove the critic from literature, whether it is regarded as a text by literary critics or as a social product by social scientists. The evident respect for disciplinary boundaries visible in American universities means that many academics think of "interdisciplinary" as a code word for indiscriminant borrowing and a fundamental disregard for crucial disciplinary distinctions. Perhaps, in some perverse sense, interdisciplinary work needs the partitions erected by departments. In any case, despite the recent proliferation of interdisciplinary committees in American universities, departments mostly prevail. To get ahead in the university, the academic-student or professor must find a niche. Finding a niche means finding a specialization, and that still, in the United States, means a departmental affiliation. By contrast, the very different organization of European universities stimulates movement between disciplines. The small number of chairs in any discipline and in most European universities accords the individual professor considerable latitude in defining and redefining a field. Barthes in effect, institutionalized his particular conception of semiotics by calling the position to which he was elected at the College de France a Chair of Semiology. Researchers, and to a lesser degree students, choose a professor (who may well also direct a research

center) with as much care as they select a discipline. Here, disciplinary labels often mislead, which is why for European scholars it is imperative to know whose brand of history a historian actually practices, whose sociology, whose sociology of literature.

In both Europe and the United States, though for different reasons, the sociology of literature occupies a marginal position within the academy. That position is likely to remain peripheral. Inevitably, the interdisciplinary nature of the sociology of literature must struggle against the disciplinary organization of universities and the ideological rigidities of schools of thought. The lack of consensus over ends and means, the absence of agreement over central concepts erect an even greater obstacle to institutionalization. Without some elements of common understanding the sociology of literature will never possess significant institutional space.

To develop as a field in American universities, the sociology of literature would need to follow the path followed by American studies beginning in the 1930s, by comparative literature in the 1950s and 1960s, and by fields as different as semiotics and women's studies in the 1970s and 1980s. In Europe, it would need to find support in chairs within the university system. In both places the sociology of literature would need to define a set of shared problems and methods; it would have to fix a research agenda. But resolutions of its contradictions would entail sacrificing the diversity that makes the sociology of literature so exciting an adventure.

The sociology of literature owes its current disarray at least in part to the conflicting traditions that are its intellectual heritage. Like sociology itself, the sociology of literature arose in the nineteenth century, a product of its many revolutions. Momentous changes in the intellectual landscape notwithstanding, a sociological perspective on literature faced obstacles that were numerous and significant. On the philosophical front, Kant's separation of aesthetics from metaphysics and ethics removed literature and art to a world apart, beyond the contingencies of the material world. Closer to specifically literary concerns, the insistence of classical aesthetics upon the universality of art similarly removed literary works from the influence of any one milieu. Romanticism rebelled against classical aesthetics on many counts. Yet the romantic conception of genius effectively took the writer out of society by defining

him (the stereotype was almost exclusively masculine) in terms of divine inspiration. Much as Kantian aesthetics abstracted art itself, a certain romanticism detached the artist from any relevant social context. Other aspects of romanticism proved more favorable to a sociological perception of literature. Against the forces that denied the relevance of material factors, certain currents of thought supported a re conceptualization of the relationship between literature and society. Expressly relevant to the sociology of literature were Voltaire's social history

Logically, the incorporation of literature into a general linguistic or semiotic order should favor the conjunction of literary theory and the sociology of literature. Other facets of contemporary theories, however, effectively block cooperation. The sociology of literature opens literature to society; literary theory turns works back on themselves, enclosing the text within the linguistic order. Reaching outside of that order requires reaching outside of the theory. Exploring the social order, on the other hand, sends research in many different directions at once, and the considerable time such exploration takes may be more than many are willing to spend in the face of vocational pressures to complete a degree, find a job, get tenure. Focusing on the text alone allows greater concentration of effort, and hence more obvious access to intellectual specializations. These strategic advantages certainly play a significant role in the favor enjoyed in past and present American academic circles by a variety of formalist approaches, from New Criticism to deconstructive theory. They join in a collective denial of the social and historical components of any text.

Those scholars who do invest the effort to move beyond the text will discover that the very formulation commonly employed-literature and society-fosters an opposition between texts and institutions, between literary studies and sociological practices-precisely those oppositions that the sociology of literature should surmount. The dichotomies become all the more powerful to the degree that they respect a "logical" division of intellectual labor. The antagonism, as durable as it is simplistic, offers further testimony to the power of the reflection metaphor. Theory and institution betray similar conceptions of social and intellectual organization.

By working from the opposition between literature and society, the reflection model justifies disciplinary boundaries that similarly divide up knowledge about the world. These boundaries between literary studies and the social sciences, in return, support the reflection theory and its assumption of an absolute division between material reality and intellectual activity.

The reciprocal relationship between theoretical model and institutional setting strengthens each. Although discussions of texts as well as institutions become ever more sophisticated, few studies effectively challenge the principle of division upon which this work depends or the model that it accredits.

Although most critics strenuously reject the naive perception of literature and society implied by the reflection model, the mirror endures in practice even as it is denied in theory. If the reflection model has been discredited, it has not been replaced. Perspectives A metaphor that cannot be avoided deserves closer attention.

Interest in the relationship between literature and society is hardly a new phenomenon. We still read and refer to the ancient Greeks in this regard. In *The Republic*, for example, Plato presages both Mme. de Staël's treatise of 1800, which was the first to discuss cross-national differences in literature, and later notions of literary reflection with his idea of imitation. What is new, however, is the relative legitimacy of the study of literature within the discipline of sociology. This is due both to the increasing interest in culture in sociology after years of marginalization (Calhoun 1989) and to the increasing influence of cultural studies on sociology and throughout the academy.

A broader interest in and acceptance of cultural sociology has meant that the types of research questions and methods common to sociological studies of literature are now more widely accepted within the field. Sociology has extended its methodological boundaries in response to both attacks on the dominance of positivism and the rising power of alternative stances suggested by postmodernism. At the same time, changes in the goals, and sometimes the methods, of studying literature sociologically have moved the area closer to what is still the mainstream of the discipline. Thus the sociology of literature has benefited from a twofold movement in which (1) sociology as a discipline has become more interested in and accepting of

research questions pertaining to meaning (cf. Wuthnow 1987, however, for a particularly strong attack on meaning from within the culture camp) and employing qualitative methods; and (2) the sociology of literature has evolved in the direction of more mainstream sociological areas through the merging of quantitative with qualitative methods and of empirical with hermeneutic research questions.

As recently as 1993, Wendy Griswold maintained that the sociology of literature was a "nonfield" and "like an amoeba . . . lack[ing] firm structure" (1993, p. 455). Certainly the sociology of literature has been a marginal area in the discipline of sociology. As such, it has generally failed to attract the kind of career-long commitments common to more central areas of the discipline. Many scholars writing on the sociology of literature see the area as a sideline and produce only a single book or article on the subject. This has exacerbated the lack of structure in the development of the field. Even so, it is surprising just how much sociological research has been done on literature and on literature's relationship to social patterns and processes.

Traditionally, the central perspective for sociologists studying literature has been the use of literature as information about society. To a much lesser degree, traditional work has focused on the effect of literature in shaping and creating social action. The former approach, the idea that literature can be "read" as information about social behavior and values, is generally referred to as *reflection theory*. Literary texts have been variously described as reflecting the "economics, family relationships, climate and landscapes, attitudes, morals, races, social classes, political events, wars, [and] religion" of the society that produced the texts (Albrecht 1954, p. 426). Most people are familiar with an at least implicit reflection perspective from journalistic social commentary. For instance, when *Time* magazine put the star of the television show *Ally McBeal* on its cover, asking "Is Feminism Dead?" (1998), it assumed that a television show could be read as information on Americans' values and understanding of feminism.

Unfortunately, "reflection" is a metaphor, not a theory. The basic idea behind reflection, that the social context of a cultural work affects the cultural work, is obvious and fundamental to a sociological study of literature. But the metaphor of reflection is misleading. Reflection assumes a simple mimetic theory of literature in which literary works transparently and unproblematically document the social world for the reader. In fact, however, literature is a construct of language; its experience is symbolic and mediating rather than direct. Literary

realism in particular "effaces its own status as a sign" (Eagleton 1983, p. 136; see also Candido [1995, p. 149] on the "liberty" of even naturalist authors). Literature draws on the social world, but it does so selectively, magnifying some aspects of reality, misspecifying others, and ignoring most (Desan et al. 1989). The reflection metaphor assumes a single and stable meaning for literary texts. Anyone who has ever argued about what a book "really" meant knows what researchers have worked hard to demonstrate—textual meaning is contingent, created by active readers with their own expectations and life experiences that act in concert with inherent textual features to produce variable meanings (Jauss 1982; Radway 1984; Griswold 1987).

Despite repeated demonstrations of reflection's myriad failings (e.g., Noble 1976; Griswold 1994; Corse 1997), the idea of literature as a mirror of society still seems a fundamental way of thinking about why sociologists—and indeed many other people as well—are interested in literature. A relatively crude reflection approach remains common for teaching sociology department courses on literature, and also in certain types of journal articles whose main interest is not the sociology of literature per se, but the illumination of some sociological theory or observation through literary "evidence" (e.g., Corbett's article [1994] advocating the use of novels featuring probation officers to teach courses on the sociology of occupations, or the continuing stream of articles examining gender portrayals in children's literature [e.g., Grauerholz and Pescosolido 1989]). Convincing research arguing for literary evidence of social patterns now requires the careful specification of how and why certain social patterns are incorporated in literature while others are not.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE

The “Sociology of Literature” has always named a polyglot and rather incoherent set of enterprises. It is scattered across so many separate domains and sub domains of scholarly research, each with its own distinct agendas of theory and method, that it scarcely even rates the designation of a “field.”¹ But for purposes of clarity and simplicity, I will focus here on

the fate of sociology in the recent history of literary studies. Is literary studies actively invested at present in the project of sustaining a sociology of literature? As currently configured, and facing the particular disciplinary circumstances that we do, are literary scholars capable of producing a *new* sociology of literature? Would they be favorably disposed toward one if it came their way?

One hesitates to answer such questions in the affirmative. New or old, the sociology of literature seems to possess little traction in literary studies. Nobody appears to regret the passing of an “old” sociology of literature, invoked these days (where it is invoked at all) as a stale and outmoded approach, like reader-response or archetypal criticism, barely worth a chapter in the latest theory anthology. But nor would many literary scholars embrace the prospect—as they perceive it—of a new sociological turn, of a more “sociological” future for literary studies. If the old sociology of literature seems all too old, a superseded relic of an earlier moment in the discipline, a new sociology of literature can seem all too contemporary, in step with ominous trends that are driving humanistic inquiry toward some small, sad corner of the increasingly social-science-dominated academy to endure an “interdisciplinary” afterlife of collaborative media research.

But there is the image problem, this resistance, at the very least, to the nomenclature, this need to place scare quotes around the phrase itself. “The sociology of literature”: something critics tried to do a long time ago, or (more worryingly) something critics are starting to do today instead of the proper tasks of literary history and criticism. When exactly did this distancing become habitual, and why? Rita Felski and I embarked on this project partly as a way to address those questions. Having entered graduate school in the early 1980s, we well remember when “the sociology of literature” was a term widely in use by literary scholars and critical theorists alike. This was especially true in Britain which, as Raymond Williams observed, remained into the 1970s a “backward—indeed an undeveloped country” with respect to sociology as an academic discipline.² With little in the way of an institutional establishment to hinder them, British scholars whose training and higher degrees were in literature could make free with the mantle of “sociologist.” In addition to Williams himself (whose visiting appointment at Stanford in 1973–74 was in the social sciences rather than the humanities), one thinks here of Richard Hoggart (labeled a sociologist in most

bibliographies and encyclopedias) and Stuart Hall (who was named Professor of Sociology at the Open University in 1979), as well as younger figures like Francis Barker, Colin Mercer, and Graham Murdock, all of whom came to be at least as closely associated with sociology as with English. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, these sociologically inclined literary critics worked productively alongside an emergent generation of cultural sociologists (Tony Bennett, John Hall, Andrew Milner, David Morley, Charlotte Brunsdon, Jim McGuigan, Janet Wolff, and many others. (James, F.)

The sociology of literature is a specialized area of study which focuses its attention upon the relation between a literary work and the social structure in which it is created. It reveals that the existence of a literary creation has the determined social situations. As there is a reciprocal relationship between a literary phenomena and social structure, sociological study of literature proves very useful to understand the socio-economic situations, political issues, the world view and creativity of the writers, the system of the social and political organizations the relations between certain thoughts and cultural configurations in which they occur and determinants of a literary work.

Generally, sociology is defined as the scientific study of society, more specifically human society. As the major concern of sociology is society, it is popularly known as the science of society (Shankar Rao: 17). Like all other social sciences, it is concerned with the life and activities of man. It also examines the origin, structure, development and functions of human society, scientifically. It also tries to determine the relationship between different elements of social life and discovers the fundamental conditions of social stability and social change. It analyses the influences of economic, political, cultural, artistic, aesthetic, geographical, scientific and other forces and factors on man and his life and throws more light on the various social problems like poverty, education, social class, religion, and others. Taking into account of all these aspects, Alan Swingewood states “Sociology is essentially the scientific, objective study of man in society, the study of social institutions and of social processes; it seeks to answer the question how society is possible, how it works, why it persists” (1972:11). He further points out that the social structure is constituted through the rigorous examination of the social, political, religious and economic institutions in the society. Lucien Goldmann also admits “Sociology is a science based on an aggregation of

categories forming an intellectual structure, then these categories and this structure are themselves social facts that sociology brings in to relief” (qtd. In Belhower 55). In the New Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary sociology is defined as ‘a study of human, especially civilized, society; study of social problems, especially with a view to solving them’.

Sociology as the science of social relations studies the society and gets its subject matter from different sources, literature being one of them. As a social product, literature reflects human society, the human relation and the world in which we live, interact and move. Literature, like sociology, critically examines the realistic picture of human life. So it has been called as the mirror and controller of the society. Sociology tries to study the literary facts and their impact on social relations. So the sociologists such as M.C.Albrecht, Rene Wellek, and others agree with the argument that literature is an institution, and sociology is the study of this institution. Today, sociology is firmly established as a distinctive discipline. Unlike other social science, it is interested in almost all aspects of man’s social life. The new generation of thinkers and scholars has invented new concepts and methods of sociological research. As a result, we get new branches of sociology. Sociology of literature which studies literature for understanding society and its forces is one of them.

Like sociology, literature too is pre-eminently concerned with man’s social world, his adaptation to it and his desire to change it. In fact, man and his society is the material out of which literature is constructed. So, literature is regarded as the expression or representation of human life through the medium of social creation via language (Wellek: 94). In the words of W.H. Hudson, “literature is a vital record of what man have seen in life, what they have experienced of it, what they have thought and felt about those aspects of it which have the most immediate and enduring interest for all of us. It is thus fundamentally an expression of life through the medium of language” (10). In short, literature grows out of life, reacts upon life, and is fed by life.

The society and individuals are the materials of literature. The outer world gets transformed within author’s mind and heart and these transformed elements become reality in literature and a source of our pleasure. However, it is hardly possible to define literature precisely because the different critics and scholars from Plato down to the present age have

defined literature diversely. These diverse views state different theories of literature. In Theory of Literature, Wellek and Warren attempt to focus the several ways of defining literature and finally come to the conclusion that the nature of literature can be understood through the particular use of literary or connotative language. They define literature as the reproduction of life. While defining the nature of literature they remark “Literature is a social institution, using as its medium language, a social creation ... literature represents life; and ‘life’ is, in large measure, a social reality, even though natural world and inner or subjective world of the individual have also been objects of literary imitation” (94).

One of the major problems related to literature is its relation with society. To New Critics, the inner structure of literature is more important than the social structure. They are very hostile to biographical and sociological approach to the study of literature. However, some other modern critics and sociologists have made attempts to explain the correlation between sociology and literature. Men of learning in different countries of the world have talked a lot either in favour or against this issue, but majority of the critics and scholars believe in the reciprocal relationship between literature and society. According to them literature and society are always dependent on each other. The most important reason of this interdependent relationship is that literature is the social institution and it uses the medium of language, a social creation. It depicts life and life is a social reality. In the words of Hudson, “literature grows directly out of life is of course to say that it is in life itself that we have to seek the sources of literature, or, in other words, impulses which have given birth to the various forms of literary expression” (10). In short, the base of both sociology and literature is alike and their stability is conditioned by the major social institutions. The changes in the form and content of literature are caused by the changes in the society and the society changes due to the current of fresh and new ideas provided by literary works. The sociology of literature studies this correlation between literature and sociology.

6.1 Reflection Theory

Alan Swingewood said in his book titled “The Sociology of Literature” that Sociology studied about a man in society objectively and significantly where it describes how its process in social life, also to answer how certain society is, what its characteristics are, how they adapt to survive in particular society. People know and comprehend social structure through a rigorous examination of the social institution, religion, and economy, politics and family.

“Sociology is essentially, objective study of man in society, the study on social institutions and of social processes; it seeks to answer the question of how society is possible, how it works, why it persists. Through a rigorous examination of the social institutions, religious, economic, political, and familial, which together constitute what is called social structure”. (Swingewood, 1972: 11)

Sociological approach is useful in literary works. Sociology has relation with family relationship or relative, class conflict between inferior and superior classes, whereas, it is obvious that literature is related to man in society and concerns on it. Sociology itself tries to reveal a process of society changes. The society changes give effect on social structure.

Meanwhile, Literature is a reflection of social culture, history and mirror of the age. Although the most popular perspective the documentary aspects of mirror age, it must be treated carefully in the application of literature. In this case, the author or writer has responsibility to describe social situations; he has critical function to form character in artificiality conditions to determine the objectivity. Its purpose is to discover values and meaning in the social world.

“The conception of the mirror, then, must be treated with great care in the sociological analysis of literature. Above all else, of course, it ignores the writer himself, his awareness and intention. Great writers do not set out simply to depict the social world in largely descriptive terms; it might be suggested that the writer by definition has a more critical task, of setting his characters in motion within artificially contrived situations to seek their own private ‘destiny’ to discover values and meaning in the social world.” (Swingewood, 1972: 15)

Literature describes human life and presents social problems happening in society and reflects social culture, history and mirror of the age. The concept of the mirror must be treated carefully in the application of literature. In this case, the writer has the responsibility to describe

social situations, and has critical functions to form character in artificially conditions to determine the objectivity. Its purpose is to discover values and meaning in the social world.

“Literature is a direct reflection of various facts of social structure, family relationships, class conflict, and possibly divorce trends and population composition... The conception of the mirror, then, must be treated with great care in the sociological analysis of literature. Above all else, of course, it ignores the writer himself, his awareness and intention. Great writers do not set out simply to depict the social world in largely descriptive terms; it might be suggested that the writer by definition has a more critical task, of setting his characters in motion within artificially contrived situations to seek their own private ‘destiny’ to discover values and meaning in the social world” (Swingewood, 1972: 13-15)

In *History and Class Consciousness*, where Lukacs offers this explanation concerning the Hegelianism of the left, there is another important observation—likewise derived from Marx—on Hegel's philosophical limits and his proximity to Kant and Fichte. It is these limits of Hegel which have permitted the Hegelians of the left, and the Neo-Hegelians in general, to use him as their authority and to continue to use his language in order to uphold a Fichtean outlook. Lukacs recalls that Hegel rejects any possibility of judgment coming from the outside because he develops a philosophy of immanence and totality. Yet, according to the Hegelian conception, history is the work of the Absolute Spirit which, although intervening through its agents, remains outside reality and has a dualist relationship with it. Thus, despite the monism of a system which denies dualism, a dualism of the subject and the object virtually exists in Hegel between the Absolute Spirit and concrete history, according to Lukacs. This opposition of the subject and the object was able to be accentuated and placed at the centre of their preoccupations by the Hegelians of the left, for whom the Absolute Spirit simply became the subjective consciousness of the critique, the 'subject' of history.

According to Lukacs it is not because the young Marx had been the most radical of the Hegelians of the left, i.e. in reality a Fichtean, that he developed dialectical materialism. Quite the contrary, it was because he was the only consistent Hegelian among them that he eliminated all of the Fichtean and Kantian residues from the thought of Hegel and that he turned toward rigorously monist thought. And he only attained this thought, and was only able to elaborate it

completely, after his exile in France and his discovery of the proletariat as the new social force and as the basis of identical theory and praxis.

Since Marx's time, and even since *History and Class Consciousness*, the development of the forces of production and economic relations has again rendered problematic the relation between thought and reality. Even Lukacs abandoned the identity of the subject of praxis and the subject of the work, and no longer relates the work to the group, but to the relation of its creator to global history. Thus, the old theory of the revolutionary proletariat as the historical basis, by its action, of dialectical thought must be modified and can no longer be maintained or asserted as before. The Frankfurt School, which no longer admits this old conception, has the impression that the ground has been pulled away from under its feet. But this disappearance of the collective subject has not led it to join the structuralists who, on the basis of the technocratic structures of organizational capitalism, deny the existence of the subject. The Frankfurt School has kept its critical positions; nevertheless, it finds itself in the situation of the Hegelians of the left in the Germany of the 1840s. It has come back to the dualism between the subject and the object, and criticizes the world on the basis of ideas which it is far from being able to justify. Bauer came from Hegel.

Following Marx's directions, Lukacs was the first to overturn the old customary scheme of the development of Neo-Hegelian philosophy. He discusses the Neo-Hegelians in *History and Class Consciousness* and in articles on Lassalle and Moses Hess of the same period. These ideas of Lukacs continued by A. Cornu in his books on M. Hess and Marx, are now very widespread and—as in the case of other Lukacsian ideas—their origin has been forgotten. The earlier history of Neo-Hegelianism was different. It constituted a chain which went from Hegel to the Neo-Hegelians, to those of the right, the centre, and the left, to reach Marx, as the most radical among the Hegelians of the left, who developed dialectical materialism. But Lukacs has shown that those who are called 'Hegelians of the Left' are in fact closer to Fichte—as the Neo-Kantians were later on—than to Hegel. They had moved away from the Hegelian position, according to Lukacs because they had abandoned the fundamental categories of totality and the identity of the subject and the object, in order to return to the subject-object opposition in the form of the opposition between 'critical consciousness' and the world.

In *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology* Marx had already accused the Hegelians of the left—Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner, etc.,—of having retained Hegel's language and his categories, but also for having returned to this side of Hegel, who tried to imagine himself in the world. In fact, the Hegelians of the left thought they were situated above the world and spoke from outside it, whereas according to Marx he ardently insists upon it in *The German Ideology* when someone speaks, he should ask who is speaking and from where. The Hegelians of the left are in opposition to the reality of ideas which have no real basis: Bauer with his critical self-consciousness and Stirner with his egoistic individual which, Marx has shown, is not real and, in short, comes from a philosophical construction, just like Bauer's 'critical consciousness'. To know what one is speaking about, Marx very justifiably requires that one know who is speaking and from where: it is necessary to know that one always speaks from within a world from which comes the structure of consciousness of the one who is speaking and who, in order to know what he is saying, must know this world and this structuration at the risk of otherwise remaining within an ideology.

According to Lukacs the Hegelians of the left are the expression of a small, radical group oriented since the beginning of the 1840s toward the revolution of 1848, without being sufficiently strong to succeed in the revolution, or capable of thinking about itself and the situation clearly. Moreover, after the failure of the revolution of 1848, the group altered and its thinkers (who had been very well-known) lost all importance. Beforehand, in the struggle against the Prussian State, which created all sorts of difficulties for them, the Hegelians of the left could not continue Hegel's compromise, nor find in Germany a real force which they could have relied on. And so they criticized the world as bad and negative without knowing where, in what place, and in what perspective or praxis, to situate their criticism. They placed it in an imaginary entity, a 'critical consciousness', or in the egoistic individual, Stirner's 'Unique Man' who is another version of this who opposes the world and judges it.

The reflection theory is found by The Hungarian theorist named George Lukács. He becomes one of the first major Marxist critics and develops the theory of reflection. Lukács explains that a reflection might be more or less tangible. Literary works do not reflect an individual phenomena in isolation, but the whole process of life.

“Lukács would say that a reflection may be more or less concrete... A literary work reflects not individual phenomena in isolation, but ‘the full process of life’. However, the reader is always aware that the work is not itself reality but rather ‘s a special form of reflecting reality’ (Selden, 1985: 29). Georg Lukács explains that a reflection might be more or less tangible. Literary works do not reflect an individual phenomenon in isolation, but the whole process of life. “Lukács would say that a reflection may be more or less concrete... A literary work reflects not individual phenomena in isolation, but ‘the full process of life’. However, the reader is always aware that the work is not itself reality but rather ‘s a special form of reflecting reality’ (Selden, 1985: 29).”

Lukács expresses that the reflection in the literature is not the same as the reflection of the mirror. In the literature, the writer shall be creative in his works. “Lukács did not see literature-reflecting reality as a minor reality as a mirror reflects the object placed in front of it... in literature reality has to pass through the creative, from giving works of the writer. The result in the case of correctly formed work will be that the form of literary work reflects the form of the real world” (Jefferson, 1986: 171).” Lukács argues that the form is the aesthetic shape expressed in the content, in which it is created through technical features such as narrative time and the interrelationship of characters and situation in a work. “Form for Lukács is the aesthetic shape given to content, a shape manifested through technical features such as narrative time and the interrelationship of characters and situation in a work. The correct form according for Lukács is one reflects reality in the most objective way” (Jefferson & Robbey, 1986: 139-140).”

According to Lukács, literary works reflect an unfolding system. It has to reveal the underlying pattern of contradictions in social order. “Literary works as reflections of an unfolding system. A realist work must reveal the underlying pattern of contradictions in social order.” (Selden, 1985: 28)

Lukács describes that a literary work can give us more than just surface appearance, but it gives us a reflection of reality which is truer, more complete, more vivid and more dynamic. “... he returns to the old realist view that the novel reflects reality, not by rendering its mere surface appearance, but by giving us ‘a truer, more complete, more vivid, and more dynamic reflection of reality’. (Selden, 1985: 28-29). He added that to reflect something is to frame a mental

structure changed into words. “To ‘reflect’ is to frame a mental structure transposed into words.” (Selden, 1985: 29). Lukacs mentioned in reflection of literature, the reality had been added the creative-form work by the writer. Then in a formed work would reveal that the literary works reflected the real world. “To be reflected in literature, reality has to pass through the creative form-giving work of the writer. The result, in the case of a correctly formed work, will be that the form of the literary work reflects the form of the real word.” (Jefferson, 171)

6.2 Negative Knowledge Model

Theodor W. Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and social critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known among anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg Gadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and intellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most prominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas, Germany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student and assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from Kant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary Western society. He was a seminal social philosopher and a leading member of the first generation of Critical Theory.

Unreliable translations hampered the initial reception of Adorno's published work in English speaking countries. Since the 1990s, however, better translations have appeared, along with newly translated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being published. These materials not only facilitate an emerging assessment of his work in epistemology and ethics but also strengthen an already advanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory.

Born on September 11, 1903 as Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund, Adorno lived in Frankfurt am Main for the first three decades of his life and the last two (Müller-Doohm 2005, Claussen 2008). He was the only son of a wealthy German wine merchant of assimilated Jewish background and an accomplished musician of Corsican Catholic descent. Adorno studied philosophy with the neo-Kantian Hans Cornelius and music composition with Alban Berg. He

completed his *Habilitationsschrift* on Kierkegaard's aesthetics in 1931, under the supervision of the Christian socialist Paul Tillich. After just two years as a university instructor (*Privatdozent*), he was expelled by the Nazis, along with other professors of Jewish heritage or on the political left. A few years later he turned his father's surname into a middle initial and adopted "Adorno," the maternal surname by which he is best known.

Adorno left Germany in the spring of 1934. During the Nazi era he resided in Oxford, New York City, and southern California. There he wrote several books for which he later became famous, including *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (with Max Horkheimer), *Philosophy of New Music*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (a collaborative project), and *Minima Moralia*. From these years come his provocative critiques of mass culture and the culture industry. Returning to Frankfurt in 1949 to take up a position in the philosophy department, Adorno quickly established himself as a leading German intellectual and a central figure in the Institute of Social Research. Founded as a free-standing center for Marxist scholarship in 1923, the Institute had been led by Max Horkheimer since 1930. It provided the hub to what has come to be known as the Frankfurt School. Adorno became the Institute's director in 1958. From the 1950s stem *In Search of Wagner*, Adorno's ideology-critique of the Nazi's favorite composer; *Prisms*, a collection of social and cultural studies; *Against Epistemology*, an antifoundationalist critique of Husserlian phenomenology; and the first volume of *Notes to Literature*, a collection of essays in literary criticism.

Conflict and consolidation marked the last decade of Adorno's life. A leading figure in the "positivism dispute" in German sociology, Adorno was a key player in debates about restructuring German universities and a lightning rod for both student activists and their right-wing critics. These controversies did not prevent him from publishing numerous volumes of music criticism, two more volumes of *Notes to Literature*, books on Hegel and on existential philosophy, and collected essays in sociology and in aesthetics. *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno's magnum opus on epistemology and metaphysics, appeared in 1966. *Aesthetic Theory*, the other magnum opus on which he had worked throughout the 1960s, appeared posthumously in 1970. He died of a heart attack on August 6, 1969, one month shy of his sixty-sixth birthday.

Long before "postmodernism" became fashionable, Adorno and Horkheimer wrote one of the most searching critiques of modernity to have emerged among progressive European

intellectuals. *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is a product of their wartime exile. It first appeared as a mimeograph titled *Philosophical Fragments* in 1944. This title became the subtitle when the book was published in 1947. Their book opens with a grim assessment of the modern West: “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth radiates under the sign of disaster triumphant” (DE 1, translation modified). How can this be, the authors ask. How can the progress of modern science and medicine and industry promise to liberate people from ignorance, disease, and brutal, mind-numbing work, yet help create a world where people willingly swallow fascist ideology, knowingly practice deliberate genocide, and energetically develop lethal weapons of mass destruction? Reason, they answer, has become irrational.

Although they cite Francis Bacon as a leading spokesman for an instrumentalized reason that becomes irrational, Horkheimer and Adorno do not think that modern science and scientism are the sole culprits. The tendency of rational progress to become irrational regress arises much earlier. Indeed, they cite both the Hebrew scriptures and Greek philosophers as contributing to regressive tendencies. If Horkheimer and Adorno are right, then a critique of modernity must also be a critique of premodernity, and a turn toward the postmodern cannot simply be a return to the premodern. Otherwise the failures of modernity will continue in a new guise under contemporary conditions. Society as a whole needs to be transformed.

Horkheimer and Adorno believe that society and culture form a historical totality, such that the pursuit of freedom in society is inseparable from the pursuit of enlightenment in culture (DE xvi). There is a flip side to this: a lack or loss of freedom in society—in the political, economic, and legal structures within which we live—signals a concomitant failure in cultural enlightenment—in philosophy, the arts, religion, and the like. The Nazi death camps are not an aberration, nor are mindless studio movies innocent entertainment. Both indicate that something fundamental has gone wrong in the modern West.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the source of today's disaster is a pattern of blind domination, domination in a triple sense: the domination of nature by human beings, the domination of nature within human beings, and, in both of these forms of domination, the domination of some human beings by others. What motivates such triple domination is an

irrational fear of the unknown: “Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized” (DE 11). In an unfree society whose culture pursues so-called progress no matter what the cost, that which is “other,” whether human or nonhuman, gets shoved aside, exploited, or destroyed. The means of destruction may be more sophisticated in the modern West, and the exploitation may be less direct than outright slavery, but blind, fear-driven domination continues, with ever greater global consequences. The all-consuming engine driving this process is an ever-expanding capitalist economy, fed by scientific research and the latest technologies.

Contrary to some interpretations, Horkheimer and Adorno do not reject the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Nor do they provide a negative “metanarrative” of universal historical decline. Rather, through a highly unusual combination of philosophical argument, sociological reflection, and literary and cultural commentary, they construct a “double perspective” on the modern West as a historical formation (Jarvis 1998, 23). They summarize this double perspective in two interlinked theses: “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (DE xviii). The first thesis allows them to suggest that, despite being declared mythical and outmoded by the forces of secularization, older rituals, religions, and philosophies may have contributed to the process of enlightenment and may still have something worthwhile to contribute. The second thesis allows them to expose ideological and destructive tendencies within modern forces of secularization, but without denying either that these forces are progressive and enlightening or that the older conceptions they displace were themselves ideological and destructive.

A fundamental mistake in many interpretations of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* occurs when readers take such theses to be theoretical definitions of unchanging categories rather than critical judgments about historical tendencies. The authors are not saying that myth is “by nature” a force of enlightenment. Nor are they claiming that enlightenment “inevitably” reverts to mythology. In fact, what they find really mythical in both myth and enlightenment is the thought that fundamental change is impossible. Such resistance to change characterizes both ancient myths of fate and modern devotion to the facts.

Accordingly, in constructing a “dialectic of enlightenment” the authors simultaneously aim to carry out a dialectical enlightenment of enlightenment not unlike Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Two Hegelian concepts anchor this project, namely, determinate negation and conceptual self-reflection. “Determinate negation” (*bestimmte Negation*) indicates that immanent criticism is the way to wrest truth from ideology. A dialectical enlightenment of enlightenment “discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from [the image's] features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth” (DE 18). Beyond and through such determinate negation, a dialectical enlightenment of enlightenment also recalls the origin and goal of thought itself. Such recollection is the work of the concept as the self-reflection of thought (*der Begriff als Selbstbesinnung des Denkens*, DE 32). Conceptual self-reflection reveals that thought arises from the very corporeal needs and desires that get forgotten when thought becomes a mere instrument of human self-preservation. It also reveals that the goal of thought is not to continue the blind domination of nature and humans but to point toward reconciliation. Adorno works out the details of this conception in his subsequent lectures on Kant (KC), ethics (PMP), and metaphysics (MCP) and in his books on Husserl (AE), Hegel (H), and Heidegger (JA). His most comprehensive statement occurs in *Negative Dialectics*, which is discussed later.

Dialectic of Enlightenment presupposes a critical social theory indebted to Karl Marx. Adorno reads Marx as a Hegelian materialist whose critique of capitalism unavoidably includes a critique of the ideologies that capitalism sustains and requires. The most important of these is what Marx called “the fetishism of commodities.” Marx aimed his critique of commodity fetishism against bourgeois social scientists who simply describe the capitalist economy but, in so doing, simultaneously misdescribe it and prescribe a false social vision. According to Marx, bourgeois economists necessarily ignore the exploitation intrinsic to capitalist production. They fail to understand that capitalist production, for all its surface “freedom” and “fairness,” must extract surplus value from the labor of the working class. Like ordinary producers and consumers under capitalist conditions, bourgeois economists treat the commodity as a fetish. They treat it as if it were a neutral object, with a life of its own, that directly relates to other commodities, in independence from the human interactions that actually sustain all commodities. Marx, by contrast, argues that whatever makes a product a commodity goes back to human needs, desires, and practices. The commodity would not have “use value” if it did not satisfy human wants. It would not have “exchange value” if no one wished to exchange it for something else. And its

exchange value could not be calculated if the commodity did not share with other commodities a “value” created by the expenditure of human labor power and measured by the average labor time socially necessary to produce commodities of various sorts.

Adorno's social theory attempts to make Marx's central insights applicable to “late capitalism.” Although in agreement with Marx's analysis of the commodity, Adorno thinks his critique of commodity fetishism does not go far enough. Significant changes have occurred in the structure of capitalism since Marx's day. This requires revisions on a number of topics: the dialectic between forces of production and relations of production; the relationship between state and economy; the sociology of classes and class consciousness; the nature and function of ideology; and the role of expert cultures, such as modern art and social theory, in criticizing capitalism and calling for the transformation of society as a whole.

The primary clues to these revisions come from a theory of reification proposed by the Hungarian socialist Georg Lukács in the 1920s and from interdisciplinary projects and debates conducted by members of the Institute of Social Research in the 1930s and 1940s. Building on Max Weber's theory of rationalization, Lukács argues that the capitalist economy is no longer one sector of society alongside others. Rather, commodity exchange has become the central organizing principle for all sectors of society. This allows commodity fetishism to permeate all social institutions (e.g., law, administration, journalism) as well as all academic disciplines, including philosophy. “Reification” refers to “the structural process whereby the commodity form permeates life in capitalist society.” Lukács was especially concerned with how reification makes human beings “seem like mere things obeying the inexorable laws of the marketplace” (Zuidervaart 1991, 76).

Initially Adorno shared this concern, even though he never had Lukács's confidence that the revolutionary working class could overcome reification. Later Adorno called the reification of consciousness an “epiphenomenon.” What a critical social theory really needs to address is why hunger, poverty, and other forms of human suffering persist despite the technological and scientific potential to mitigate them or to eliminate them altogether. The root cause, Adorno says, lies in how capitalist relations of production have come to dominate society as a whole, leading to extreme, albeit often invisible, concentrations of wealth and power (ND 189–92). Society has come to be organized around the production of exchange values for the sake of producing

exchange values, which, of course, always already requires a silent appropriation of surplus value. Adorno refers to this nexus of production and power as the “principle of exchange” (*Tauschprinzip*). A society where this nexus prevails is an “exchange society” (*Tauschgesellschaft*).

Adorno's diagnosis of the exchange society has three levels: politico-economic, social-psychological, and cultural. Politically and economically he responds to a theory of state capitalism proposed by Friedrich Pollock during the war years. An economist by training who was supposed to contribute a chapter to *Dialectic of Enlightenment* but never did (Wiggershaus 1994, 313–19), Pollock argued that the state had acquired dominant economic power in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and New Deal America. He called this new constellation of politics and economics “state capitalism.” While acknowledging with Pollock that political and economic power have become more tightly meshed, Adorno does not think this fact changes the fundamentally economic character of capitalist exploitation. Rather, such exploitation has become even more abstract than it was in Marx's day, and therefore all the more effective and pervasive.

The social-psychological level in Adorno's diagnosis serves to demonstrate the effectiveness and pervasiveness of late capitalist exploitation. His American studies of anti-Semitism and the “authoritarian personality” argue that these pathologically extend “the logic of late capitalism itself, with its associated dialectic of enlightenment.” People who embrace anti-Semitism and fascism tend to project their fear of abstract domination onto the supposed mediators of capitalism, while rejecting as elitist “all claims to a qualitative difference transcending exchange” (Jarvis 1998, 63).

Adorno's cultural studies show that a similar logic prevails in television, film, and the recording industries. In fact, Adorno first discovered late capitalism's structural change through his work with sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld on the Princeton University Radio Research Project. He articulated this discovery in a widely anthologized essay “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” (1938) and in “The Culture Industry,” a chapter in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. There Adorno argues that the culture industry involves a change in the commodity character of art, such that art's commodity character is deliberately acknowledged and art “abjures its autonomy” (DE 127). With its emphasis on marketability, the culture industry

dispenses entirely with the “purposelessness” that was central to art's autonomy. Once marketability becomes a total demand, the internal economic structure of cultural commodities shifts. Instead of promising freedom from societally dictated uses, and thereby having a genuine use value that people can enjoy, products mediated by the culture industry have their use value *replaced* by exchange value: “Everything has value only in so far as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in itself. For consumers the use value of art, its essence, is a fetish, and the fetish—the social valuation [*gesellschaftliche Schätzung*] which they mistake for the merit [*Rang*] of works of art— becomes its only use value, the only quality they enjoy” (DE 128). Hence the culture industry dissolves the “genuine commodity character” that artworks once possessed when exchange value still presupposed use value (DE 129–30). Lacking a background in Marxist theory, and desiring to secure legitimacy for “mass art” or “popular culture,” too many of Adorno's anglophone critics simply ignore the main point to his critique of the culture industry. His main point is that culture-industrial hypercommercialization evidences a fateful shift in the structure of all commodities and therefore in the structure of capitalism itself.

Philosophical and sociological studies of the arts and literature make up more than half of Adorno's collected works (*Gesammelte Schriften*). All of his most important social-theoretical claims show up in these studies. Yet his “aesthetic writings” are not simply “applications” or “test cases” for theses developed in “nonaesthetic” texts. Adorno rejects any such separation of subject matter from methodology and all neat divisions of philosophy into specialized subdisciplines. This is one reason why academic specialists find his texts so challenging, not only musicologists and literary critics but also epistemologists and aestheticians. All of his writings contribute to a comprehensive and interdisciplinary social philosophy (Zuidervaat 2007).

First published the year after Adorno died, *Aesthetic Theory* marks the unfinished culmination of his remarkably rich body of aesthetic reflections. It casts retrospective light on the entire corpus. It also comes closest to the model of “paratactical presentation” (Hullot-Kentor in AT xi-xxi) that Adorno, inspired especially by Walter Benjamin, found most appropriate for his own “atonal philosophy.” Relentlessly tracing concentric circles, *Aesthetic Theory* carries out a dialectical double reconstruction. It reconstructs the modern art movement from the perspective of philosophical aesthetics. It simultaneously reconstructs philosophical aesthetics, especially

that of Kant and Hegel, from the perspective of modern art. From both sides Adorno tries to elicit the sociohistorical significance of the art and philosophy discussed.

Adorno's claims about art in general stem from his reconstruction of the modern art movement. So a summary of his philosophy of art sometimes needs to signal this by putting “modern” in parentheses. The book begins and ends with reflections on the social character of (modern) art. Two themes stand out in these reflections. One is an updated Hegelian question whether art can survive in a late capitalist world. The other is an updated Marxian question whether art can contribute to the transformation of this world. When addressing both questions, Adorno retains from Kant the notion that art proper (“fine art” or “beautiful art”—*schöne Kunst*—in Kant's vocabulary) is characterized by formal autonomy. But Adorno combines this Kantian emphasis on form with Hegel's emphasis on intellectual import (*geistiger Gehalt*) and Marx's emphasis on art's embeddedness in society as a whole. The result is a complex account of the simultaneous necessity and illusoriness of the artwork's autonomy. The artwork's necessary and illusory autonomy, in turn, is the key to (modern) art's social character, namely, to be “the social antithesis of society” (AT 8).

Adorno regards authentic works of (modern) art as social monads. The unavoidable tensions within them express unavoidable conflicts within the larger sociohistorical process from which they arise and to which they belong. These tensions enter the artwork through the artist's struggle with sociohistorically laden materials, and they call forth conflicting interpretations, many of which misread either the work-internal tensions or their connection to conflicts in society as a whole. Adorno sees all of these tensions and conflicts as “contradictions” to be worked through and eventually to be resolved. Their complete resolution, however, would require a transformation in society as a whole, which, given his social theory, does not seem imminent.

As commentary and criticism, Adorno's aesthetic writings are unparalleled in the subtlety and sophistication with which they trace work-internal tensions and relate them to unavoidable sociohistorical conflicts. One gets frequent glimpses of this in *Aesthetic Theory*. For the most part, however, the book proceeds at the level of “third reflections”—reflections on categories employed in actual commentary and criticism, with a view to their suitability for what artworks

express and to their societal implications. Typically he elaborates these categories as polarities or dialectical pairs.

One such polarity, and a central one in Adorno's theory of artworks as social monads, occurs between the categories of import (*Gehalt*) and function (*Funktion*). Adorno's account of these categories distinguishes his sociology of art from both hermeneutical and empirical approaches. A hermeneutical approach would emphasize the artwork's inherent meaning or its cultural significance and downplay the artwork's political or economic functions. An empirical approach would investigate causal connections between the artwork and various social factors without asking hermeneutical questions about its meaning or significance. Adorno, by contrast, argues that, both as categories and as phenomena, import and function need to be understood in terms of each other. On the one hand, an artwork's import and its functions in society can be diametrically opposed. On the other hand, one cannot give a proper account of an artwork's social functions if one does not raise import-related questions about their significance. So too, an artwork's import embodies the work's social functions and has potential relevance for various social contexts. In general, however, and in line with his critiques of positivism and instrumentalized reason, Adorno gives priority to import, understood as societally mediated and socially significant meaning. The social functions emphasized in his own commentaries and criticisms are primarily intellectual functions rather than straightforwardly political or economic functions. This is consistent with a hyperbolic version of the claim that (modern) art is society's social antithesis: "Insofar as a social function can be predicated for artworks, it is their functionlessness" (AT 227).

The priority of import also informs Adorno's stance on art and politics, which derives from debates with Lukács, Benjamin, and Bertolt Brecht in the 1930s (Lunn 1982; Zuidervaart 1991, 28–43). Because of the shift in capitalism's structure, and because of Adorno's own complex emphasis on (modern) art's autonomy, he doubts both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of tendentious, agitative, or deliberately consciousness-raising art. Yet he does see politically engaged art as a partial corrective to the bankrupt aestheticism of much mainstream art. Under the conditions of late capitalism, the best art, and politically the most effective, so thoroughly works out its own internal contradictions that the hidden contradictions in society can no longer be ignored. The plays of Samuel Beckett, to whom Adorno had intended to

dedicate *Aesthetic Theory*, are emblematic in that regard. Adorno finds them more true than many other artworks.

Arguably, the idea of “truth content” (*Wahrheitsgehalt*) is the pivotal center around which all the concentric circles of Adorno's aesthetics turn (Zuidervaart 1991; Wellmer 1991, 1–35 ; Jarvis 1998, 90–123). To gain access to this center, one must temporarily suspend standard theories about the nature of truth (whether as correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic success) and allow for artistic truth to be dialectical, disclosive, and nonpropositional. According to Adorno, each artwork has its own import (*Gehalt*) by virtue of an internal dialectic between content (*Inhalt*) and form (*Form*). This import invites critical judgments about its truth or falsity. To do justice to the artwork and its import, such critical judgments need to grasp both the artwork's complex internal dynamics and the dynamics of the sociohistorical totality to which the artwork belongs. The artwork has an internal truth content to the extent that the artwork's import can be found internally and externally either true or false. Such truth content is not a metaphysical idea or essence hovering outside the artwork. But neither is it a merely human construct. It is historical but not arbitrary; nonpropositional, yet calling for propositional claims to be made about it; utopian in its reach, yet firmly tied to specific societal conditions. Truth content is the way in which an artwork simultaneously challenges the way things are and suggests how things could be better, but leaves things practically unchanged: “Art has truth as the semblance of the illusionless” (AT 132).

Adorno's idea of artistic truth content presupposes the epistemological and metaphysical claims he works out most thoroughly in *Negative Dialectics*. These claims, in turn, consolidate and extend the historiographic and social-theoretical arguments already canvassed. As Simon Jarvis demonstrates, *Negative Dialectics* tries to formulate a “philosophical materialism” that is historical and critical but not dogmatic. Alternatively, one can describe the book as a “metacritique” of idealist philosophy, especially of the philosophy of Kant and Hegel (Jarvis 1998, 148–74; O'Connor 2004). Adorno says the book aims to complete what he considered his lifelong task as a philosopher: “to use the strength of the [epistemic] subject to break through the deception [*Trug*] of constitutive subjectivity” (ND xx).

This occurs in four stages. First, a long Introduction (ND 1–57) works out a concept of “philosophical experience” that both challenges Kant's distinction between “phenomena” and

“noumena” and rejects Hegel's construction of “absolute spirit.” Then Part One (ND 59–131) distinguishes Adorno's project from the “fundamental ontology” in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Part Two (ND 133–207) works out Adorno's alternative with respect to the categories he reconfigures from German idealism. Part Three (ND 209–408), composing nearly half the book, elaborates philosophical “models.” These present negative dialectics in action upon key concepts of moral philosophy (“freedom”), philosophy of history (“world spirit” and “natural history”), and metaphysics. Adorno says the final model, devoted to metaphysical questions, “tries by critical self reflection to give the Copernican revolution an axial turn” (ND xx). Alluding to Kant's self-proclaimed “second Copernican revolution,” this description echoes Adorno's comment about breaking through the deception of constitutive subjectivity.

Like Hegel, Adorno criticizes Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena by arguing that the transcendental conditions of experience can be neither so pure nor so separate from each other as Kant seems to claim. As concepts, for example, the a priori categories of the faculty of understanding (*Verstand*) would be unintelligible if they were not already about something that is nonconceptual. Conversely, the supposedly pure forms of space and time cannot simply be nonconceptual intuitions. Not even a transcendental philosopher would have access to them apart from concepts about them. So too, what makes possible any genuine experience cannot simply be the “application” of a priori concepts to a priori intuitions via the “schematism” of the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*). Genuine experience is made possible by that which exceeds the grasp of thought and sensibility. Adorno does not call this excess the “thing in itself,” however, for that would assume the Kantian framework he criticizes. Rather, he calls it “the nonidentical” (*das Nichtidentische*).

The concept of the nonidentical, in turn, marks the difference between Adorno's materialism and Hegel's idealism. Although he shares Hegel's emphasis on a speculative identity between thought and being, between subject and object, and between reason and reality, Adorno denies that this identity has been achieved in a positive fashion. For the most part this identity has occurred negatively instead. That is to say, human thought, in achieving identity and unity, has imposed these upon objects, suppressing or ignoring their differences and diversity. Such imposition is driven by a societal formation whose exchange principle demands the equivalence (exchange value) of what is inherently nonequivalent (use value). Whereas Hegel's speculative

identity amounts to an identity between identity and nonidentity, Adorno's amounts to a nonidentity between identity and nonidentity. That is why Adorno calls for a “negative dialectic” and why he rejects the affirmative character of Hegel's dialectic (ND 143–61).

Adorno does not reject the necessity of conceptual identification, however, nor does his philosophy claim to have direct access to the nonidentical. Under current societal conditions, thought can only have access to the nonidentical via conceptual criticisms of false identifications. Such criticisms must be “determinate negations,” pointing up specific contradictions between what thought claims and what it actually delivers. Through determinate negation, those aspects of the object which thought misidentifies receive an indirect, conceptual articulation.

The motivation for Adorno's negative dialectic is not simply conceptual, however, nor are its intellectual resources. His epistemology is “materialist” in both regards. It is motivated, he says, by undeniable human suffering—a fact of unreason, if you will, to counter Kant's “fact of reason.” Suffering is the corporeal imprint of society and the object upon human consciousness: “The need to let suffering speak is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject ... ” (ND 17–18). The resources available to philosophy in this regard include the “expressive” or “mimetic” dimensions of language, which conflict with “ordinary” (i.e., societally sanctioned) syntax and semantics. In philosophy, this requires an emphasis on “presentation” (*Darstellung*) in which logical stringency and expressive flexibility interact (ND 18–19, 52–53). Another resource lies in unscripted relationships among established concepts. By taking such concepts out of their established patterns and rearranging them in “constellations” around a specific subject matter, philosophy can unlock some of the historical dynamic hidden within objects whose identity exceeds the classifications imposed upon them (ND 52–53, 162–66).

What unifies all of these desiderata, and what most clearly distinguishes Adorno's materialist epistemology from “idealism,” whether Kantian or Hegelian, is his insisting on the “priority of the object” (*Vorrang des Objekts*, ND 183–97). Adorno regards as “idealist” any philosophy that affirms an identity between subject and object and thereby assigns constitutive priority to the epistemic subject. In insisting on the priority of the object, Adorno repeatedly makes three claims: first, that the epistemic subject is itself objectively constituted by the society to which it belongs and without which the subject could not exist; second, that no object can be

fully known according to the rules and procedures of identitarian thinking; third, that the goal of thought itself, even when thought forgets its goal under societally induced pressures to impose identity on objects, is to honor them in their nonidentity, in their difference from what a restricted rationality declares them to be. Against empiricism, however, he argues that no object is simply “given” either, both because it can be an object only in relation to a subject and because objects are historical and have the potential to change.

Under current conditions the only way for philosophy to give priority to the object is dialectically, Adorno argues. He describes dialectics as the attempt to recognize the nonidentity between thought and the object while carrying out the project of conceptual identification. Dialectics is “the consistent consciousness of nonidentity,” and contradiction, its central category, is “the nonidentical under the aspect of identity.” Thought itself forces this emphasis on contradiction upon us, he says. To think is to identify, and thought can achieve truth only by identifying. So the semblance (*Schein*) of total identity lives within thought itself, mingled with thought's truth (*Wahrheit*). The only way to break through the semblance of total identity is immanently, using the concept. Accordingly, everything that is qualitatively different and that resists conceptualization will show up as a contradiction. “The contradiction is the nonidentical under the aspect of [conceptual] identity; the primacy of the principle of contradiction in dialectics tests the heterogeneous according to unitary thought [*Einheitsdenken*]. By colliding with its own boundary [*Grenze*], unitary thought surpasses itself. Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of nonidentity” (ND 5).

But thinking in contradictions is also forced upon philosophy by society itself. Society is riven with fundamental antagonisms, which, in accordance with the exchange principle, get covered up by identitarian thought. The only way to expose these antagonisms, and thereby to point toward their possible resolution, is to think against thought—in other words, to think in contradictions. In this way “contradiction” cannot be ascribed neatly to either thought or reality. Instead it is a “category of reflection” (*Reflexionskategorie*), enabling a thoughtful confrontation between concept (*Begriff*) and subject matter or object (*Sache*): “To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction already experienced in the object [*Sache*], and against that contradiction. A contradiction in reality, [dialectics] is a contradiction against reality” (ND 144–45).

The point of thinking in contradictions is not simply negative, however. It has a fragile, transformative horizon, namely, a society that would no longer be riven with fundamental antagonisms, thinking that would be rid of the compulsion to dominate through conceptual identification, and the flourishing of particular objects in their particularity. Because Adorno is convinced that contemporary society has the resources to alleviate the suffering it nevertheless perpetuates, his negative dialectics has a utopian reach: “In view of the concrete possibility of utopia, dialectics is the ontology of the false condition. A right condition would be freed from dialectics, no more system than contradiction” (ND 11). Such a “right condition” would be one of reconciliation between humans and nature, including the nature within human beings, and among human beings themselves. This idea of reconciliation sustains Adorno's reflections on ethics and metaphysics.

Like Adorno's epistemology, his moral philosophy derives from a materialistic metacritique of German idealism. The model on “Freedom” in *Negative Dialectics* (ND 211–99) conducts a metacritique of Kant's critique of practical reason. So too, the model on “World Spirit and Natural History” (ND 300–60) provides a metacritique of Hegel's philosophy of history. Both models simultaneously carry out a subterranean debate with the Marxist tradition, and this debate guides Adorno's appropriation of both Kantian and Hegelian “practical philosophy.”

The first section in the Introduction to *Negative Dialectics* indicates the direction Adorno's appropriation will take (ND 3–4). There he asks whether and how philosophy is still possible. Adorno asks this against the backdrop of Karl Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, which famously proclaimed that philosophy's task is not simply to interpret the world but to change it. In distinguishing his historical materialism from the sensory materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx portrays human beings as fundamentally productive and political organisms whose interrelations are not merely interpersonal but societal and historical. Marx's emphasis on production, politics, society, and history takes his epistemology in a “pragmatic” direction. “Truth” does not indicate the abstract correspondence between thought and reality, between proposition and fact, he says. Instead, “truth” refers to the economic, political, societal, and historical fruitfulness of thought in practice.

Although Adorno shares many of Marx's anthropological intuitions, he thinks that a twentieth-century equation of truth with practical fruitfulness had disastrous effects on both sides

of the iron curtain. The Introduction to *Negative Dialectics* begins by making two claims. First, although apparently obsolete, philosophy remains necessary because capitalism has not been overthrown. Second, Marx's interpretation of capitalist society was inadequate and his critique is outmoded. Hence, praxis no longer serves as an adequate basis for challenging (philosophical) theory. In fact, praxis serves mostly as a pretext for shutting down the theoretical critique that transformative praxis would require. Having missed the moment of its realization (via the proletarian revolution, according to early Marx), philosophy today must criticize itself: its societal naivete, its intellectual antiquation, its inability to grasp the power at work in industrial late capitalism. While still pretending to grasp the whole, philosophy fails to recognize how thoroughly it depends upon society as a whole, all the way into philosophy's "immanent truth" (ND 4). Philosophy must shed such naivete. It must ask, as Kant asked about metaphysics after Hume's critique of rationalism, How is philosophy still possible? More specifically, How, after the collapse of Hegelian thought, is philosophy still possible? How can the dialectical effort to conceptualize the nonconceptual—which Marx also pursued—how can this philosophy be continued?

This self-implicating critique of the relation between theory and practice is one crucial source to Adorno's reflections on ethics and metaphysics. Another is the catastrophic impact of twentieth-century history on the prospects for imagining and achieving a more humane world. Adorno's is an ethics and metaphysics "after Auschwitz" (Bernstein 2001, 371–414; Zuidervaart 2007, 48–76). Ethically, he says, Hitler's barbarism imposes a "new categorical imperative" on human beings in their condition of unfreedom: so to arrange their thought and action that "Auschwitz would not repeat itself, [that] nothing similar would happen" (ND 365). Metaphysically, philosophers must find historically appropriate ways to speak about meaning and truth and suffering that neither deny nor affirm the existence of a world transcendent to the one we know. Whereas denying it would suppress the suffering that calls out for fundamental change, straightforwardly affirming the existence of utopia would cut off the critique of contemporary society and the struggle to change it. The basis for Adorno's double strategy is not a hidden ontology, as some have suggested, but rather a "speculative" or "metaphysical" experience. Adorno appeals to the experience that thought which "does not decapitate itself" flows into the idea of a world where "not only extant suffering would be abolished but also

suffering that is irrevocably past would be revoked” (403). Neither logical positivist antimetaphysics nor Heideggerian hypermetaphysics can do justice to this experience.

Adorno indicates his own alternative to both traditional metaphysics and more recent antimetaphysics in passages that juxtapose resolute self-criticism and impassioned hope. His historiographic, social theoretical, aesthetic, and negative dialectical concerns meet in passages such as this:

Thought that does not capitulate before wretched existence comes to nought before its criteria, truth becomes untruth, philosophy becomes folly. And yet philosophy cannot give up, lest idiocy triumph in actualized unreason [*Widervernunft*] ... Folly is truth in the shape that human beings must accept whenever, amid the untrue, they do not give up truth. Even at the highest peaks art is semblance; but art receives the semblance ... from nonsemblance [*vom Scheinlosen*] No light falls on people and things in which transcendence would not appear [*widerschiene*]. Indelible in resistance to the fungible world of exchange is the resistance of the eye that does not want the world's colors to vanish. In semblance nonsemblance is promised (ND 404–5).

Adorno revealed his new conceptions at a recent congress on the sociology of literature, as, moreover, had Agnes Heller (one of Lukacs's closest collaborators) on behalf of Lukacs. According to Adorno, the creator situates himself outside reality, not at this necessary distance from the group whose world vision he expresses, but outside of reality, and his attitude toward it is extremely critical: a minimal acceptance and a maximal rejection. That leads Adorno to the idea of a purely negative dialectic, to rejection, and to the requirement of the impoverishment of content, an impoverishment and rejection for which the ideal would be Beckett. In almost Heideggerian tones—whom he criticizes sharply, moreover—Adorno now rejects everything which is popular, and any concession to the popular, and thus arrives, through criticism, at rather conservative positions.

He conceives of the work as a sort of objective reality, a nearly Platonic reality or form which the creator should attain. To defend the idea of this constraint by form, Adorno recalls that, however great a genius he may be, the creator could only produce everything he wants to at the risk of succumbing to mediocrity. This is incontestable at the psychological level of the individual, but in no way does it explain to us the existence of its objective realities, nor their

origin. As we have seen, this objective reality—in other words coherence, significant structure, aesthetic form, which goes beyond the subjective consciousness of the individual creator—is not in the least a Platonic reality, but rather the possible consciousness of a plural object, its world vision. This objectivity, this form, exists for the individual who must attain it not as an evident reality, but as a non-conscious norm; it is here that the individual is differentiated from the collective subject, because, in the historical praxis of a plural subject, the forms are neither given nor are they preexistent. It is by starting from this collective praxis that the forms become intelligible and that their genesis can be grasped.

Moreover, Adorno is little interested in these significant structures. What makes a work important for him, what interests him, is what he calls its 'truth content'. This truth content, according to his pronouncements on it at the congress, is difficult to define and always goes beyond the purely intellectual. Consequently, the work must not be approached in its totality and by following its genesis, but in relation to criticism, to the philosopher, who knows this truth content today. Literature no longer appears interesting or valid except to the extent that the critical philosopher speaks about it in order to extract certain elements from it which he judges in relation to something which is not the work itself. Thus, the truth content is beyond the work, in the consciousness of the critical philosopher who chooses this content in accordance with the critical consciousness, and the work is no longer considered except outside itself. This truth content, then, is situated outside history or in the history of philosophy. As a result, aesthetics is subordinated to philosophy, to truth, to the theoretically valid content. And, since this truth content is not a significant structure inherent to the work, it becomes a sort of evidence, of which the cultured man, the thinker, the philosopher may have a sort of intuitive knowledge. Their knowledge is shared by other cultured men, without the existence of any foundation other than culture for this community. With much finesse and subtlety Adorno comes back to this Neo-Kantian thought and to the dualism of the subject and the object which Lukacs and Heidegger had transcended, thus taking up the position of Bruno Bauer's and Max Stirner's *Critical Consciousness*.

Today, Adorno comes from an earlier Adorno, close to the positions of *History and Class Consciousness*, who would not easily have accepted this radical rejection and this 'critical consciousness' which he upholds today, while continuing, on other points, his refined and

intelligent dialectical analyses. The need to know worldly reality, the collective subject on the basis of which one thinks, obviously only exists for the dialectical thinker. Descartes—to take the famous example of a non-dialectical thinker—does not have such a problem and almost ignores its possibilities. The relation between the dialectical thinker and the worldly reality from which he begins, is a dialectical, circular, relation. The collective subject produces the mental structures which the thinker expresses and elaborates, and he must be able to account for their real origin in his thought.

If one does not accept Adorno's 'critical consciousness', which judges and scans reality from on high, or the individual relation to global history as Lukacs currently conceives it, if one wishes to maintain, no longer the idea of the revolutionary proletariat, but the requirements of Marx's dialectical thought (which always demands that one know who is speaking and from where), of the subject-object totality, then the basic question arises of knowing who is, now, the subject of speech and action. It is necessary to know in the name of what and from where we are speaking today, if we believe that there are only valid works and actions to the extent that they are placed within a universe created by men and are attached to specific groups.

There are situations in which one cannot give an answer because the group, from which speech and action comes, is not yet manifest. In these situations, on the basis of a modified tradition, individuals speak by formulating perspectives and positions for which the group, the true subject, if it is not yet there, is in gestation or waiting to be elaborated. And very probably, these positions will be modified when the group becomes manifest.

Adorno and other Frankfurt School theorists developed the theory of alienation in the philosophy of Karl Marx and applied it to social cultural contexts. They were critical of the mechanical interpretation of Marxism as a “scientific theory,” which was presented by the “authorized” theorists of the Soviet Union. Adorno argued that advanced capitalism is different from early capitalism and so Marxist theory applicable to early capitalism does not apply to advanced capitalism. Furthermore, he asserted that “reification” or “commoditization” of human life should be the primary issue for Marxism.

Adorno was to a great extent influenced by Walter Benjamin's application of Karl Marx's thought. Adorno, along with other major Frankfurt School theorists such as Horkheimer and Marcuse, argued that advanced capitalism was able to contain or liquidate the forces that would

bring about its collapse and that the revolutionary moment, when it would have been possible to transform it into socialism, had passed. Adorno argued that capitalism had become more entrenched through its attack on the objective basis of revolutionary consciousness and through liquidation of the individualism that had been the basis of critical consciousness.

Adorno's works focused on art, literature, and music as key areas of sensuous, indirect critique of the established culture and petrified modes of thought. The argument, which is complex and dialectic, dominates his *Aesthetic Theory*, *Philosophy of New Music*, and many other works.

The culture industry is seen as an arena in which critical tendencies or potentialities were eliminated. He argued that the culture industry, which produced and circulated cultural commodities through the mass media, manipulated the population. Popular culture was identified as a reason why people become passive; the easy pleasures available through consumption of popular culture made people docile and content, no matter how terrible their economic circumstances. The differences among cultural goods make them appear different, but they are in fact just variations on the same theme. Adorno conceptualizes this phenomenon, *pseudo-individualization* and the *always-the-same*. Adorno saw this mass-produced culture as a danger to the more difficult high arts. Culture industries cultivate false needs; that is, needs created and satisfied by capitalism. True needs, in contrast, are freedom, creativity, or genuine happiness. Some, however, criticized Adorno's high esteem of the high arts as cultural elitism.

Some of the work on mass culture Adorno undertook together with Horkheimer. His work heavily influenced intellectual discourse on popular culture and scholarly popular culture studies. At the time Adorno began writing, there was a tremendous unease among many intellectuals as to the results of mass culture and mass production on the character of individuals within a nation. By exploring the mechanisms for the creation of mass culture, Adorno presented a framework which gave specific terms to what had been a more general concern.

At the time, this was considered important because of the role which the state took in cultural production; Adorno's analysis allowed for a critique of mass culture from the left which balanced the critique of popular culture from the right. From both perspectives—left and right—the nature of cultural production was felt to be at the root of social and moral problems resulting from the consumption of culture. However, while the critique from the right emphasized moral

degeneracy ascribed to sexual and racial influences within popular culture, Adorno approached the problem from a social, historical, political, and economic perspective.

Adorno, again along with the other principal thinkers of the Frankfurt school, attacked positivism in the social sciences and in philosophy. He was particularly harsh on approaches that claimed to be scientific and quantitative, although the collective Frankfurt School work, *The Authoritarian Personality*, that appeared under Adorno's name was one of the most influential empirical studies in the social sciences in America for decades after its publication in 1950

Theodor Adorno was the most important of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists. His legacy for the human and social sciences has been enormous, though undoubtedly his major contribution has been to aesthetic theory. In sociology Adorno is probably most widely read as a representative, if not founder, of critical social theory; he is less seen as a sociologist as such. Matthias Benzer's book offers an important corrective to the reception of Adorno as a theorist unconcerned with empirical analysis. His book provides a detailed account of Adorno's sociological writings, which are often neglected or misunderstood or simply seen as a kind of cultural critique or ideology critique unconnected with sociological theory. Benzer's book offers a much needed alternative reading and shows how his sociological writings can be understood only when considered in the context of his broader work. The works that are of most significance are the collections *Critical Models*, *Prisms*, *Minima Moralia* and two collective sociological research projects, the *Authoritarian Personality* and *Group Experiment*.

The concept of society was central to Adorno's sociology, which was primarily addressed to the reality of 'exchange society.' Society is an objective reality that shapes every aspect of the social world, including too nature. Society for Adorno is a relational concept in that it is formed out of social relations between individuals. Capitalism itself is dominated by exchange relations and through the process of social integration, which Benzer argues is a key concept in Adorno's sociology, more and more areas of social life are drawn into exchange society, for social integration allows the exchange principle to dominate.

Adorno attaches importance to the analysis of social phenomena from the standpoint of society as a whole and from the perspective of social actors who can change society. Much of Adorno's sociology is based on his observations of the minute details of everyday life as well as aspects of the culture industry, and was informed from the perspective of a somewhat

disconnected foreigner in the United States. The perspective of the outsider and the experience of exile formed the basis of an approach that was otherwise not methodologically rigorous. Possibly his greatest work, *Mimima Moralia*, is an exploration of everyday life distorted by the capitalist exchange principle. This approach, which can be characterized as a sociological analysis of exchange society, informed his philosophy of social science, which was opposed to positivist analysis in that he saw as the objective the analysis of complications and contradictions of social life. Sociology should try to discover possibilities for social transformation within the present; it is in this sense a critical endeavour and one in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition.

Sociology, as practised by Adorno, must be based on a theory of society but it must also have an empirical dimension. He was opposed to the separation of theory from empirical research and always insisted that sociology was not a purely theoretical discipline, but required empirical field research. It is probably the case that what he had in mind here was the polarization of empirical social research and philosophy. He wanted sociology to occupy a mid-way position. Benzer's book offers a corrective to the conventional view that he was opposed to empirical research. The empirical material that informed his sociological analysis was drawn from his own personal observations of everyday life, many of which are deeply insightful while some are the bizzare thoughts of a bourgeois intellectual whose Marxism confirmed his disdain for everyday life. Adorno's difficulty lay with method-guided empirical research. He believed that such research isolates itself from theoretical analysis and is generally theoretically improvised. Benzer offers a very good account of Adorno's struggle to deal with theory, research methods, and empirical data. Adorno, while not always dismissive of conventional research methodology, was convinced that empirical social research is not entirely exhausted by method guided research and can instead be theoretically guided. Adorno's own engagement with method-guided social research was not a happy one; for example the famous F-Scale that was devised in the Authoritarian Personality studies to discover the extent of fascist personality traits in post-war America was flawed in its basic research design in that the research instruments presupposed the theory they were trying to validate.

Adorno was a product of Germany's unempirical sociological tradition. While he did his best to become familiar with empirical sociological research he was never at home in it and instead relied on his own rather idiosyncratic observations of everyday life, many of which were

drawn from travel. It is possible to characterize Adorno's empirical sociology as a 'microsociology' of exchange society informed by a theory of society, which is also based on a range of concepts such as constellation and mimesis, which are discussed by Benzer in later chapters of the book. Benzer suggests that his approach is a hermeneutics of capitalism and that he was informed by Weber's methodology in this regard. It was certainly a deeply personal kind of sociology based on his own observations and much of it written in the style of the essay than a journal article.

In this sense Adorno belonged to a generation of thinkers such as Simmel, Veblen, Kracauer, and Benjamin who did not engage with professional social research. It is difficult not to conclude that Adorno misunderstood not much of social life, but also had a poor understanding of social science. Whether the exchange principle is as dominating as Adorno believed is a matter of some debate. Adorno held that the exchange principle had much the same power of society as Weber's 'iron cage' and had a very limited perspective on society's capacity for social change. Yet, his work was haunted by the possibility that something could lie outside exchange society. His attack on positivism was often misdirected and over generalized, against both Mannheim and Popper for instance. His rejection of method-guided research was undoubtedly a product of his own failure to engage with the real world of social research. Benzer is aware of these problems and does not seek to offer a defence of what were clearly problems in Adorno's sociology. This book does an excellent job in clarifying Adorno's sociological approach in all its complexity. It is lucid and as clear as it is possible to be in explaining Adorno's often obscure concepts.

According to Adorno, there is a space or a distance between art and reality. We can criticize the actuality from the work art a vantage-point of this distance. "Adorno's own view is that art and reality stand at a distance from each other and that this distance gives 'the work of art a vantage-point from which it can criticize actuality'" (Jefferson, 1982: 188). Adorno states that the art is separated from the reality. Its separation can give special meaning and power to the art for criticising the reality.

In Adorno's view, art is set apart from reality; its detachment gives it its special significance and power. Modernist writings are particularly distanced from the reality which they allude, and this distance gives their work the power of criticising reality (Selden, 1985: 34).

Adorno adds the point this critical distance come out from the fact that literature has its “formal laws”. “For Adorno, this critical distance comes from the fact that literature (his word is art, but he means it to include literature) has its ‘formal laws’...” (Jefferson,1982: 188)

Adorno does not explain what these formal laws are, but he gives two important indications of the kind of thing he means. The first, he talks of procedures and techniques in modern art, the subject matter is recognized and cannot be solved. Secondly, in his view, the art is the essence and image of reality. It is not merely reproduction of photogenic. According to Adorno, we can also see the reality from the structure which is received of a process of thought besides through our eyes or through camera lens.

Firstly, he talks of the ‘procedures and techniques’ which in modern art ‘dissolve the subject matter and reorganize it. Secondly, he says that the art is the “essence and image” of reality rather than its photographic reproduction “... Adorno takes reality to be not the empirical world we see through our eyes or through the camera lens but the dialectics totality, a structure which can only be perceived by a process of thought linking things together and seeing how they effectively are.” (Jefferson,1982: 188-189)

Adorno emphasizes on the distance between work and reality and he also insists on the work’s formal laws, according to him, an art really exist in the real world and has a function in it. It is the reverse of which is the case. He also states that literary work does not give us a neatly-shaped reflection and knowledge of reality but it acts in reality to expose its contradictions. According to him, Art is the negative knowledge of the actual world. He describes that negative knowledge which implies a knowledge which could deny and undermine of false or reified condition. “...he stresses the distance between the work and reality. He says that ‘art exists in the real world and has a function in it’ and yet it is ‘the antithesis of that which is the case’” The literary work does not give us a neatly-shaped reflection and a knowledge of reality but acts within reality to expose its contradictions. Adorno says, ‘Art is the negative knowledge of the actual world “Negative Knowledge’ does not mean knowledge of nothing, non-knowledge. It means knowledge which can undermine and negate and false or reified condition.” (Jefferson, 1982: 189 - 190)

In negative knowledge model, Adorno views literature and reality stand at a distance from each other and that this distance gives ‘the work of art a vantage-point from which it can

criticize actuality' (Jefferson, 1982). For Adorno, this critical distance comes from the fact that literature (his word is art, but he means it to include literature) has its own 'formal laws'. He does not spell out precisely what these formal laws are, but he gives two indications of the kind of things he means. Firstly, he talks about 'procedures and techniques' which in modern art 'dissolve the subject matter and reorganize it' (Jefferson, 1982:153). Secondly, he says that art is the 'essence and image' of reality rather than its photographic reproduction. An image in a work of art comes for Adorno from the artist (the subject) absorbing in the creative process what he perceives in reality (the object); 'In the form of an image the object is absorbed into the subject' (Jefferson, 1982:160). Adorno takes reality not as the empirical world we see through our eyes or through the camera lens but the dialectical totality, a structure which can only be perceived by a process of thought linking things together and seeing how they effectively are.

In addition, for Adorno, a great modernist work is precisely that which manages to reveal the contradiction between appearance and reality. He stresses the distance between the work and reality by saying that 'art exists in the real world and has a function in it' and yet it is 'the antithesis of that which is the case' (Jefferson, 1982:159).

The literary work does not give us a neatly-shaped reflection and knowledge of reality but acts within reality to expose its contradiction. Adorno says 'art is the negative knowledge of the actual world', but 'negative knowledge does not mean knowledge of nothing, non-knowledge. It means knowledge which can undermine and negate a false or reified condition (Jefferson, 1982: 160). Adorno makes this knowledge a negative rather than a positive one and places a central emphasis on the antagonistic, critical role played by the literary work which respects its formal laws. Adorno opens up modernist writing to Marxist literary theory by showing that a different kind of relationship between the text and reality is possible; one of critical distance and negative knowledge rather than reflection. He stresses that all art stands a distance from reality.

The main features of Hegel's and Marx's dialectical method. This runs counter to the thesis of Theodor Adorno in his celebrated *Negative Dialectics* who argues that a genuinely dialectical method cannot be spelled out in a straightforward narrative form. To establish the identity of the dialectical method through such a narrative would, in his view, render the method impotent. What, at best, can be done to present the method is to identify some of the underlying

concepts which are important in its use and then to advance a number of models in which these concepts are employed. According to Adorno, dialecticians may legitimately aspire to teach by example, but in trying to do more they risk the method being turned into a dogma. Above all, Adorno believes those who employ dialectic should attempt to avoid the platitudes and simplifications of the Marxism of the Stalinist era.

The key principle of dialectical thinking for Adorno is the principle of non-identity. By this principle Adorno means 'that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder.' With this principle Adorno appears to be attacking both the philosophical basis of Hegel's dialectic and the dogmas of dialectical materialism. Common to both these approaches appears to be the assumption that in dialectic we have an exhaustive explanation of human experience. The dogmatist assumes that dialectic sums up all that can be rationally said of the world. Adorno takes such an approach to be antagonistic to a truly dialectical mode of procedure since for him the main impetus behind such a procedure is the recognition that our thinking can never fully encapsulate its object. It is the inherent incompleteness of our intellectual attempts to capture the essence of our experience which provides the continual stimulus for dialectical enquiry.

Insisting on this principle of non-identity is not, however, a straightforward task since 'the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself.' 'To think is,' as Adorno says, 'to identify'. The way out of this dilemma for those who want to think and write dialectically is to refrain from fully establishing the identity of objects. To attempt to encapsulate in full the nature of an object is, for Adorno, to undermine the dialectical process of thought. In place of such a positive philosophy of identification Adorno proposes negative dialectics. Negative dialectics he sees as a meta philosophy which is parasitic on ordinary, non-dialectical thought. The meta philosophy points out the contradictions of ordinary thinking and hints at more enlightening ways of conceptualizing our experience.

But persuasive as Adorno's criticisms of idealism and dialectical materialism are, his meta philosophy in which he refuses to identify dialectic with anything in particular leaves us with nothing solid to grasp. Apparently, the conclusion we can draw from this is that without Adorno's own complex, aphoristic speculation there cannot, it seems, be a negative dialectic. When we set to one side Adorno's ornate style what is most striking about his critique of identity

thinking is the sense of scepticism and aloofness which it imparts. Withdrawal from the world appears to be Adorno's answer to the dilemmas of modern life. He takes too far his thesis of non-identity when he refuses to be clear about what he is doing. If dialectic is a riddle then it cannot be recommended to anyone as a form of thought. Adorno harks back to the suggestive, enigmatic dialectic of Heraclitus rather than moving forward to the more systematic dialectic of Hegel and Marx. I think it is worth the effort to go beyond Adorno. To show that there is something solid to grasp I have outlined and criticized Hegel's meta philosophy of dialectic and tried to derive from various examples of Marx's analysis of capitalist society an account of his dialectical method. But I have not entirely rejected Adorno's conclusions. I agree with Adorno and Sartre's view (expressed in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*) that existence is primary and that our way of comprehending the world should not be identified with the world. [3] As Adorno puts it, concepts do not fully contain their objects. I accept also Adorno's view that dialectic is a form of meta philosophy which is parasitic upon ordinary thought. The best starting point for our attempts to comprehend the world is the given of ordinary experience and thought. Existence though has its own peculiar form. We cannot start simply with objects, sensations or theories since what is first given to us is given to us also in our language and its received ideas. Our existence is usually already structured by thought. But this ordinary thought operates with categories and concepts which are not brought into a fully systematic relation with each other. What the analyst attempts to do with the dialectical method is to bring these categories and concepts into a coherent form.

If dialectic is a meta philosophy it appears to follow that it cannot be something which is inherent in things. By definition it would appear that a meta philosophy is not directly of the world. Things (i.e., external objects in the world) provide an impetus to this meta philosophy but they never wholly provide its substance. In attempting to comprehend the world with the help of this meta philosophy we come to know it only as the knowledge of 'things' as they affect the human senses and mind and as they are, in turn, shaped by human activity and purposes. (To speak of a knowledge of things not brought to our attention in this way is, I feel, to speak of a non-imaginable world). In Marx's dialectical method this subjective element pertaining to all knowledge is taken into account, but he appears to regard it not as indicating the limited nature of human knowledge but as testifying to its possible authenticity. Our knowledge of the world is always that of practically active human beings. But this is a knowledge of something which

when initially encountered always lies beyond the wit and intelligence of the individual human being. Our thought is inevitably incommensurate with the reality it seeks to take in. We form our knowledge from our experience of things, not from those things in themselves. In recognizing that dialectic operates only at a meta philosophical level we take it for granted that things may have an unpredictable logic of their own. Dialectical method does not provide a privileged intuition into the nature of the world. On the contrary, the dialectic method when employed most usefully affords an understanding of the world which captures its essence only at one particular historical juncture. The dialectical method feeds off what we experience of the world, it does not control that experience.

However, his *Negative Dialectics* tries to avoid, rather than deal with, a difficulty which besets any attempt to outline the dialectical method. This difficulty is summed up in Spinoza's famous dictum 'all determination is negation'. Interestingly, this phrase is referred to in Volume 1 of Marx's *Capital* where he criticizes the vulgar economists who try to explain profit as a return for the abstinence of the capitalist. [4] These vulgar economists fail to see that any activity can from one point of view be regarded as abstinence whilst from another being seen as enjoyment. The abstinence of the capitalist in not deciding to spend his income is no doubt compensated for by the enjoyment received through maintaining and expanding the business through further investment. Doing anything has both a positive and negative significance. The risk that Adorno thinks is run by spelling out the dialectical method is similar in that it may, he fears, by exposing both its strengths and weaknesses, appear simply to be one philosophical method just like any other. In this respect Adorno appears to share Hegel's view that dialectic represents the only appropriate method of enquiry. But to try to shield dialectical method from critical examination in refusing to stipulate what it is, does nothing to advance the claim that the method may often be the most appropriate one. The truth of Hegel's claim about dialectic has to be tested by an examination not only of examples of the method's use in practice but also through an analysis of the bare bones of the method itself. When this is done it becomes apparent, as Marx recognizes, that the dialectical method is not the one solely satisfactory method of enquiry in science or the humanities. Knowledge can be gained in a vast variety of ways: through observation, classification, experiment, play, repetition, and making mistakes; procedures which owe nothing to the dialectical method. Where the dialectical method does offer a unique contribution to our gaining understanding is possibly in the systematic presentation of

the results of an enquiry. Its suggested rules, such as the unity of opposites, the true is the whole and difference within identity, provide us with the means with which to make sense of the most complex and confusing information given to us by our experience and understanding.

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURALISM

Structuralism is a way of thinking about the world that is predominantly concerned with the perception and description of structures of interrelated objects, concepts or ideas. Structuralism hinges on the view that the world does not consist of independently existing objects whose concrete features can be perceived clearly and individually. Structuralism takes as its object of investigation the inter relationship between objects of enquiry as opposed to the objects themselves. Structuralism, however, is not a single unified theory or approach but has been developed in several disciplines and in diverse ways. Approaches to structuralism include: semiotics, search for deep structures and Marxist structuralism. These, are not, however to be regarded as discrete. To some extent they overlap and draw on similar traditions. They all have two aspects; a methodic and a metaphysical component.

Common to structuralism in all its approaches, at least to some degree are the following: The world can only be understood on the basis of structural relationships. The first principle of structuralism, then, is that the world is made up of relationships rather than things. This means that the significance of any element cannot be grasped independently of the structure of which it forms a part. Unlike systems theory or structural functionalism that identify elements, structuralism looks at the relationship between elements. Structuralism is concerned with underlying structure not just surface reality. Thus structuralism sees structures as rational or logical and assumes that there is some form of underlying structure (or deep structure). This may be implicit or ostensibly the focus of attention of structuralist analysis. Structuralism argues that actions are determined (in some way) by social structures rather than as affected but different from social structures. The pre-eminence of structures leads to an indifference (or even hostility) towards history (and especially historicism). Structuralism, because of its concern with structural relations, and thus of the meaning of signs/objects etc. as dependent upon their relations with other signs/objects, is strongly anti-empiricist.

Structuralism is not concerned with the role of the active subject, subjects are 'determined' by structures. Structuralism sees social meanings as more than the sum of subjective perspectives. This has implications for the notion of the self. The self comes to appear as a product of conventions, constructed, as it is within a structure of trans-subjective components. The 'I' is not something given, rather it comes to exist mirroring society as the organism grows from infancy.

Structural explanation is guided by a system of norms such as the rules of a language, the collective representations of a society, or the mechanisms of a physical economy. However, such rules are not overt and may be 'unknown' to the structuring agent. They exist, argue Saussure, Freud and Durkheim, in the unconscious. All observation is, structuralists maintain, inherently biased and no 'objective' observation is possible as any observer actually creates something of what he or she observes. It is only the relationship between observer and observed that can be observed. This is what reality consists of. Reality is not the things themselves but the relationships we construct and perceive between entities. Structuralism can be seen to have begun in the work of Vico (1725) who argued that people constantly structure their world. A basic human characteristic, Vico argued, was the capacity to use language to generate myths to make sense of, and thus deal with, the world. In this sense we are all structuralist.

Structuralism has developed as a way of looking at the world that is practiced in a variety of disciplines. In the main it derives from work done in linguistics (Saussure, Pierce, Jakobson) but also has roots in philosophy (Kant), anthropology (Levi-Strauss) and sociology (French sociology) and has been developed in the fields of psychoanalysis (Lacan), film studies (Metz) and media analysis (Derrida, Barthes). It also has a more common currency in sociology notably through those who have been labelled Marxist structuralists, notably Althusser and Poulantzas. The ultimate goal of structuralism for some structuralists is revealing the permanent structures into which individual human acts, perceptions, etc., fit and from which they derive their final nature. Jameson argues that this leads ultimately to a search for the permanent structures of the mind itself.

The three approaches to structuralism are: 1) Semiology derived from Saussurian linguistics and developed as a sociological tool (especially in film and media studies) through

Barthes. It hinges on the analysis of the 'mythical' level of sign systems. 2) The search for deep structures. Levi-Strauss, Piaget, Jameson and, to some extent, linguistic structuralism in general, all are involved in a search for the underlying structures of society, language, myths and even thought. Thus structuralism is a theory of general meanings: ideas have an underlying (rational) structure that determines what we think. 3) Marxist structuralism, which owes most to Althusser's endeavors. It draws on the long tradition of French sociology as well as epistemological debates in the philosophy of science. It sees social structures existing independently of our knowledge of them and of our actions.

Structuralism is a metaphysical system (i.e. 'statements about the world which cannot be proved but must be taken on faith' (Craib, 1984). These metaphysical assumptions are: a) The world is a product of our ideas. This is a 'distortion' of Kant. In extreme form is anti-empiricist. b) A logical order or structure underlies general meanings and c) The subject is trapped by the structure. The idea that there is an unconscious logical structure is common to all structuralist approaches (Larrain 1979). Thus ideology becomes an unconscious phenomenon whose meaning is received but not read (as in Barthes) or a set of images, concepts and structures subconsciously imposed upon people (as in Althusser) or a psychological structure of mind that determines the logic of myth (as in Levi-Strauss).

Structuralism is a method. As a method it sets out to show structural relationships. Various methodological devices are used: a. Linguistic model: based on the work of Saussure and Pierce, it sees language as the underlying structure behind speech. This relies on an analysis of signs and their relationships. b. The anthropological method of Levi-Strauss, which is based on a notion that the human mind arranges world into binary pairs (opposites). c. Semiotics, principally the adaptation of Saussurian semiotics by Barthes.

Sometimes these, or elements of these, are combined and labelled the 'structuralist method'. In general a structuralist method allows for a way to classify what is an apparently infinite number of variations by analyzing structure. For example, when analyzing the Western film Wright (1975) analyses the structural forms of the narrative rather than the multiplicity of roles and actions of the participants.

Types of Structuralism

1) Anthropological Structuralism

Anthropological structuralism is exemplified by the work of Levi-Strauss and his attempt to reveal 'deep structures'. Levi-Strauss extended Saussure's analysis of signification to non-linguistic sign systems, inc. food, myth, economic systems and kinship. Each are constituted through rules of a code.

Prior to *Mythologiques*, Levi-Strauss analyzed individual myths using a linguistic pattern of approach, i.e. 'language-speech' type differences. He exposes the constituent units, mythemes, (like phonemes in normal language) which are basically sentences. The story of the myth is broken down into the shortest possible sentences, written on an index card bearing a number reflecting its sequence in the story. Synchronic bundles of mythemes comparing a *unit of meaning* are assembled, which also allow for sequential reading of the story. Like a musical score, this dual analysis is done via a vertical reading (harmony) and a horizontal reading (melody). Telling the myth is a principle of diachronic speech, understanding involves ignoring this and reading 'vertically through' the text. This vertical reading is through four columns, two represented the terms of the contradiction to be solved and the other two are the mediating terms whose relationship is supposed to reduce the contradiction to a new logical and manageable dimension.

After, *Mythologiques* Levi-Strauss abandons this and concentrates on the interrelationship between myths. 'A sort of spiral methodology is thus employed: one myth illuminates another, which in turn elucidates a third, and so forth. Every aspect is related to its homologue in other myths and the analysis aims at discovering an internal coherence, a general logic of myth. Now the emphasis is much less on the particular contradictions which myth supposedly seeks to solve in a logical manner and more on the general unconscious mental structures behind it.' (Larrain, 1979, p. 148).

In 1961, Levi-Strauss defined anthropology as a branch of semiology following on his work of fifteen years earlier. Levi-Strauss had suggested anthropology follow phonology and analyze signifying phenomena in order to investigate actions or objects that bear meaning, he should postulate the existence of an underlying system of relations and try to see whether the meaning of individual elements or objects is not a result of their contracts with other elements

and objects in a system of relations of which members of a culture are not already aware. (Culler, 19***, p. 94).

Trubetzkoy (1939) had already argued for a phonological approach to social science, on the grounds that social science investigates meaning, that meaning inheres in differentiation of elements and thus cannot be grasped by natural science, which investigates intrinsic (natural) properties of phenomena. The natural sciences have nothing approaching a difference between *langue* and *parole*, whereas social and human sciences are concerned with the social use of material objects and the system of differentiation which give them meaning and value.

Levi-Strauss argues that the psychological structure of mind, common to all humanity, is what determines the logic of myth. It is an unconscious structure, unknown by people. The true nature of cultural life is in its being unconscious. Ultimately, Levi-Strauss is engaged in the search for the universal synchronic logic. [3]

Levi-Strauss [curiously given the arbitrary nature of sign systems] leads towards a notion of the 'translatability' of one rule system from another. This he does through an attempt to reveal 'innate cultural universals', which are not dependent upon social reality. 'The unrealized supposition of Levi-Strauss's anthropology is the ultimate reducibility of the diversity of human cultural practices to a unitary and universal 'depth-grammar' of the mind' (Benton, 1984, p. 12).

The important thing for Levi-Strauss is not that myth may distort reality, but that myth makes sense from a logical point of view. 'In myth, structural anthropology sees a means whereby individual subjects are bound together in their submission to the symbolic representation of the founding and integrity of their social order. But the integration of their lived experience with the intelligible categories of the myth, the means whereby the order sustains itself, is no guarantee of the truth of the myth. On the contrary, the characteristic structuralist detachment of signification from reference implies that whatever 'truth' the myth attains will be disclosed not to the consciousness of the believer, but only to the anthropologist who applies to it structuralist methods of analysis.' (Benton, 1984, p. 13)

The human sciences then exhibit a relation to their object similar to that which the natural sciences exhibit. Levi-Strauss, in common with many other structuralists, has little time for history. He is opposed to any notion of 'man-made' history (Sartre), which he regards as a

modern myth, which also answers to social imperatives. The myth of the French Revolution, for example, motivates revolutionary action but is not necessarily true. For the myth to be true would require that contemporary schemes of interpretation were 'congruent with imperatives of action'. History, then, is not the product of conscious subjects but as a process whose meaning is endowed by the totality of rule systems within which subjects are located. The structure of the cultural system predates the subject who is subordinate to the constituting rules of cultural practices. Subjective projects are devised only within such practices.

The idea of 'man made history', Levi-Strauss also relates to 'presentist' ('Whig') history. He argues that cultures and historical forms are either incommensurable, or they are interpreted selectively from the standpoint of the project of the present. The latter entails the imposition of a spurious continuity upon discrete historical forms and periods, denying the specificity of those periods and cultural forms.

For Levi-Strauss, Sartre's conception of history inhibits analysis. Cultures and historical forms are either incommensurable, or they are interpreted selectively from the standpoint of the project of the present. The latter entails the imposition of a spurious continuity upon discrete historical forms and periods, denying the specificity of those periods and cultural forms. Levi-Strauss draws a direct comparison of this approach with 'primitive' mythology. In myth (particularly creation myths), structural anthropology sees a means whereby individual subjects are bound together in their submission to the symbolic representation of the founding and integrity of their social order. However, the integration of their lived experience with the intelligible categories of the myth, the means whereby the order sustains itself, is no guarantee of the truth of the myth. On the contrary, the characteristic structuralist detachment of signification from reference implies that whatever 'truth' the myth attains will be disclosed not to the consciousness of the believer, but only to the anthropologist who applies to it structuralist methods of analysis.

Levi-Strauss is concerned with the origin and structure of myth. He argues that the structure of myth reveals the structure of the mind, which he sees as autonomous. He does this by assuming what this structure is and then demonstrating that the conceptual meaning of tribal myths is expressed through this structure. The structure is one borrowed from linguistics; the idea of binary oppositions. Strauss claims that if myth exhibits the same binary structure as

phonetics, this structure must be derived from the human mind. In *Mythologiques* he demonstrates the existence of binary oppositions in tribal myths. For Levi-Strauss, this implies that myths signify the mind that evolves them. This psychological concern prevents him from paying particular attention to the way myths of a particular society relate to its social actions or institutions, although he argues meticulously that the myths of totemistic societies serve to resolve conceptual contradictions inherent in those societies.

In analysing myth, Levi-Strauss begins with the notion of classification. In 'scientific' communities, classification is according to abstract or primary qualities. In 'primitive' societies, classification is according to sensible, or secondary, qualities. Levi-Strauss looks at the binary oppositions in the structure of myth. An image of something (a human) is structurally opposed in a myth to an image of something else (an animal). The sensible differences (like human/unlike human) become symbols of conceptual differences (culture/nature). Thus the image of a character (human) in a myth does not come to represent a concept (culture) because of any inherent properties of the image but because of *differences* between it and the image of the character (animal) it is opposed to. Each society has a system of such oppositions and it is through them that myths are (unconsciously) understood by members.

The inherent binary nature of myth, for Levi-Strauss, is simply because myth is the mind imitating itself as object and the (autonomous) mind operates on binary oppositions. This does not adequately address the issue for Wright who notes that Levi-Strauss got the idea from Roman Jakobson who argues that the structure of language is inherently dichotomous. Jakobson's approach, based on Saussure's idea of the diacritical nature of symbols, i.e. that symbols are defined negatively in relation to other terms of the system.

For Jakobson, a dichotomous system means that the symbolic meaning of an image is determined only by differences, similarities are irrelevant. When three or more images/characters are structurally opposed, their symbolic reference becomes more restricted and obscure because fine distinctions are required and thus their interpretation becomes more difficult. On the other hand, when two characters are opposed in a binary structure, their symbolic meaning is virtually forced to be both general and easily accessible because of the simplicity of the differences between them.

Levi-Strauss, therefore, argues that tribal myths are cognitive rather than emotional attempts to classify and understand the world. (Burke takes a similar approach to works of literature in modern societies). Levi-Strauss, Burke and others concentrate on the conceptual dimension of myths (and literature) at the expense of their function as a model of social action. The concern with social symbolism tends to ignore the movement of the story as evidenced in the resolutions of the plot. According to Levi-Strauss, the narrative (syntagmatic) aspect of the myth is to the binary (paradigmatic) aspect as melody is to harmony in music: the former provides the interest, the latter provides the depth. Levi-Strauss also argues that the narrative contains only superficial, or apparent, content; the real, conceptual meaning of myth is established and communicated solely by the structure of oppositions.

For Levi-Strauss, myth designates the underlying sphere of connotation which represents the ideological level. He sees myth as a particular kind of language 'whose purpose is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, as it happens, the contradiction is real).' (Larrain, 1979, p. 142). This, says Larrain, is similar to Marx's concept of ideology, as both see the solution to contradiction as distorting, Marx because it inverts reality and Levi-Strauss because myth is a logical model unable to succeed when facing a real contradiction.

'Levi-Strauss's concept of science tends entirely to substitute the discovery of an order or arrangement in phenomena for their causal explanation. These operations are not necessarily opposed, but when the emphasis lies heavily on the classificatory side without taking into account the cause-effect relationship, science becomes powerless'. (Larrain, 1979, p. 143–144). Larrain argues, however, that Levi-Strauss, emphasis form over content and his myth therefore differs from Marx's ideology. Levi-Strauss's myth respond to a logical problem of human nature, Marx's ideology responds to historical contradiction.

Marx sees ideology as attempting to solve social contradictions and myth as attempting to solve contradictions with nature. In mythology it is nature that is invested with subjective characteristics. Myth exists in primitive classless societies with simple social relations whereas ideology emerges when social relations have become complex enough to produce a class system. As science proceeds and people progressively gain control over the environment, then myth

diminishes as ideology evolves towards more abstract forms whose contradictory character assumes an increasingly deceptive appearance.

Larrain argues that Levi-Strauss's view is at variance with Marx because it ignores the fact that the structures are themselves historically produced through praxis. Myth, for Marx, like ideology deals with concrete historical situations, rather than the 'universal conflict of the human species'. Ideology, for Marx, is always given in the consciousness of individuals through the process of their practice. Ideology is produced in the conjunction of subject and object it is neither pure illusion nor pure mentality. It cannot be said that ideology constitutes a hidden structure which imposes itself upon people without passing through their practice.

The main critiques of Levi-Strauss is that his structuralism entirely ignores content in favour of form and that he tends to be arbitrary in leaving out those elements that do not fit the postulated structure.

Some elements of the 'deep structure' perspective are to be found in some developments of structural linguistics. For example, the search for deep structure of language and the structuralist analysis of texts which relies on the elaboration of opposites. (Hawkes, 1977). This latter, in effect seems to develop an analysis through an assessment of paradigmatic relationships, irrespective of any concerns about mythical or ideological representations.

2) Psychoanalytic structuralism

Psychoanalytic structuralism can be seen in the work of Lacan who traces the constitutive subject to its psychic source. This he does through a re-working of Freudian psychoanalysis. The core of Freud is seen to be his discovery of the nature and significance of the unconscious. Rather than an 'ego-centered' psychoanalysis, Lacan employed the basic concepts and distinctions of structural linguistics to show that the conscious life of the individual is not self-sufficient, and does not carry the means of its own intelligibility. Not only is analysis via language, but Lacan claimed, the unconscious is structured like a language. The Freudian phases of identity constitution are transformed by Lacan into phases in the subjection of this subject to the authority of the culture, i.e. the symbolic order. (Benton, 1984, p. 14)

3) French (Social) Structuralism

French structuralism refers to a general attitude rooted in a French tradition of thought that stands opposed to subject-centered history and subject-constituted knowledge. This goes back as far as Comte and is clearly expressed in Durkheim. For these, human subjects are constituted by their social milieu. The consciousness of the individual subject is a function of external social constructs.

4) Marxist structuralism

Marxist structuralists attempt to combine Marxism with structuralism. They argue strongly that Marx developed a structural analysis of capitalism in his later works, which used history as a context rather than as an analytic tool.

Structural Marxists accept that there is an epistemological break in the work of Marx. Larrain (1979) says that structuralist approaches to Marx see a break in his work and regard *German Ideology* with suspicion as it comes at the point of the break (1845?) 'Structuralism wants to free Marx from a conception of ideology as 'pure speculation' or false consciousness'. (Larrain, 1979, p 154).

Structuralism is opposed to historicism, which supposedly emphasis the role of the subject class and of consciousness in the origin of ideology thus making ideology an arbitrary and psychological creation of individuals. Structuralism advocates a material existence for ideology, which determines the subject. Ideology, then, it's not a false representation of reality because its source is not the subject but material reality itself' (Larrain, 1979, p 154). Structuralist Marxists tend to argue that the economic base is, in the final analysis, the determinant of super structural constructs (although this is by no means a simple economic determinism of some Orthodox Marxism).

Althusser's approach is the best known and most widely debated version of structuralist Marxism. The work draws upon what is seen as Marx's concerns with structure in his later works (*Capital*). Althusser argues that Marx, in analyzing capitalism, is dealing with a system rather than with a historiographical task. Structuralist Marxism sees capitalism as a self-generating system.

Althusser argues that Marx has been misread. First, he proposed a fundamental error in the reading of Marx within an empiricist theory of knowledge. Althusser drew on structuralism

and conventionalism in developing his reconstruction of Marxism. He, thereby, proposed instead an entirely different epistemology whereby the subject matter of Marxism can be identified as:

- a) the real object: the reality that the theory seeks to explain.
- b) the thought object: the theoretical system making up the science.

Theoretical development takes place directly at the level of the thought object. What Althusser is doing is distinguishing clearly between reality and the process whereby we come to know reality. This enables Althusser to present a new theory of reading which involves a dialectic between the theory whose principles govern the reading and the theory contained in the text. Second, Althusser identified an epistemological break in the works of Marx. He interprets Marx's writings as being in two parts: the early Marx which, in he regards as an ideology and the later Marx which he sees as a science. The difference is between an ideology, which formulates a problem (a problematic) that is merely the theoretical expression of the conditions that allow a solution to be imposed, and a science that allows an objective understanding of the theory at work in the text. In this case the text chosen is *Capital*. In principle then the ideology formulates the framework of the problematic; the theory specifies the problematic and the objective solution to the problematic by a symptomatic reading of the text.

There are two outcomes to this symptomatic reading. First, the concept of over-determination. This relates to the notion of totality (about which *Capital* is concerned). A totality is determined by the contradictions between the social relations of production and the material processes of production (forces of production). Totality is not a harmonious structure but it possesses a certain hierarchal order and autonomy. Its unity is that of a complex of instances at uneven stages of development relative to each other. In the last resort, however, a totality is determined by the structure-in-dominance. That is, the totality is over-determined. Second, the notion of theoretical practice. The totality is the sum of the instances and the practices associated with each instance. Practice is the process of transformation of a determinate raw material into a determinate product. Althusser proposes to discuss three forms of practice: ideological, political and theoretical. Political and ideological practice are manifested in the super structural agencies Althusser calls the *ideological state apparatuses* (civil society) and *repressive state apparatuses* (political society). However these practices are designed to maintain the hidden

mystery of capitalist relations of production. Theoretical practice is that which can reveal the hidden mystery.

Theoretical practice works at three levels: Generality I, Generality II and Generality III. Generality I comprises the raw material of theoretical practice - the body of concepts upon which the process will set to work to transform them. Generality II comprises the system of concepts whose unity comprises the 'theory of the science by defining the field in which the problems of the science must be posed. Generality III is the 'concrete-in-thought' the knowledge produced by the work of G II on G I. There is always a real transformation between GI and GIII; the 'work' between GI and GIII takes place in thought.

CHAPTER VI

GENETIC STRUCTURALISM

Genetic structuralism is a term applied by Goldmann to his historicist Marxist methodology. Methodologically, Goldmann (1971) sees all human behavior as a significant structure that may be understood. He distinguishes understanding or comprehension, which is the description of basic universal and permanent structures, from explanation, which proceeds via the identification of laws and causes. Goldmann regards comprehension alone as non-genetic structuralism. Genetic structuralism in effect combines understanding and explanation. It involves an *internal* analysis aiming to understand the social structure by revealing its immanent structure and an *external* analysis aiming to explain the structure by inserting the structure as a functional element in another larger structure. Thus, genetic structuralism sees comprehensive description and causal explanation as two sides of the same process. Every partial structure is explained by its subsumption under a wider structure but each partial structure must be understood through comprehensive description. Structures are dynamic and the result of praxis.

Genetic structuralism is based on the assertion that the significance of social phenomena is given by their being structured and upon the fact that these significant structures are the result of a genesis and cannot be understood or explained independent of this genesis. The genesis of structures must be sought in the wider structure which subsumes it. Every human fact is a process of structuration, which tends towards a provisional equilibrium. The equilibrium becomes contradictory and, for that reason, is at the same time a process of deconstruction. This dynamism is not merely internal to the structure in question but is closely related to the dynamism of a wider structure which also tends to a provisional equilibrium. The reference to the structure in itself is description or comprehension, the reference to the wider structure which subsumes it is explanation (Larain, 1979, p. 123). As an example of what he means Goldmann refers to literary analysis. To understand it one needs to go beyond mere analysis of text. But to impute the author's intentions is essentially an arbitrary procedure. The author's intentions are determined by his *Weltanschauung*. Goldmann raises two problems in attempting to assess an author's intentions first, the delimitation of the author's output so as to isolate the important or significant texts, second the problem of contextualisation.

What is needed, he argues, is a structure within which to locate both text and author. As a historicist, Goldmann sees this structure to be the *Weltanschauung*, which permits of the

counterposing of oppositional frameworks. The Weltanschauung of a class, he argues, is manifested in the works of 'gifted' members of the class who convey this perspective coherently.

Weltanschauung and Ideology in Goldmann's Genetic Structuralism.

Utilizing the concept of Weltanschauung as fundamental structuring principle raises certain problems when Goldmann approaches ideology. Following Lukacs, Goldmann distinguishes the real (i.e. factual) consciousness from the possible consciousness of the class, the latter being what the class might attain without changing its nature. Thus Kant's 'tragic vision' is justified by the situation of the 18th century German bourgeoisie 'which aspired to a revolution it was unable to bring about'. According to Goldman, the frustrated class created a tragic vision that refers a real contradiction to a new conceptual one or imaginary opposition, which makes the situation bearable. (In this Goldman reflects Levi-Strauss' logic of myth but differs from Strauss in that Goldmann privileges class struggle not logical paradoxes, and concentrates on historical and not universal structures.)

Goldmann causes confusion by sometimes equating Weltanschauung with ideology and sometimes differentiating between them. When used interchangeably they form a general concept that elaborates 'truth'. Ideologies exist on different planes, and different ideologies have different scientific values. The criteria for objective assessment is based on which allows for a critical understanding of the other. Thus Marxism provides a full understanding and critique of Saint-Simonism but not vice-versa.

The above view of ideology and Weltanschauung dispenses with Marx's negative or critical aspect of ideology and reflects Lenin's formulation of ideology as the embodiment of the class interest. Goldmann, however, confuses the issue by attempting a distinction in which he refers to ideology as partial and distorted whereas Weltanschauung is total. For Goldmann, ideologies are products of defensive postures of declining class interests. Weltanschauungen are related to social classes which 'possess an ideal bearing on the whole of society'. In constituting ideology as a distorted Weltanschauung the critical nature of ideology is lost and the ascendant Weltanschauung, *per se*, transcends ideology.

Larrain (1979) argues that Goldmann's identification of class consciousness with the production of literary and philosophical works is a problematic element in genetic structuralism

as it fails to take account of the mediation of the individual and of other cultural products. Furthermore, Goldman's requirement that only relevant literature be taken into account introduces an arbitrary element for what determines how authentic literature may be distinguished from inauthentic.

In Marx, class consciousness is the collective consciousness of the class based upon praxis. To relate ideology in the sense of *Weltanschauung* to class consciousness ignores the practical aspect of class consciousness. Larrain argues that, in effect, in Goldman's usage, class consciousness, ideology and *Weltanschauung* become confused and overlapping concepts. He suggests that Goldman's contribution consists of 'comparative study of cultural production and an analysis of its social determination by the class struggles of the historical period in which it emerges'. (Larrain, 1979: 129).

Goldman derives genetic structuralism from the work of Lukacs. Goldman develops his historicist perspective from Lukacs's (1923) 'History and Class Consciousness'. Despite Lukacs's later reservations about this work, written in the post Russian Revolutionary era, Goldman (1971) considers that it contains methodological, philosophical and sociological elements relevant to a contemporary understanding of the social world. For Goldman, Lukacs (1923) was the first expression of a rebirth of dialectical thought in Marxism. Apart from Rosa Luxemburg and the, then, unknown works of Gramsci, Lukacs was alone in opposing the positivist orthodoxy of the Russian Bolsheviks. This orthodoxy constituted a return to mechanism and Stalinist positivism from 1922 and picked up momentum after the death of Lenin. For Goldman, then, Lukacs provided a return to the essence of Marx's thought. Lukacs's theoretical analyses constitute a vital element in the development of the metascience of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Central to this is the idea that the collective, not the individual subject, is the proper focus of historical enquiry. Specifically, Lukacs argues that social classes are the only historical subjects, and that the ideology (?) of the individual subject is a deforming ideology, which is itself the product of a collective subject. Social classes, as trans-individual subjects, are accorded a privileged position (not available to, for example, families and professional groups) because they are the only ones

'Whose consciousness and action are directed to the organization of the sum of interhuman relationships and relationships between men and nature, with a view to either

keeping them as they are or of transforming them in a more or less radical manner; this is to say they they are the subject *par excellence* of historical action, and, at a level of consciousness, the subject of the creation of conceptual and imaginative worlds.’ (Goldmann, 1971:72).

The relating of historical process to the trans-historical subject (social class) requires, says Goldmann, a radical reversal of scientific perspectives and methodology. This is provided by Lukacs. Goldmann sees the individual as having both a libidinal and a collective existence and that these aspects are difficult to disentangle. The relationship between the *individual* subject and the surrounding world is, at the level of knowledge, inevitably static and contemplative. It required the identity of the subject and the object of thought and action. So the contemplative individual could only move into the field of action via a radical break which identified theory with praxis. For Goldmann, all other philosophies concentrated on the individual and only attempted to avoid a dichotomy of thought and action via speculative transcendentalism. Thus, Goldmann saw Lukacs’s reworking of Marx as important because it opposed the notion that fact and value were independent judgements with no necessary connection.

Lukacs’s dialectical approach, encapsulated in the concept of the transhistorical subject offered a resolution to the numerous dichotomies (subject–object, thought–action, science–conscience, fact–value, part–whole, synchrony–diachrony, static–dynamic, political–moral, ends–means) that divorced theory from praxis. The trans-individual subject as basis of a dialectical analysis makes redundant such dichotomies. In terms of the science–conscience dichotomy the duality disappears because the study of the object is simultaneously a transforming self-knowledge of the subject. Only the structuring force of history is important in dialectical analyses because it takes account of the limitation on action of prevailing social conditions and the resulting mental categories. However, this limitation provides an arena for social class action within which this very action modifies the social structures thereby affecting the scope of this arena, in Goldmann’s terms, the structuring of history itself effects the freedom of social classes. The dichotomous relationships posited above, then, are not permanent and static but are a function of historical circumstances.

Methodologically, Goldmann notes that dialectical thought (like psychoanalysis at the individual level) involves an internal analysis aiming to understand the social structure by revealing its immanent structure (and thus the potential significance of the various elements of a

given relationship) *and* an external analysis aiming to ‘explain them by inserting the structure as a functional element in another larger structure.’ (Goldmann, 1971: 76).

Goldmann says, therefore, that despite their differences the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, Freud and Lukacs are all varieties of genetic structuralism based on the idea that all human acts must be regarded as actions whose aim is to establish a more satisfactory equilibrium between the subject and the world surrounding it. Goldmann reasserts Marx’s distinction between class in itself and class for itself. The actual consciousness of a class must be perceived in the light of the potential consciousness (the potential reality which the class seeks to bring into being).

The McGraw-Hill (2004) in ‘Sociological Theory’ defines genetic structuralism as an approach which involves the study of objective structures that cannot be separated from mental structures that, themselves, involve the internalization of objective structures. Structuralism is a theory that depends on the view that there are hidden or underlying structures that determine what transpires in the social world.

Here we get a precis of Goldmann's famous analysis of Pascal and the Jansenists. It seems to me this analysis stands on its own regardless of what thinks about the basic philosophical postulates of collective subjects and the like. Goldmann ends up addressing the general question of meaning and the dilemmas involved, for example, in Althusser, who poses the alternative of Spinoza vs. Feuerbach, interpreted in dubious ways. This somehow ends up as a choice between mechanism and idealism, a dichotomy which plagues the history of Marxism as well as social science in general. [pp. 76-77] Both Hegel and Marx reject this dichotomy. Then there is a return to the discussion of Jansenism, and eventually of contradiction and coherence in world views. [p. 83]

Goldmann concerns himself with the problem of adequation of scientific knowledge, but his bearing toward the subject-object relation obviates a standard materialist/realist view. Goldmann is quite willing to criticize Stalinism, admit the difficulties of revolutionary prospects in the current situation (1960s), and so forth. And of course he is not shy about linking Heidegger to Hitler. Goldmann is pretty much silent about the late Lukacs and Lukacs' repudiation of the young Lukacs. And I think this is the major symptom of my puzzlement over this book. Goldmann criticizes both Lukacs and Heidegger, but is also sympathetic to both on some level. But ultimately on what basis? The basis looks suspicious to me. Furthermore, while

it is a standard cliché of the artificial construct known as "Western Marxism" to excoriate dialectical materialism and link it to Stalinist orthodoxy, my own opinion is that idealism is just as or more congenial to Stalinism. Early Lukacs with his collective subject and subject-object identity seems to be *more* conducive to Stalinism in some respects than something like *The Destruction of Reason*, which comes into being with Stalin's gun pointed to Lukacs' head. Hence Goldman's ontological foundation, the basis for his sympathy to these two figures, and his silence about the later Lukacs, all place a question mark over this book.

So this is what I find troubling about Goldman's argument. I suppose everyone's viscera reacts differently. My problem here is not with the alleged bloodlessness of epistemological and ontological foundations, but the reverse: how they can tangibly muck up our understanding of the world. Goldman, piggybacking on Hegel and early Lukacs, finds his way out of the dichotomy variously characterized as mechanist-idealist, Kantian, dualist, via the fundamental notions of totality, subject-object identity, and the collective subject. It's a neat package, I admit, but I think it's inadequate.

Literary works have four approaches (Abrams, 1979: 3-29): mimetic approach, pragmatic approach, expressive approach, and objective approach. Structuralism theory included in the objective approach, namely literary works stand-alone, autonomous, regardless of the surrounding nature, both the reader and even the author himself. Therefore, in order to understand a work of literature, the literature must be analyzed through structural elements.

In the development, perceived structuralism theory less valid in the provision of literary meaning. If literature is only understood from the intrinsic elements, the literature can be considered apart from its social context. Literature should always relate to society and history surrounding the creation of literary works. Therefore, the theory of structuralism has been criticized, especially from people who subscribe to the theory of genetic.

Hippolyte Taine (1766-1817) was a French critic and historian who first introduced the theory of genetic structuralism. He tried to review the literature from the perspective sociological and trying to develop a scientific insights in the literature approach. According to him, literature is not only imaginative but also a certain form of mind at the time the work was born. This is the first genetic concept but used different methods. Genetic Structuralism is a theory under the sociology of literature. Genetic structuralism was born from a French

sociologist Lucien Goldmann (1975). Appearance caused, dissatisfaction against the approach of structuralism, which studies only focused on the intrinsic elements without regard to extrinsic elements of literary works, literary works are considered to be separated from its social context. Genetic factors include genetic structuralism in literature, literary means the origin of the genetic literature. The factors involved in the origin of literature and is the author of historical fact are also conditioned the literature when it was created. Genetic structuralism trying to fix weaknesses structuralism approach, by inserting genetic factors in understanding literature. Genetic structuralism often referred to historical structuralism, which considers the typical literary work is analyzed in terms of the historical. Goldmann intends to bridge the gap between the approaches of structuralism (intrinsic) and sociological approaches (extrinsic). From the perspective of the sociology of literature, genetic structuralism has significance, because it puts the literature as a baseline study, sees it as a system of multi-layered meanings which constitute a totality that can not be separated (Damono, 1979:42). Essentially literary work is always related to society and history are also conditioned the creation of literary works, although not entirely under the influence of external factors. According to Goldmann, the structure is not static, but rather is the product of an ongoing historical process, a process of structuration and destructuration who lived and internalized by the society of origin literature is concerned (Faruk, 1999b:12).

Goldmann believes in the existence of homology between the structure of a literary work with the structure of society because both are products in the same structuration activity (Faruk, 1999b: 15). To support his theory, Goldmann build coherent set of categories to one another which he calls the genetic structuralism. The categories is a fact of humanity, the collective subject, literary structure, world view, understanding and explanation.

1) Fact of Humanity

The fact of humanity is all of the result of activity or human behavior, both verbal and physical, which seeks understood by science (Faruk, 1999b: 12). Activity or human behavior must adjust to the life of the neighborhood. The individuals come together to form a community. With society, humans can adapt to the environment. Humans and the surrounding environment are always in a process of reciprocal structuration conflicting but complementary at the same time. Therefore, the fact that humanity is a meaningful structure.

2) The Collective Subject

Collective subject is part of humanity in addition to the fact the individual subject. Humanity facts arise because of human activity as the subject. The author is a subject that is in the middle of society. Therefore there are in fact human society. Literary works created by the author. Thus the literary work is more of a duplication of the fact that humanity has been mixed by the author. All ideas can be regarded as a representative author of a social group. Therefore, assessment of the literature can not be separated with the author to get a thorough sense. Collective subject is a collection of individuals who form a single unit and its activities. Goldmann (in Faruk, 1999:15) specify them as a social class in the Marxist sense, because that's the group that is proven in history as the group has created a complete and comprehensive view of the life and that has influenced the development of human history.

3) Literary Structure

Literature is an expression of the views in an imaginary world, and in his attempt to express the world view, the author creates the characters, objects, and imagination. In his essay entitled *The Sociology of Literature: Status and Problem Method*, Goldmann said that in almost all of his research is focused on the elements of unity, the effort reveals a coherent and unified structure that governs the entire universe of literary works (Faruk in Chalima, 1994).

4) World View

Goldmann also developed the concept of a world view that can be manifested in literature and philosophy. According to him, the categorical structure which is a whole complex of ideas, aspirations, and feelings, which links together the members of a particular social group called world view (Faruk, 1999a: 12). Understanding of the literary work is an attempt to understand the mix of elements, intrinsic and extrinsic elements. According to Goldmann, the author was not as individuals, but represent a class (class) society (Satoto, 1986:175). Historical background, age and social condition helped the creation of literary works both in terms of content or in terms of form and structure.

5) Understanding and Explanation

Goldmann describes the method: to be realistic, must be historical sociology; vice versa, to be scientific and realistic, historical research should be sociological (Damono, 1979:43). Thus, genetic structuralism is an alternative theory to analyze literary works between historical and sociological. Literary works should have coherence between structures with each other. Outside elements and the elements in both importance in building literature. Cohesiveness of the two elements gives completeness, that literature can not only be seen from within(text) literature, but forming elements from outside. Literary work trying to uncover the problems facing mankind. The problems that some have been solved and some not found a way out. Therefore, Goldmann tries to develop the dialectical method. Dialectical method developed two concepts, namely "understanding-explanation" and "Overall-section. "Understanding is a description of the structure of the object being studied, whereas explanation is move to incorporate into larger structures. Genetic structuralism looked not only as a work of literature that have loose structure, but the intervention of other factors (social factors) in the process of its creation.Literary work is understood as the totality of the structure blend in and outside the structure.

There are many ways a postface to, or retrospective theoretical framework for, Goldmann's famous study *The Hidden God : a study of Tragic vision in the Pensees of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine* (1959). Here, Goldmann begins by arguing that 'cultural creation' is but one of the many 'sectors of human behavior' (156). He attempts to analyze some of the fundamental principles of genetic structuralism as applied to the human sciences in a term normally associated with the work of the child psychologist Jean Piaget – who had an enormous influence on Goldmann – but which Goldmann uses in a much more expansive way as something of a synonym for Hegelian Marxist theory. He also offers a few reflections concerning the analogy and opposition between the two great complementary schools of criticism associated with this method: Marxism and psychoanalysis. The basis of genetic structuralism is the hypothesis that all human behavior is an attempt to give a meaningful response to a particular situation and tends, therefore, to create a balance between the subject of action and the object on which it bears, the environment. This tendency to equilibrium, however, always retains an unstable, provisional character, in so far as any equilibrium that is more or less satisfactory between the mental structure of the subject and the external world culminates in a situation in which human behavior transforms the world and in which this transformation renders the old equilibrium inadequate and engenders the tendency to a new equilibrium that will in turn

be superseded. Thus human realities are presented as two-sided processes; deconstruction of old structurations and structuration of new totalities capable of creating equilibria capable of satisfying the new demands of the social groups that are elaborating them. He concludes that the scientific study of human facts, whether economic, social, political, or cultural, involves an effort to elucidate those processes by uncovering both the equilibria which they are destroying and those toward which they moving.

A whole series of problems suggest themselves, one of which is the problem of knowing who in fact is the subject of thought and action. Goldmann lists three possible responses that of the empiricists, rationalists and, more recently phenomenologists who identify this subject with the individual; certain types of romantic thought which reduce the individual to a mere epiphenomenon and see in the collectivity the only real, authentic subject (an approach that borders on mysticism in so far as it denies the individual all reality and autonomy) and believes that the individual may and must become identified wholly in the totality; and dialectical Hegelian, and above all Marxist thought which, while accepting that the collective is the real subject, stress that this collectivity is no more than a complex network of inter-individual relations and that it is important always to specify the structure of this network and the particular place that the individuals occupy within it – the individuals appearing quite obviously as the immediate, if not ultimate, subjects of the behavior being studied.

The question arises, however, as to why the work should in the first place be attached to the social group and not to the individual who wrote it. This is important given that the dialectical perspective does not deny the importance of the individual and the rationalist, empiricist, or phenomenologist positions do not deny the reality of the social environment which they equate with an external conditioning, that is to say, as a reality whose action on the individual has a causal character. In Goldmann's view, the answer is simple : when it tries to grasp the work in its cultural (literary, philosophical, artistic) specificity, the study that confines its attention solely or primarily to the author may ... account, at best, for its internal unity and the relation between the whole and its parts; but it cannot establish in a positive way a relation of the same type between this work and the man who created it. (Goldmann, 1975:157)

Goldmann argues that the psychological structure is too complex a reality for one to be able to analyze it with the help of various sets of evidence concerning an individual who is no

longer alive, or an author whom one does not know personally, or even on the basis of the intuitive or empirical knowledge of an individual to whom one is bound by close bonds of friendship. This is why he repeats his point made in the *Hidden God* that no psychological study can account for the fact that Racine wrote precisely the dramas and tragedies that he did and explain why he could not write the plays of Corneille and Moliere.

In studying great cultural works, sociological study finds it easier to uncover necessary links by relating them to collective unities whose structuration is much easier to elucidate. These unities are complex networks of inter-individual relations in which the Complexity of the psychology of individuals derives from the fact that each of them belongs to a fairly large number of different groups (familial, occupational, national, friends and acquaintances, social classes, et.) and that each of these groups acts upon his consciousness thus helping to form a unique, complex, and relatively incoherent structure, whereas conversely, as soon as we study a sufficiently large number of individuals belonging to one and the same social group, the action of other different social groups to which each of them belongs and psychological elements due to this membership cancel themselves out, and we are confronted with a much simpler, more coherent structure. (Goldmann, 1975:158)

This is why Goldmann contends that the relation between the truly important work and the social group, which - through the medium of the creator - is, in the last resort, the true subject of creation, are of the same order as relations between the elements of the work and the work as a whole. In both cases, we deal with the relations between the elements of a comprehensive structure and the totality of this structure, relations of both a comprehensive and explanatory kind. For this reason, he argues, "in so far as science is an attempt to discover necessary relations between phenomena, attempts to relate cultural works with social groups qua creative subjects proves much more effective than any attempt to regard the individual as the true subject of creation.

However, two problems arise in turn. Firstly, that of determining what is the order of the relations between the group and the work; secondly, that of knowing between which works and which groups relations of this type may be established. On the first point, genetic structuralism, exemplified by the work of Georg Lukacs represents a real turning-point in the sociology of literature. All other schools of literary sociology, old or contemporary, try in effect to establish

relations between the contents of literary works and those of the collective consciousness, an approach which presents two major conveniences: A) traces of elements of the content of the collective consciousness, or, quite simply of the immediate empirical aspect of the social reality that surrounds him, is almost never either systematic or general and is to be found only at certain points in his work. In other words, a sociological study oriented, exclusively or principally, towards the search for correspondences of content, allows the unity of the work to escape, and with it its specifically literary character; and B) the reproduction of the immediate aspect of social reality and the collective consciousness in the work is more frequently found in the work of writers of little creative force who are each content to describe or recount his personal experience without transposing it. For this reason, literary sociology oriented towards content often has an anecdotal character and is most effective in the study of works of average importance or literary tendencies, as opposed to major works of creation. Genetic structuralism offers a total change of orientation in its view that the collective character of literary creation derives from the fact that the structures of the world of the work are homologous with the mental structures of certain social groups or is in intelligible relation with them, whereas on the level of content, that is to say, of the creation of the imaginary worlds governed by these structures, the writer has total freedom (Goldmann, 1975: 159). The writer creates the imaginary worlds by inserting the immediate aspect of his individual experience into his works.

Goldmann summarizes the relation between the creative group and the work in this way; the group constitutes a process of structuration that elaborates in the consciousness of its members affective, intellectual, and practical tendencies towards a coherent response to the problems presented by their relations with nature and their inter-human relations. However, these tendencies fall far short of effective coherence, in so far as they are counteracted in the consciousness of individuals by the fact that each of them belongs to a number of other social groups. Moreover, mental categories exist in the group only in the form of tendencies moving towards a coherence I have called a world-view, a view that the group does not therefore create, but whose constituent elements it elaborates (and it alone can elaborate) and the energy that makes it possible to bring them together. The great writer (or artist) is precisely the exceptional individual who succeeds in creating a given domain, that of the literary (or pictorial, conceptual, musical, etc.) work, an imaginary, coherent, or almost strictly coherent world, whose structure corresponds to that towards which the whole of the group is tending; as for the work, it is, in

relation to other works, more or less important as its structure moves away from or close to rigorous coherence (Goldmann, 1975:160)

This points to a crucial difference between what he terms the sociology of contents and structuralist sociology; the first sees in the work a reflection of the collective consciousness, the second sees it on the contrary as one of the most important constituent elements of this collective consciousness, that element that enables the members of this group to become aware of what they thought, felt, and did without realizing objectively its signification. This is why the former approach best deals with average works while the latter, the genetic structuralist approach, is more effective in dealing with the masterpieces of world literature. Such works represent the expression of world views, that is to say, slices of imaginary or conceptual reality, structured in such a way that, without it being necessary to complete their structure in essence, one can develop them into over-all worlds.

It is the point that an epistemological problem presents itself; though all human groups act on the consciousness, affectivity, and behavior of their members, only the action of certain particular, specific groups encourage cultural creation. The structuration of slices of imaginary reality takes place on the part of only those groups whose consciousness tends to an over-all vision of man. He contends that social classes are the only groups of this kind (though, he warns, this may not be true of non-European societies where other factors may come into play. He is of the view the affirmation of the existence of a link between great cultural works and social groups oriented towards an over-all restructuring of society or towards its preservation eliminates at the outset any attempt to link them to a number of other social groups, notably to the nation, generations, provinces, and family, to mention only the most important. He admits that these groups do act on the consciousness of its members and therefore on that of the writer, but they can explain only certain peripheral elements of the work and not its essential structure. For example, he argues, a common Frenchness does not explain the work of Pascal, Descartes, or Gassendi, nor that of Racine, Corneille and Moliere to the very extent that these works express different and even opposite views, although their authors all belong to seventeenth century French society, though it may explain the presence of certain formal elements common to these thinkers.

Goldmann then turns his attention to what he terms the most important problem of all sociological research of a genetic-structuralist type: that of the carving-up of the object which one is striving to comprehend. One can study structures only if one has defined the set of immediate empirical data that make it up, while one can define these empirical data only in so far as one already possesses a more or less elaborate hypothesis about the structure that gives them unity. This presents a problem (sometimes called that of the hermeneutical circle) of something of the order of which comes first, the chicken or the egg? Goldmann's solution: one sets out with the hypothesis that one may gather a number of facts into a structural unity, one tries to establish between these facts the maximum number of comprehensive and explanatory relations by trying to include in them other facts that seem alien to the structure that one is uncovering, one repeats this operation by successive approximations until one arrives at a structural hypothesis that can account for a perfectly coherent set of facts. (Goldmann, 1975:161-162)

Those who study cultural creation find themselves at an advantage: great literary, artistic, or philosophical works constitute coherent signifiatory structures for which reason the object of study in question is always already to some extent carved up. However, each such work can contain heterogeneous elements that undermine its unity. Furthermore, such unity is diminished the more one considers all the writers of one and the same writer.

Hence, Goldmann's recommendation that one begin with the analysis of each of a writer's work and study them in the order of composition. Proceeding in this way will enable us to make provisional groupings of writings on the basis of which we can seek in the intellectual, political, social, and economic life of the period, structured social groupings, in which one can integrate, as partial elements, the works being studied, by establishing between them and the whole intelligible relations and, hopefully, homologies. The progress of a piece of genetic-structuralist research consist in the fact of delimiting groups of empirical data that constitute structures, relative totalities which can later be inserted as elements in other larger, but similar structures, and so on.

This method has the double advantage first of conceiving of the whole set of human facts in a unitary manner and, then, of being both comprehensive and explanatory. The reason for this is that the elucidation of a signifiatory structure constitutes a process of comprehension, whereas its insertion into a larger structure is, in relation to it, a process of explanation. He then

illustrates what he means by arguing that to elucidate the tragic structure of one of Racine's plays is a process of comprehension (or understanding) just as to insert them into extremist Jansenism by uncovering the structure of this school of thought is a process of comprehension, but a process of explanation in relation to the writings of Racine. In turn, to insert Jansenism, as a movement of ideological expression, into the history of the seventeenth century noblesse de robe is to explain Jansenism and to understand the noblesse de robe and so on.

In short, the passage from appearance to essence, from the partial, abstract, empirical datum to its concrete, objective signification is brought about by the insertion into relative, structured, and signifiatory totalities – every human fact may, and even must possess a certain number of significations, differing according to the number of structures into which it can be inserted.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF HEGEMONY

The term 'hegemony' refers to the leadership, dominance or great influence that one entity or group of people has over others. Historically, this term often referred to a city-state or country that exerted power over other city-states or countries indirectly rather than through military force. Modern uses of 'hegemony' often refer to a group in a society having power over others within that society. For example, the wealthy class might be said to have hegemony over the poor because of its ability to use its money to influence many aspects of society and government.

Strinati (1995: 165) stated “Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the spontaneous consent of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.”

The word hegemony is derived from the Greek verb *hegeisthai*, which translates as ‘to lead’. Early leaders who were able to exert control and influence over a group of people might be referred to as hegemons. A hegemon had to have the support from at least one dominant class of people to keep the population as a whole from rebelling against the leadership. Hegemony is certainly not the same thing as dictatorship. (Gramsci, 1977:45)

Hegemony is the leadership that goes to domination. The concept of hegemony begins when there is a superiority that dominates inferiority. It is related to the view of oriental that as a powerful country, the most powerful group must be dominant or superior. Antonio Gramsci thought that the function of culture is only as an instrument to create people who can not adjust themselves. The concept is based on the assumption that the specialty of the social groups to express themselves into ways, as the hegemony of domination and as the hegemony intellectual morality. The most powerful group uses the hegemony concept to dominate, to possess a country which has no leadership. The groups who think that they have a power may rule or dominate the country with a political superiority.

Based on the conflict, hegemony can be divided into three kinds: integral, decadent, and minimal. Integral hegemony is a relation between the dominant and the subordinate groups and shows a strong moral and intellectual unity, thus creating a good relationship between them. In this kind of hegemony, the subordinate group shows respect to the dominant group. The subordinate group obeys the rules which are made by the dominant group, and hence their relationship will not bring about conflicts. Decadent hegemony is a hostile relation between the dominant and the subordinate groups that has become antagonistic to one another. In this kind of hegemony, there is no sense of belonging between the subordinate group and the authority. This relationship produces a hidden conflict that will make political integrity collapse easily. Minimal hegemony is indicated by the conflict between the social classes in which none of those classes is willing to compromise in order to gain mutual benefits. The superior will do anything that is possible to maintain their power and to make the minor go along with their rules and on the

country. Minimal hegemony occurs when the superior groups do not want to adapt their interest and aspirations with those of another class in the society.

No man wants to live in the shadow of another one's power, while on the other hand man never gives up the ambition of influencing and even controlling his fellow countrymen. Therefore, the democracy is invented to alleviate the conflict between the instinct of chasing power and the will of equality, namely, democracy is a system to prevent the emergence of dictatorship and ensure the sharing power of all citizens. However, the principle of democracy abided by in the domestic political life never gets the upper hand in the struggle with hegemony in international relations during long history of human being. To some extent, the contemporary and modern international history is also the history of chasing hegemony by powers. According to patterns or methods taken by the hegemonist to maintain hegemony, three different types of hegemonies exist. They are strength hegemony, institution hegemony and culture hegemony.

Strength hegemony is the traditional hegemony. It emphasizes the importance of force. Using force and threat against the territory integrity and political independence of any countries challenging the existing hegemon is its philosophy, which partly results in the outbreak of First World War and Second World War and the advent of cold war. In practice, any hegemon worshipping and cherishing the concept of strength hegemony will concentrate on developing, maintaining and making use of their military and economic power. They tend to ignore the international organizations and laws, or acknowledge them as tools to serve their interests or their rivals.

Institution hegemony is the way and strategy to consolidate existing hegemony structure through designing, maintaining and enforcing international institution. It builds on the existing unchallengeable power of hegemon, such as political and economic power. In other word, institution hegemony depends on strength hegemony. However, contrary to the latter, it attaches much importance to benevolent rule, that is, rule by virtue rather than by force, which decides its emphasis on the importance of mutual interests. Making best use of mutual interests instead of despotism, hegemon wins the support of other countries in the process of establishing international institution. Through international institution created according mostly to its will, hegemon cooperates with other main powers to rule to world.

Culture hegemony ranks highest in the three types of hegemonies. It controls the world through dominating the international main stream cultures. In practice, culture hegemony calls for the hegemon to take advantage of his political, cultural and institutional creation power to disseminate its value standard worldwide, influence other countries and gradually assimilates others. Hence, culture hegemony emphasize civil power and cultural and value identity. Through achieving similar cultures, hegemon can better realize its aim of controlling the world.

To conclude, there are three types of hegemonies. They are different from one another in pattern or level. Meanwhile, they depend on and mix up one another in practice, so it is hard to distinguish them. However, their aim is same, that is, to satisfy the will of hegemon to control the world.

Minimal hegemony is indicated by the conflict between the social classes in which none of those classes is willing to compromise in order to gain mutual benefits. The superior will do anything that is possible to maintain their power and to make the minor go along with their rules and on the country. Minimal hegemony occurs when the superior groups do not want to adapt their interest and aspirations with those of another class in the society.

Minimal hegemony occurs when the dominance put more emphasis in executing their domination, rather than implement a strong leadership. Moreover, the dominance did not share collective interest and aspiration with other members of their society. In this type of hegemony a significant conflict arise due instability and disintegration, usually marked by war or struggle for independence, etc. The dominance cannot establish policies to cater society's interest.

“Minimal hegemony is a regime under which the leading state does not wish to lead anybody, that is, there is no desire to persuade other states to share its interest and aspirations. Dominance becomes more important than exercising leadership per se. At this juncture, significant conflict has evolved between the interest of the leading and subordinate states. Minimal hegemony is achieved through what Gramsci calls “ Passive Revolution”. The leading state is no longer powerful enough to fashion policies capable of serving collective interests, but the subordinate states are too weak and disorganized to bring together counter hegemonic bloc. The leading state maintains hegemony through co-optation of the leaders of the rival bloc, leading the formation of an even broader collective leadership. Nevertheless, minimal hegemony

is characterized by instability and disintegration. However, coercion is not employed as a result of the co-optation of rival leading states.” (Thomas, Daryll C. 2001: 21)

Integral hegemony is a relation between the dominant and the subordinate groups and shows a strong moral and intellectual unity, thus creating a good relationship between them. In this kind of hegemony, the subordinate group shows respect to the dominant group. The subordinate group obeys the rules which are made by the dominant group, and hence their relationship will not bring about conflicts.

In integral hegemony, a harmony is established between dominance and the dominated party. The dominated party respected the dominance, and the dominance have strong leadership that advance the community, not only satisfying oneself existential requirements but also encourages its cadres in increasing their economic and productive activity. In integral hegemony, conflict is none existence.

“Integral hegemony is the strongest and most consolidated form of power. It describes the evolution of highly established leading state characterized by a well-developed sense of shared objectives and lack of overt antagonism among various subordinate states. The leading state is capable of simultaneously satisfying its own economic goals and those of the system as a whole. Integral hegemony thus defines as a particular type of power marked not only by strong intellectual leadership and the formation of consensus, but also by policies through which the ruling strata “really cause the whole community to advance, not merely satisfying its own existential requirements, but continuously increasing its cadres for the conquest of ever new spheres of economic and productive activity”. (Thomas, Daryll C. 2001: 21).

Decadent hegemony is a hostile relation between the dominant and subordinate groups that has become antagonistic to one another. In this kind of hegemony, there is no sense of belonging between the subordinate group and the authority. This relationship produces a hidden conflict that will make political integrity collapse easily.

Decadent hegemony occurs when the dominance cannot meet everyone’s interest with their ideas and achievements of the system, according to Fermia. It resulted in fragile cultural, social and political integration. Conflict existed and ready to burst beneath the surface. However, the conflict is not openly realized. In addition, Fermia stated a harmony cannot be establishes and the potential for social disintegration is present.

“In modern capitalist society, Gramsci claims, bourgeois economic dominance, whether or not it faces serious challenge, has become outmoded: no longer is it capable of representing or furthering, everyone’s interest. Neither is it commanding unequivocal allegiance from the non-elite: ‘as soon as the dominant group has exhausted its function, the ideological bloc tends to decay’. Thus, the potential for social disintegration is ever-present: conflict lurks just beneath the surface. In spite of the numerous achievements of the system, the needs, inclinations, and mentality of the masses are not truly in harmony with the dominant ideas. Though widespread, cultural and political integration is fragile; such a situation might be called decadent hegemony. (Femia, Joseph V. 1981:47)

No man wants to live in the shadow of another one’ power, while on the other hand man never gives up the ambition of influencing and even controlling his fellow countrymen. Therefore, the democracy is invented to alleviate the conflict between the instinct of chasing power and the will of equality, namely, democracy is a system to prevent the emergence of dictatorship and ensure the sharing power of all citizens. However, the principle of democracy abided by in the domestic political life never gets the upper hand in the struggle with hegemony in international relations during long history of human being. To some extent, the contemporary and modern international history is also the history of chasing hegemony by powers. According to patterns or methods taken by the hegemonist to maintain hegemony, three different types of hegemonies exist. They are strength hegemony, institution hegemony and culture hegemony.

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institution hegemony depends on strength hegemony. However, contrary to the latter, it attaches much importance to benevolent rule, that is, rule by virtue rather than by force, which decides its emphasis on the importance of mutual interests. Making best use of mutual interests instead of despotism, hegemon wins the support of other countries in the process of establishing international institution. Through international institution created according mostly to its will, hegemon cooperates with other main powers to rule to world.

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Strinati (1995:166) stated “it can be argued that Gramsci’s theory suggests that subordinated groups accept the ideas, values and leadership of the dominant group not because they are physically or mentally induced to do so, nor because they are ideologically indoctrinated, but because they have reason of their own.” From Gramsci’s view, the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based on two, equally important facts: power of the wealthy and intellectual and influence. But in this new era of information, this one point is as important as those two, it is media power.

Power of the wealthy.

In many democracies, the wealthy class can be said to have hegemony over the middle class and the poor. Wealthy individuals can contribute the most money to the campaigns of certain political candidates, political parties or causes. To ensure re-election or continued contributions, government officials who use those funds might then pass laws or create policies that favor those who contributed to the campaigns. People who don’t have the money to contribute, however, are unable to influence the government in the same way. One argument against significant dominance over the poor by the wealthy is that wealthy people don’t all share the same political ideologies and different members of the upper class might actually contribute to competing candidates, parties or causes. Also, not all wealthy people favor policies that benefit only the wealthy, such as certain tax laws, and many wealthy people support policies that

benefit the poor. This means that the wealthy class' money isn't necessarily being used to increase its dominance or influence over the poor and might even be helping the poor.

Intellectual and influence

Hegemony more often refers to the power of a single group in a society to essentially lead and dominate other groups in the society. This might be done by controlling forms of communication, by influencing voters or by influencing government leaders. Some lobbying groups, for example, might have hegemony status over leaders in congress. Rules that would prohibit or limit political spending by special interest groups are designed to reduce their dominance and allow individual voters to have more control.

A single country might also be considered to be hegemonical if it has enough power to influence the way that other countries behave. States that are hegemonies, such as the British Empire of the mid-19th century, have extraordinary influence over many other countries. Hegemony that exists in a single country means that the dominant and most influential group often is able to affect government policies to its advantage.

Media power.

Beside money, other forms of influence can be used by one group to dominate others. For example, control of the media can influence things such as what shows get aired or canceled and the degree to which a television station covers or does not cover certain news stories. In the late 20th century and early 21st century, however, this dominance was reduced because the internet gave individuals and small companies more access and control over different forms of media, such as news and music.

People became able to self-publish music, videos, texts and other works of art rather than being under the control of broadcasting, publishing or other types of corporations. In addition, a greater variety of these works became available to consumers. News came to be disseminated through blogs and social networking websites in addition to traditional media outlets. All of these things reduced the hegemony of large corporations in the news and entertainment industries.

CHAPTER VIII

FEMINISM AND LITERATURE

Imagine you get a new job. On the first day of work, you're getting a tour of the office building, and you notice something strange: only men work here! You wonder where the women are, and you ask your new boss. He looks surprised at the question and says, 'What are you, some kind of feminist?' If this happened to you, what would you think? Would you be offended by the implication that you're a feminist? What exactly is feminism, anyway?

First, let's define feminism in general. The global idea of feminism refers to the belief that men and women deserve equality in all opportunities, treatment, respect, and social rights. In general, feminists are people who try to acknowledge social inequality based on gender and stop it from continuing. Feminists point out that in most cultures throughout history men have received more opportunities than women.

While this basic idea of feminism seems simple enough, there are many people who misunderstand what the goal of feminism is. Some people imagine that all feminists are angry, bitter women who only want to subjugate men! Of course, this stereotype offends actual feminists. Why is there such a big difference between stereotype and reality when it comes to feminists? One of the reasons for this discrepancy might be because there are, in fact, lots of different, specific types of feminism. Let's cover four of those types now - radical feminism, socialist feminism, cultural feminism, and liberal feminism. Maybe you are a feminist, and you didn't even know it!

Now, imagine you're in a bus in 1963, traveling from Birmingham, Alabama, to Washington, DC, to participate in the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, a historic event and site of Martin Luther King Jr.'s famous 'I Have a Dream' speech. You travel this distance in spite of the potential for violence from white segregationists. You believe you have an opportunity to make your life better by adding your voice to the larger group.

As a form of political protest and consciousness raising, the civil rights movement of the 1960s inspired the liberal feminist movement. The term consciousness raising refers to the sharing of personal experiences and information among people in a particular group.

Francine is a politically active feminist. Feminism is a group of social theories, moral philosophies and related political movements that advocates social, political and economic equality between the sexes. Francine and other feminists want to ensure that women have all the same rights and opportunities as men, which has not been the case through much of history. In fact, women didn't get the right to vote in the United States until 1919 with the adoption of the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution - well over 100 years after the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights were penned.

The seeds of modern feminism were planted with the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill. Wollstonecraft wrote the *Vindication of the Rights of Women* in 1792, which argued that women should have the same rights as men, including the right to education, earnings and property. John Stuart Mill, in his 1869 book, *The Subjection of Women*, also argued that women should have the same legal rights as men.

We can break the historical development of feminism into three different waves. Let's take a look at each.

Historians define the first wave of feminism as being from the middle of the 19th century to the early 20th century. The feminist movement during the first wave was primarily concerned with fundamental political rights, such as the right to vote; economic rights, such as the right to own property apart from a husband; rights to education and employment; and fairer marriage laws.

The second wave of the movement began in the 1960s. The focus of the second wave was for employment and reproductive rights. Some notable laws were passed during this period, including the Equal Pay Act; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibited gender discrimination in employment; and Title IX, which prohibits discrimination in education. The landmark Supreme Court decisions of *Griswold v. Connecticut*, involving birth control, and *Roe v. Wade*, regarding abortion, greatly extended female reproductive rights.

The third wave of feminism is the latest stage of the movement. The third wave is in part a reaction to a perceived overemphasis of the movement to focus on middle-class mainstream white females. The third wave movement is more pluralistic and divergent than the past waves

and is diffused from a national movement to the grassroots level. Concerns include such things as globalism, technology and other forces that affect women.

Another key characteristic of third wave feminism is the recognition of the value of the feminine. For example, because of traditional feminine characteristics of nurturing and empathy, females are often superior at dispute resolution. Additionally, modern feminism is also about choice. Modern feminism believes that women should have the choice to pursue all the opportunities that are available to men but also have the right to choose 'traditional' roles as well. The key point is not what you choose to do but that you have the choice.

Feminist theory, or feminism, is support of equality for women and men. Although all feminists strive for gender equality, there are various ways to approach this theory, including liberal feminism, socialist feminism and radical feminism. Let's take a look at the basic feminist ideas and various approaches to achieving gender equality.

Both females and males who identify themselves as feminists disagree on many things. That being said, most feminists agree on basic principles as follows:

- **Working to increase equality:** Feminist thought links ideas to action, insisting we should push for change toward gender equality and not just talk about it.
- **Expanding human choice:** Feminists believe that both men and women should have the freedom to develop their human interests and talents, even if those interests and talents conflict with the status quo. For example, if a woman wants to be a mechanic, she should have the right and opportunity to do so.
- **Eliminating gender stratification:** Feminists oppose laws and cultural norms that limit income, educational and job opportunities for women.
- **Ending sexual violence & promoting sexual freedom:** Feminists feel that women should have control over their sexuality and reproduction.

For many decades, psychology had a predominantly male influence. Therapists who led the way in creating the field were male, and psychological theories about human development were generalized to men and women .

When the women's movement arose in the 1960s, however, there was much more attention paid to women as independent individuals. More women began working outside the home and seeking a greater sense of equality with male counterparts. While these changes were taking place in society, they impacted a change in the counseling field. Some therapists were joining in the advocacy of women's empowerment by helping their clients understand and develop their uniqueness. Three of the most influential female therapists were Carol Gilligan, Linda Silverman, and Sharon Conarton.

Silverman and Conarton believed that the current psychological theories on development came from a male understanding of the world. They noticed a leaning toward logic, independence, and linear growth in these theories as well as a discouragement of the feminine traits of prizing relationships, sensitivity, and circular development. Gilligan agreed that rather than seeing feminine tendencies, like dependency, as a problem, therapists should appreciate them and encourage them to grow in healthy ways.

Silverman and Conarton drew from some of Gilligan's ideas and decided to create their own developmental theory specifically for women. It is often referred to as a feminist development theory. Right now, we are going to meet Mary, who is going to illustrate the typical stages of female development as she goes to counseling.

Mary is going to counseling for support and guidance. She is a 35-year old, divorced woman with a son who is 8 years old. Mary is a kind-hearted, encouraging woman. She works hard at an advertising firm, and she feels that she has to compete with her male peers. She is the type of person others praise for 'always being there' and helping them with whatever they need. Her brother is an alcoholic, and she finds herself driving him places or giving him money because of his addiction. She feels taken advantage of but doesn't know how to stop helping others.

The gender difference perspective examines how women's location in, and experience of, social situations differ from men's. For example, cultural feminists look to the different values associated with womanhood and femininity as a reason why men and women experience the social world differently. Other feminist theorists believe that the different roles assigned to women and men within institutions better explain gender difference, including the sexual

division of labor in the household. Existential and phenomenological feminists focus on how women have been marginalized and defined as the “other” in patriarchal societies. Women are thus seen as objects and are denied the opportunity for self-realization.

Feminism is the belief that women should have equal rights to men. In consequence, the feminist movement fights for equal rights and opportunities for women. • There are many different kinds of feminism and feminists themselves tend to disagree about the ways in which women are disadvantaged and what exactly should be done to get equal rights. For example, ‘social feminists’ believe that women are exploited by the capitalist system both at work and in the home.

It can be argued that there have been real improvements in the way that women are now represented in the media possibly because of the increase in women working in the media, sometimes in positions of power. However, many would argue that women are still represented in a negative and stereotypical way and are still a long way from enjoying equal power in media institutions. Feminists would argue that this reflects and reinforces the unequal social, economic and political position of women.

The term feminism can be used to describe a political, cultural or economic movement aimed at establishing equal rights and legal protection for women. Feminism involves political and sociological theories and philosophies concerned with issues of gender difference, as well as a movement that advocates gender equality for women and campaigns for women's rights and interests. Although the terms "feminism" and "feminist" did not gain widespread use until the 1970s, they were already being used in the public parlance much earlier; for instance, Katherine Hepburn speaks of the "feminist movement" in the 1942 film *Woman of the Year*.

According to Maggie Humm and Rebecca Walker, the history of feminism can be divided into three waves. The first feminist wave was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the second was in the 1960s and 1970s, and the third extends from the 1990s to the present. Feminist theory emerged from these feminist movements. It is manifest in a variety of disciplines such as feminist geography, feminist history and feminist literary criticism.

Feminism has altered predominant perspectives in a wide range of areas within Western society, ranging from culture to law. Feminist activists have campaigned for women's legal rights

(rights of contract, property rights, voting rights); for women's right to bodily integrity and autonomy, for abortion rights, and for reproductive rights (including access to contraception and quality prenatal care); for protection of women and girls from domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape; for workplace rights, including maternity leave and equal pay; against misogyny; and against other forms of gender-specific discrimination against women.

During much of its history, most feminist movements and theories had leaders who were predominantly middle-class white women from Western Europe and North America. However, at least since Sojourner Truth's 1851 speech to American feminists, women of other races have proposed alternative feminisms. This trend accelerated in the 1960s with the Civil Rights movement in the United States and the collapse of European colonialism in Africa, the Caribbean, parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. Since that time, women in former European colonies and the Third World have proposed "Post-colonial" and "Third World" feminisms. Some Postcolonial Feminists, such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty, are critical of Western feminism for being ethnocentric. Black feminists, such as Angela Davis and Alice Walker, share this view.

Simone de Beauvoir wrote that "the first time we see a woman take up her pen in defense of her sex" was Christine de Pizan who wrote *Epitre au Dieu d'Amour* (Epistle to the God of Love) in the 15th century. Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Modesta di Pozzo di Forzi worked in the 16th century. Marie Le Jars de Gournay, Anne Bradstreet and Francois Poullain de la Barre wrote during the 17th.

Feminists and scholars have divided the movement's history into three "waves". The first wave refers mainly to women's suffrage movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (mainly concerned with women's right to vote). The second wave refers to the ideas and actions associated with the women's liberation movement beginning in the 1960s (which campaigned for legal and social rights for women). The third wave refers to a continuation of, and a reaction to the perceived failures of, second-wave feminism, beginning in the 1990s.

8.1 The First Wave Feminism

First-wave feminism refers to an extended period of feminist activity during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Originally it focused on the promotion of equal contract and property rights for women and the opposition to chattel marriage and ownership of married women (and their children) by their husbands. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, activism focused primarily on gaining political power, particularly the right of women's suffrage. Yet, feminists such as Voltairine de Cleyre and Margaret Sanger were still active in campaigning for women's sexual, reproductive, and economic rights at this time. In 1854, Florence Nightingale established female nurses as adjuncts to the military.

In Britain the Suffragettes and, possibly more effectively, the Suffragists campaigned for the women's vote. In 1918 the Representation of the People Act 1918 was passed granting the vote to women over the age of 30 who owned houses. In 1928 this was extended to all women over twenty-one. In the United States, leaders of this movement included Lucretia Mott, Lucy Stone, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony, who each campaigned for the abolition of slavery prior to championing women's right to vote; all were strongly influenced by Quaker thought. American first-wave feminism involved a wide range of women. Some, such as Frances Willard, belonged to conservative Christian groups such as the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. Others, such as Matilda Joslyn Gage, were more radical, and expressed themselves within the National Woman Suffrage Association or individually. American first-wave feminism is considered to have ended with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1919), granting women the right to vote in all states.

The term first wave was coined retrospectively after the term second-wave feminism began to be used to describe a newer feminist movement that focused as much on fighting social and cultural inequalities as political inequalities.

In this early stage of feminist criticism, critics consider male novelists' demeaning treatment or marginalisation of female characters. First wave feminist criticism includes books like Marry Ellman's *Thinking About Women* (1968) Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1969), and Germaine Greer's *The Female Eunuch* (1970). An example of first wave feminist literary analysis would be a critique of William Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew* for Petruchio's abuse of Katherina.

The First Wave 19th century and early 20th century UK & US. It won improved rights for women in marriage and property. Its biggest achievement was winning some political power. In the UK the Suffragettes and Suffragists campaigned for the women's vote. In 1918, women over thirty who owned property won the vote and in 1928 it was extended to all women over twenty-one.

8.2 The Second Wave Feminism

The Second Wave 1960s & 1970s. It extended the fight beyond political rights to education, work and the home. In 'The Feminine Mystique' (1963) Betty Freidan argues women were unhappy because of the feminine mystique. She said this was a damaging ideal of femininity which she called, "The Happy Housewife" and it restricted women to the role of housewife and mother, giving up on work and education.

Second-wave feminism refers to the period of activity in the early 1960s and lasting through the late 1980s. The scholar Imelda Whelehan suggests that the second wave was a continuation of the earlier phase of feminism involving the suffragettes in the UK and USA. Second-wave feminism has continued to exist since that time and coexists with what is termed third-wave feminism. The scholar Estelle Freedman compares first and second-wave feminism saying that the first wave focused on rights such as suffrage, whereas the second wave was largely concerned with other issues of equality, such as ending discrimination.

The feminist activist and author Carol Hanisch coined the slogan "The Personal is Political" which became synonymous with the second wave. Second-wave feminists saw women's cultural and political inequalities as inextricably linked and encouraged women to understand aspects of their personal lives as deeply politicized and as reflecting sexist power

The French author and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir wrote novels; monographs on philosophy, politics, and social issues; essays; biographies; and an autobiography. She is now best known for her metaphysical novels, including *She Came to Stay* and *The Mandarins*, and for her treatise *The Second Sex*, a detailed analysis of women's oppression and a foundational tract of contemporary feminism. Written in 1949, its English translation was published in 1953. It sets out a feminist existentialism which prescribes a moral revolution. As an existentialist, she accepted Jean-Paul Sartre's precept existence precedes essence; hence "one is not born a woman,

but becomes one." Her analysis focuses on the social construction of Woman as the Other. This de Beauvoir identifies as fundamental to women's oppression. She argues women have historically been considered deviant and abnormal and contends that even Mary Wollstonecraft considered men to be the ideal toward which women should aspire. De Beauvoir argues that for feminism to move forward, this attitude must be set aside.

Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) criticized the idea that women could only find fulfillment through childrearing and homemaking. According to Friedan's obituary in the *The New York Times*, *The Feminine Mystique* "ignited the contemporary women's movement in 1963 and as a result permanently transformed the social fabric of the United States and countries around the world" and "is widely regarded as one of the most influential nonfiction books of the 20th century." In the book Friedan hypothesizes that women are victims of a false belief system that requires them to find identity and meaning in their lives through their husbands and children. Such a system causes women to completely lose their identity in that of their family. Friedan specifically locates this system among post-World War II middle-class suburban communities. At the same time, America's post-war economic boom had led to the development of new technologies that were supposed to make household work less difficult, but that often had the result of making women's work less meaningful and valuable.

The phrase "Women's Liberation" was first used in the United States in 1964 and first appeared in print in 1966. By 1968, although the term Women's Liberation Front appeared in the magazine *Ramparts*, it was starting to refer to the whole women's movement. Bra-burning also became associated with the movement, though the actual prevalence of bra-burning is debatable. One of the most vocal critics of the women's liberation movement has been the African American feminist and intellectual Gloria Jean Watkins (who uses the pseudonym "bell hooks") who argues that this movement glossed over race and class and thus failed to address "the issues that divided women." She highlighted the lack of minority voices in the women's movement in her book *Feminist theory from margin to center* (1984).

Elaine Showalter pioneered gynocriticism with her book *A Literature of Their Own* (1977). Gynocriticism involves three major aspects. The first is the examination of female writers and their place in literary history. The second is the consideration of the treatment of female characters in books by both male and female writers. The third and most important aspect

of gynocriticism is the discovery and exploration of a canon of literature written by women; gynocriticism seeks to appropriate a female literary tradition.

In Showalter's *A Literature of Their Own*, she proposes the following three phases of women's writing: The 'Feminine' Phase - in the feminine phase, female writers tried to adhere to male values, writing as men, and usually did not enter into debate regarding women's place in society. Female writers often employed male pseudonyms during this period. The 'Feminist' Phase - in the feminist phase, the central theme of works by female writers was the criticism of the role of women in society and the oppression of women. The 'Female' Phase - during the 'female' phase, women writers were no longer trying to prove the legitimacy of a woman's perspective. Rather, it was assumed that the works of a women writer were authentic and valid. The female phase lacked the anger and combative consciousness of the feminist phase.

Do you agree with Showalter's 'phases'? How does your favourite female writer fit into these phases? The Madwoman Thesis. Made famous by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's *The Madwoman in the Attic* (1979), the eponymous madwoman is Bertha Jenkins of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*, Rochester's mad wife hidden away in the attic of Thornfield Hall. Gilbert and Gubar's thesis suggests that because society forbade women from expressing themselves through creative outlets, their creative powers were channelled into psychologically self-destructive behaviour and subversive actions. A great example of the madwoman thesis in action is in Charlotte Perkins Gilman's 1892 short story *The Yellow Wallpaper*.

Read *Jane Eyre* with the madwoman thesis in mind. Are there connections between Jane's subversive thoughts and Bertha's appearances in the text? How does it change your view of the novel to consider Bertha as an alter ego for Jane, unencumbered by societal norms? Look closely at Rochester's explanation of the early symptoms of Bertha's madness. How do they differ from his licentious behavior?

French Feminism, led by critics such as Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray, relies heavily on Freudian psychology and the theory of penis envy. French feminists postulate the existence of a separate language belonging to women that consists of loose, digressive sentences written without use of the ego. How does Jane Austen fit into French Feminism? She uses very concise language, yet speaks from a woman's perspective with confidence. Can she be placed in Showalter's phases of women's writing? Dr. Simon Swift of the

University of Leeds gives a podcast titled 'How Words, Form, and Structure Create Meaning: Women and Writing' that uses the works of Virginia Woolf and Sylvia Plath to analyze the form and structural aspects of texts to ask whether or not women writers have a voice inherently different from that of men. In Professor Deborah Cameron's podcast English and Gender, Cameron discusses the differences and similarities in use of the English language between men and women. In another of Professor Paul Fry's podcasts, Queer Theory and Gender Performativity, Fry discusses sexuality, the nature of performing gender, and gendered reading.

With the movement from Renaissance to Restoration theatre, the depiction of women on stage changed dramatically, in no small part because women could portray women for the first time. Dr. Abigail Williams' adapted lecture, Behn and the Restoration Theatre, discusses Behn's use and abuse of the woman on stage.

What were the feminist advantages and disadvantages to women's introduction to the stage? The essay Who is Aphra Behn? addresses the transformation of Behn into a feminist icon by later writers, especially Bloomsbury Group member Virginia Woolf in her novella/essay A Room of One's Own. How might Woolf's description and analysis of Behn indicate her own feminist agenda? Behn created an obstacle for later women writers in that her scandalous life did little to undermine the perception that women writing for money were little better than whores. In what position did that place chaste female novelists like Frances Burney or Jane Austen? To what extent was the perception of women and the literary vogue for female heroines impacted by Samuel Richardson's Pamela? Students could examine a passage from Pamela and evaluate Richardson's success and failures, and look for his influence in novels with which they are more familiar, like those of Austen or the Brontë sisters. In Dr. Catherine's Brown's podcast on Eliot's Reception History, Dr. Brown discusses feminist criticism of Eliot's novels. In the podcast Genre and Justice, she discusses Eliot's use of women as scapegoats to illustrate the injustice of the distribution of happiness in Victorian England. Professor Sir Richard Evans' Gresham College lecture The Victorians: Gender and Sexuality can provide crucial background for any study of women in Victorian literature.

8.3 The Third Wave Feminism

The Third Wave 1990s – present. Widened the feminist movement and its ideas beyond middle class, white women, addressing the different disadvantages women experience because of, for example their race, ethnicity and class. Some argue that seeing the history of feminism in just these three waves can ignore the fight for equal rights and the end to discrimination by women outside the large feminist movements in the UK and US, including working class women and black and ethnic minority women.

Third-wave feminism began in the early 1990s, arising as a response to perceived failures of the second wave and also as a response to the backlash against initiatives and movements created by the second wave. Third-wave feminism seeks to challenge or avoid what it deems the second wave's essentialist definitions of femininity, which (according to them) over-emphasize the experiences of upper middle-class white women.

A post-structuralist interpretation of gender and sexuality is central to much of the third wave's ideology. Third-wave feminists often focus on "micro-politics" and challenge the second wave's paradigm as to what is, or is not, good for females. The third wave has its origins in the mid-1980s. Feminist leaders rooted in the second wave like Gloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, Chela Sandoval, Cherrie Moraga, Audre Lorde, Maxine Hong Kingston, and many other black feminists, sought to negotiate a space within feminist thought for consideration of race-related subjectivities.

Third-wave feminism also contains internal debates between difference feminists such as the psychologist Carol Gilligan (who believes that there are important differences between the sexes) and those who believe that there are no inherent differences between the sexes and contend that gender roles are due to social conditioning.

8.4 Postfeminism

In her definitive essay "Postfeminism," Sarah Gamble notes that the term "post-feminism" originated in the early 1980s in the news and other popular media. She says media commentators typically used the term to indicate "joyous liberation from the ideological shackles of a hopelessly outdated feminist movement" (Gamble 2006: 36). A clear, if highly unsympathetic, example of this understanding of the term can be found in Susan Faludi's best-selling book, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against Women* (1991), in which she names

postfeminism as covertly hostile to the broader aims of the women's movement. As Gamble explains:

For Faludi, postfeminism *is* the backlash, and its triumph lies in its ability to define itself as an ironic, pseudo-intellectual critique on the feminist movement, rather than an overtly hostile response to it. In a society which largely defines itself through media-inspired images, women are easily persuaded that feminism is unfashionable, passé, and therefore not worthy of serious consideration. "We're all 'post-feminist' now, they assert, meaning not that women have arrived at equal justice and moved beyond it, but simply that they themselves are beyond even pretending to care."(Gamble 2006: 38)

Post-feminism 1980s – present Includes a wide range of reactions to the feminist movement and is often critical of the feminist ideas. The word 'post' suggests that feminism isn't relevant anymore because women have won equal rights. Other post feminists ideas argue that younger women don't see feminism as relevant to them now. They may still believe in equal rights for women, but either see themselves as individuals, not part of a feminist movement or don't want to use the word 'feminist'. This has been criticised by feminists as a way of 'manufacturing consent' for the fact that women are still unequal, by getting women to accept their unequal position in society.

Post-feminism describes a range of viewpoints reacting to feminism. While not being "anti-feminist," post-feminists believe that women have achieved second wave goals while being critical of third wave feminist goals. The term was first used in the 1980s to describe a backlash against second-wave feminism. It is now a label for a wide range of theories that take critical approaches to previous feminist discourses and includes challenges to the second wave's ideas. Other post-feminists say that feminism is no longer relevant to today's society. Amelia Jones wrote that the post-feminist texts which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s portrayed second-wave feminism as a monolithic entity and criticized it using generalizations.

In the tradition of analyzing the popular that has long marked out our discipline, we are prompted to come to grips with postfeminism in part because its language and conceptualization are now so pronounced a feature of popular discourse. Existing scholarship on postfeminist media culture tilts heavily toward analysis of the romantic comedies and female-centered sitcoms and dramas that have been so strongly associated with female audiences since the 1990s. This In

Focus section is designed in part to highlight the influence of a postfeminist mindset in examining a wider spectrum of films. Our hope is to dismantle any tendency we might have to assume that postfeminist effects are felt only in recognizably, reliably "female-centered" genres. The essays here help to establish the wider currency of postfeminism and postfeminist themes and archetypes in such genres as crime and noir and in independent as well as mainstream films.

Writing elsewhere on the emergence in the 1990s of the erotic thriller in its direct-to-video and mainstream versions, Linda Ruth Williams underlined the importance of feminism to the genre's female audience.³ The starting point for these postfeminist debates is a recognition that by the late 1990s representational verisimilitude required an acknowledgment of feminism as a feature of the cultural milieu. Yet, crucially, such acknowledgment has frequently taken the form of a prepackaged and highly commodifiable entity, so that discourses having to do with women's economic, geographic, professional, and perhaps most particularly sexual freedom are effectively harnessed to individualism and consumerism. Crudely, freedom is construed as the freedom to shop (and to cook), albeit, as Charlotte Brunsdon notes here, with the option of an ironic mode. Although a variety of films and genres of the late 1990s and early 2000s hype empowerment, these texts do not sustain any easy or straightforward relationship to women's experiences and social health. Indeed, scholars, popular critics, and mass audiences often report a "hollow quality" at the heart of many postfeminist media texts.

Within contemporary popular culture, it is clear that certain kinds of female agency are recognizably and profitably packaged as commodities. Typically, texts of this form are directed at a female audience even while covertly acknowledging **[End Page 107]** male viewers/voyeurs. This packaging involves both inclusions and exclusions, as Linda Mizejewski demonstrates here in her analysis of the now seemingly ubiquitous "female dick." And, as Chris Holmlund notes, it was through the 1990s and into the 2000s that genres such as crime and action opened up the possibility of roles for African American women and Latinas, as well as for white female stars, in big-budget, high-profile films.⁴ These (limited) inclusions are not coincidental; postfeminism already incorporates a negotiation with hegemonic forces in simultaneously assuming the achievement and desirability of gender equality on the one hand while repeatedly associating such equality with loss on the other. That such fictions tend to exclude even as they include, propagating an environment for ethnically and racially diverse protagonists that is devoid of

social or political context—at least explicitly—is also no surprise. Even so, our instinct is to resist any temptation to dismiss the development of popular, consumer-led versions of feminism as simply more of the (patriarchal) same.

To some extent, the problem postfeminism poses for scholars interested in engaging with contemporary gender culture resides precisely in its characteristic double address. The achievement of certain important legal rights and enhanced visibility for women (in areas including law, politics, and education) are positioned alongside a persistently articulated dissatisfaction with...

One of the earliest uses of the term was in Susan Bolotin's 1982 article "Voices of the Post-Feminist Generation," published in *New York Times Magazine*. This article was based on a number of interviews with women who largely agreed with the goals of feminism, but did not identify as feminists.

Some contemporary feminists, such as Katha Pollitt or Nadine Strossen, consider feminism to hold simply that "women are people". Views that separate the sexes rather than unite them are considered by these writers to be sexist rather than feminist.'

In her book *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women*, Susan Faludi argues that a backlash against second wave feminism in the 1980s has successfully re-defined feminism through its terms. She argues that it constructed the women's liberation movement as the source of many of the problems alleged to be plaguing women in the late 1980s. She also argues that many of these problems are illusory, constructed by the media without reliable evidence. According to her, this type of backlash is a historical trend, recurring when it appears that women have made substantial gains in their efforts to obtain equal rights.

Angela McRobbie argues that adding the prefix post to feminism undermines the strides that feminism has made in achieving equality for everyone, including women. Post-feminism gives the impression that equality has been achieved and that feminists can now focus on something else entirely. McRobbie believes that post-feminism is most clearly seen on so-called feminist media products, such as Bridget Jones's *Diary*, *Sex and the City*, and *Ally McBeal*. Female characters like Bridget Jones and Carrie Bradshaw claim to be liberated and clearly enjoy

their sexuality, but what they are constantly searching for is the one man who will make everything worthwhile.

Angela McRobbie has written several books, especially about young women and the media. She argues that many feminist ideas from the past aren't seen as relevant by young women now. Her first famous study was on the teenage girls magazine 'Jackie'. Then in 'Feminism and Youth Culture: From Jackie to J17'(1991), she came to a more positive conclusions about media representations of young women. She argued that there were some positive aspects to women's magazines, with ideas that could empower their young female audience, for example how to enjoy sex or learning about their bodies. In 'The Aftermath of Feminism'(2008), she explored how the media encouraged women to consent to and play a part in negative media representations, for example lads mags competitions to appear on front covers or makeover programmes that ask the female audience to be critical of other women's bodies.

The Beauty Myth – Naomi Wolf (1991). Wolf argues that women are oppressed by the pressure to fit into a myth or false ideal of beauty. Feminism may have won new rights, but they are still held back by an obsession with physical appearance and a very narrow definition of beauty, for example to be white, thin and made- up. This beauty myth is socially constructed and helps to maintain patriarchy, where men still have power in society. Women buy into this myth, helping to create hegemony, where the values are accepted even by those that are harmed by them.

French feminism refers to a branch of feminist thought from a group of feminists in France from the 1970s to the 1990s. French feminism, compared to Anglophone feminism, is distinguished by an approach which is more philosophical and literary. Its writings tend to be effusive and metaphorical, being less concerned with political doctrine and generally focused on theories of "the body." The term includes writers who are not French, but who have worked substantially in France and the French tradition such as Julia Kristeva and Bracha Ettinger.

In the 1970s French feminists approached feminism with the concept of *écriture féminine*, which translates as female, or feminine writing. Helene Cixous argues that writing and philosophy are phallogentric and along with other French feminists such as Luce Irigaray emphasizes "writing from the body" as a subversive exercise. The work of the feminist psychoanalyst and philosopher, Julia Kristeva, has influenced feminist theory in general and

feminist literary criticism in particular. From the 1980s onwards the work of artist and psychoanalyst Bracha Ettinger has influenced literary criticism, art history and film theory. However, as the scholar Elizabeth Wright pointed out, "none of these French feminists align themselves with the feminist movement as it appeared in the Anglophone world.

Feminist theory is an extension of feminism into theoretical or philosophical fields. It encompasses work in a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, economics, women's studies, literary criticism, art history, psychoanalysis and philosophy. Feminist theory aims to understand gender inequality and focuses on gender politics, power relations and sexuality. While providing a critique of these social and political relations, much of feminist theory focuses on the promotion of women's rights and interests. Themes explored in feminist theory include discrimination, stereotyping, objectification (especially sexual objectification), oppression and patriarchy.

The American literary critic and feminist Elaine Showalter describes the phased development of feminist theory. The first she calls "feminist critique," in which the feminist reader examines the ideologies behind literary phenomena. The second Showalter calls "gynocriticism," in which the "woman is producer of textual meaning" including "the psychodynamics of female creativity; linguistics and the problem of a female language; the trajectory of the individual or collective female literary career and literary history." The last phase she calls "gender theory," in which the "ideological inscription and the literary effects of the sex/gender system" are explored. The scholar Toril Moi criticized this model, seeing it as an essentialist and deterministic model for female subjectivity that fails to account for the situation of women outside the West.

Several submovements of feminist ideology have developed over the years; some of the major subtypes are listed below. These movements often overlap, and some feminists identify themselves with several types of feminist thought.

Anarcha-feminism (also called anarchist feminism and anarcho-feminism) combines anarchism with feminism. It generally views patriarchy as a manifestation of involuntary hierarchy. Anarcha-feminists believe that the struggle against patriarchy is an essential part of class struggle, and the anarchist struggle against the State. In essence, the philosophy sees

anarchist struggle as a necessary component of feminist struggle and vice-versa. As L. Susan Brown puts it, "as anarchism is a political philosophy that opposes all relationships of power, it is inherently feminist".

Important historic anarcha-feminists include Emma Goldman, Federica Montseny, Voltairine de Cleyre and Lucy Parsons. In the Spanish Civil War, an anarcha-feminist group, Mujeres Libres ("Free Women") linked to the Federacion Anarquista Iberica, organized to defend both anarchist and feminist ideas.

Contemporary anarcha-feminist writers/theorists include Germaine Greer, L. Susan Brown and the eco-feminist Starhawk. Contemporary anarcha-feminist groups include Bolivia's Mujeres Creando, Radical Cheerleaders, the Spanish anarcha-feminist squat La Eskalera Karakola, and the annual La Rivolta! conference in Boston.

CHAPTER IX

TYPES OF FEMINISM (PART 1)

The new pluralism of the feminist movement has created different types of feminism. There are three basic forms of feminism: liberal, social and radical feminism. Liberal feminism is rooted in classic liberal thought and believes that individuals should be free to develop their own talents and pursue their own interests.

This approach sees gender inequalities as rooted in the attitudes of our social and cultural institutions. Liberal feminists do not see women's equality as requiring a reorganization of society, but they do seek to expand the rights and opportunities of women.

They focus mainly on protecting equal opportunities for women through legislation. Passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 was a big step forward for liberal feminist agenda, which in part states that, 'Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.' To date, 35 states have ratified the amendment; 38 are needed for it to become part of the U.S. Constitution. The 15 states that have not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment include those in the Deep South, Midwest and Southwest and include Florida, Missouri and Nevada.

9.1 Liberal Feminism

Both socialist feminism and radical feminism can be distinguished from the main theoretical strand in first wave feminism - equal rights feminism or liberal feminism. This version of feminism continued to exist into the 1950s and 1960s. Early activists in the WLM tended to ignore it or be dismissive of it, but in many ways liberal feminism was reinvigorated as a result of the emergence of second wave feminism. The emphasis of liberal feminism is on inequality between men and women in the public sphere of life - employment, education and politics.

Many liberal feminists explain women's exclusion or inequality with reference to ideas of female inferiority or incapacity that inform the upbringing and education of both men and women. Liberal feminists seek to challenge ideas and practices that treat women as second class citizens while leaving relatively unchallenged other areas such as sexuality, reproduction and domestic labor.

This is where the label 'liberal' comes from. Liberalism can be seen as the dominant ethos of contemporary society and so it indicates that liberal feminists are not challenging capitalism or patriarchy or any other fundamental structures of society, but rather looking for the removal of barriers that prevent women operating effectively in the public sphere on equal terms with men. To this end, they will work with both women and men, quite often in formal pressure-group type organizations and quite often aiming their tactics at changes in legislation.

Laura is a liberal feminist. Liberal feminism is generally considered to be within the mainstream. Liberal feminism concedes that there are differences between men and women but argues that men and women should have equal social, political and economic opportunities.

Liberal feminism is a particular approach to achieving equality between men and women that emphasizes the power of an individual person to alter discriminatory practices against women. For example, pretend it's 1913, and you're walking from New York City to Washington, DC, a hike over 200 miles, because you believe in women's suffrage, or a woman's right to vote.

Over 100 years ago, participants in the Women's Suffrage Parade of 1913 took a liberal feminist approach by using their democratic right to protest to promote women's rights. And it worked! In 1920, the U.S. Congress ratified the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which gave women the right to vote.

Liberal feminism aims for individuals to use their own abilities and the democratic process to help women and men become more equal in the eyes of the law, in society and in the workplace. By organizing women into larger groups that can speak at a higher level, lobbying legislators and raising awareness of issues, liberal feminists use available resources and tools to advocate for change. As such, they stand in contrast to Marxist or socialist feminists who believe the democratic process itself needs to be changed.

For instance, what would you do if someone at work repeatedly made inappropriate remarks to you or your coworkers? Would you speak with your supervisor? Would you file a complaint with the company's human resources department? If the company did not comply with harassment laws, would you seek legal representation or speak out publicly against the company's lack of compliance?

If you'd been in the workforce prior to the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, you might have sought out other people in your community who had experienced the same thing or voted for someone supporting legislation to prevent sexual harassment. Or, perhaps you would have kept working for the same company, hoping for a promotion and the authority to change its corporate culture over time.

The actions we've just discussed demonstrate the liberal feminist approach of working within the democratic system to improve conditions.

Liberal feminists argue that gender inequality results from past traditions that pose barriers to women's advancement. It emphasizes individual rights and equal opportunity as the basis for social justice and reform. Socialist feminists, on the other hand, argue that the origin of women's oppression lies with the system of capitalism. Because women are a cheap supply of labor, they are exploited by capitalism, which makes them less powerful both as women and as workers. Third, radical feminists see patriarchy as the main cause of women's oppression and argue that women's oppression lies in men's control over women's bodies. Finally, multiracial feminists examine the interactive influence of gender, race, and class, showing how together they shape the experiences of all women and men.

Liberal feminism asserts the equality of men and women through political and legal reform. It is an individualistic form of feminism, which focuses on women's ability to show and maintain their equality through their own actions and choices. Liberal feminism uses the personal interactions between men and women as the place from which to transform society. According to liberal feminists, all women are capable of asserting their ability to achieve equality, therefore it is possible for change to happen without altering the structure of society. Issues important to liberal feminists include reproductive and abortion rights, sexual harassment, voting, education,

"equal pay for equal work", affordable childcare, affordable health care, and bringing to light the frequency of sexual and domestic violence against women.

Gender Inequality: Gender-inequality theories recognize that women's location in, and experience of, social situations are not only different but also unequal to men's. Liberal feminists argue that women have the same capacity as men for moral reasoning and agency, but that patriarchy, particularly the sexist patterning of the division of labor, has historically denied women the opportunity to express and practice this reasoning. Women have been isolated to the private sphere of the household and, thus, left without a voice in the public sphere. Even after women enter the public sphere, they are still expected to manage the private sphere and take care of household duties and child rearing. Liberal feminists point out that marriage is a site of gender inequality and that women do not benefit from being married as men do. Indeed, married women have higher levels of stress than unmarried women and married men. According to liberal feminists, the sexual division of labor in both the public and private spheres needs to be altered in order for women to achieve equality.

Betty Friedan (born 1921) used the post-graduation experiences of her former college classmates to write about the dissatisfaction of many American housewives. An immediate bestseller, the *Feminine Mystique* launched a resurgence of women's rights activism among middle class white women, a group that had been politically passive since achieving suffrage. Friedan helped found the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966 and became its first president. Friedan was a major proponent for the legalization of abortion (which was achieved with *Roe v. Wade* in 1973) and equal pay for women (which was helped with passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Bill 1964 and the Equal Pay Act 1963).

9.2 Radical Feminism

Radical feminists may or may not be anti-capitalist. They see the basic division in all societies as that between men and women and clearly state that men are the oppressors of women. The term 'patriarchy' is often used to describe this systematic and universal oppression. For many radical feminists, patriarchal relations underlie all other forms of oppression - class oppression, color oppression and imperialist oppression.

Some radical feminists see women's role in reproduction as both motivating and enabling men to take power over them, others emphasize the wish of men to control women's sexual availability or to use their unpaid domestic labor in marriage. Because of their common oppression, women form a social group who share common interests - common interests that override differences between them. They must struggle as women to overthrow patriarchy and oppression in women-only groups. The ultimate aim is to change gender relations fundamentally - sometimes expressed as eliminating male power, sometimes as eliminating male values in favour of female values.

Roxanne is a radical feminist. Radical feminism argues that men and the dominant patriarchal, or male dominated, society oppress women. Roxanne and her fellow radical feminists argue that the patriarchal society must be overthrown before women can gain true equality.

By comparison, radical feminists find the attempts by liberal and socialist feminists to address issues related to gender inequality inadequate. Radical feminists believe that men not only benefit from the exploitation of women but are also responsible for it as well.

Radical feminist beliefs are based on the idea that the main cause of women's oppression originates from social roles and institutional structures being constructed from male supremacy and patriarchy. The main difference between radical feminism and other branches is that they didn't concentrate on equalizing the distribution of power. Instead, they focused their efforts on completely eliminating patriarchy by transforming the entire structure of society. More specifically, they wanted to get rid of traditional gender roles.

Radical feminism was a branch that formed during the second wave of feminism in the 1960s. At this point in time, women had won the right to vote and were working more outside of the home. In addition, the United States had gone through the sexual revolution which had lowered the pressure for people to be strictly monogamous and had given them more room for sexual expression.

In other words, life for women had greatly improved over the previous half century. However, women still experienced oppression on a regular basis. Would you have felt satisfied

knowing that you could now work outside the home but would not be viewed as equal? Or knowing that you were going to be paid much less than a man that did the exact same job as you?

The sexual revolution had also brought some freedom to sexual expression. However, there was still a lack of reproductive rights. For example, how would you have felt if you didn't have the right to access birth control? Radical feminists believed that these were deliberate power plays by men and that the institutions and systems that supported this oppression were just the tools they used to maintain control.

Unlike other forms of feminism that viewed power as something positive as long as it was evenly distributed, radical feminists believed that power was mostly something experienced in a dualistic system of domination and subordination, with one party always experiencing oppression. This system was an outrage to radical feminists, and as a result, they tended to be militant with their efforts, calling for direct action against patriarchy and male supremacy. They organized sit-ins and demonstrations at various events that they felt supported these systems and institutions of oppression.

One of the most memorable demonstrations was the Miss America protest of 1968 which was staged by the New York Radical Women. This event was what gave birth to the mythical image of the 'bra-burning feminist'. Bras were not burned at this demonstration, but they were tossed into a trash can with other items including high heels, eyelash curlers, cosmetics, wigs, and magazines such as *Cosmopolitan* and *Playboy*. This was done in protest against what was seen as the ridiculous standards of beauty to which women were held.

Radical feminism considers the male controlled capitalist hierarchy, which it describes as sexist, as the defining feature of women's oppression. Radical feminists believe that women can free themselves only when they have done away with what they consider an inherently oppressive and dominating patriarchal system. Radical feminists feel that there is a male-based authority and power structure and that it is responsible for oppression and inequality, and that as long as the system and its values are in place, society will not be able to be reformed in any significant way. Some radical feminists see no alternatives other than the total uprooting and reconstruction of society in order to achieve their goals.

Over time a number of sub-types of Radical feminism have emerged, such as Cultural feminism, Separatist feminism and Anti-pornography feminism. Cultural feminism is the ideology of a "female nature" or "female essence" that attempts to revalidate what they consider undervalued female attributes. It emphasizes the difference between women and men but considers that difference to be psychological, and to be culturally constructed rather than biologically innate. Its critics assert that because it is based on an essentialist view of the differences between women and men and advocates independence and institution building, it has led feminists to retreat from politics to "life-style" Once such critic, Alice Echols (a feminist historian and cultural theorist), credits Redstockings member Brooke Williams with introducing the term cultural feminism in 1975 to describe the depoliticisation of radical feminism.

Separatist feminism is a form of radical feminism that does not support heterosexual relationships. Its proponents argue that the sexual disparities between men and women are unresolvable. Separatist feminists generally do not feel that men can make positive contributions to the feminist movement and that even well-intentioned men replicate patriarchal dynamics. Author Marilyn Frye describes separatist feminism as "separation of various sorts or modes from men and from institutions, relationships, roles and activities that are male-defined, male-dominated, and operating for the benefit of males and the maintenance of male privilege – this separation being initiated or maintained, at will, by women".

Gender Oppression: Theories of gender oppression go further than theories of gender difference and gender inequality by arguing that not only are women different from or unequal to men, but that they are actively oppressed, subordinated, and even abused by men. Power is the key variable in the two main theories of gender oppression: psychoanalytic feminism and radical feminism. Psychoanalytic feminists attempt to explain power relations between men and women by reformulating Freud's theories of the subconscious and unconscious, human emotions, and childhood development. They feel that conscious calculation cannot fully explain the production and reproduction of patriarchy. Radical feminists argue that being a woman is a positive thing in and of itself, but that this is not acknowledged in patriarchal societies where women are oppressed. They identify physical violence as being at the base of patriarchy, but they think that patriarchy can be defeated if women recognize their own value and strength, establish a

sisterhood of trust with other women, confront oppression critically, and form female separatist networks in the private and public spheres.

Structural Oppression: Structural oppression theories posit that women's oppression and inequality are a result of capitalism, patriarchy, and racism. Socialist feminists agree with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that the working class is exploited as a consequence of the capitalist mode of production, but they seek to extend this exploitation not just to class but also to gender. Intersectionality theorists seek to explain oppression and inequality across a variety of variables, including class, gender, race, ethnicity, and age. They make the important insight that not all women experience oppression in the same way. White women and black women, for example, face different forms of discrimination in the workplace. Thus, different groups of women come to view the world through a shared standpoint of "heterogeneous commonality."

9.3 Socialist and Marxist Feminism

Socialist feminists can be defined as those feminists who are concerned with challenging capitalism as well as male supremacy or 'patriarchy'. They endeavor to make analytical connections between class relations and gender relations in society and to relate changes in the role of women to changes in the economic system and patterns of ownership of the means of production.

Socialist feminists recognize that while women are divided by class, color and political belief, they do experience a common oppression as women. This oppression needs to be understood, not just in terms of inequalities of power between men and women, but also in terms of the requirements of capitalism and the role of state institutions in a capitalist society. Socialist feminist writers in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to concentrate on issues such as employment, domestic labor and state policy.

Socialist feminists advocate an autonomous women's movement, but also a broadening of the socialist movement to include feminist perspectives and the challenge the oppression of women within socialist parties and trades unions. This clearly involves political activity alongside men and a belief that the interests of women and men can be reconciled. In many ways their analysis, strategy and tactics are all dual - sometimes summed up by the slogan "There can be no women's liberation without socialism, no socialism without women's liberation".

There have been a number of different types of feminism over the years, all varying in goals and strategies. One of the most extreme and controversial types of feminism for its time was socialist feminism. Socialist feminism addresses women's inequality in a two-pronged approach. The first objective is to make the connection between capitalism and patriarchy, often referring to women's limited roles in society (staying at home/raising a family) as a major factor in their oppression. The second objective is to prove that patriarchy is not the only source of oppression and that women can experience it in various other ways, including race, class, sexual orientation, and education, among others. (Teasley)

Socialist feminism gained momentum during the 1960s-1970s, a timeframe also known as *the second wave of feminism*. This wave was focused on social welfare issues. Though it is not considered the most radical form of feminism, socialist feminism still has strong ties to Marxist theory and calls for a major shift in societal structure. More specifically, it calls for an end to the capitalist economic system, which social feminists believe perpetuates sexism, patriarchy and a division of labor based on gender. The common mentality during that second wave of feminism was that children needed their mothers at home in order to be properly nurtured. However, with the rise of single mothers and lack of affordable childcare and liveable working wages for women, socialist feminism began to spread.

Instead of focusing primarily on working-class women, socialist feminism also reached out to poor women of color and color activists. At the time, women of color were experiencing a different kind of oppression based on their race. Many were victims of forced sterilization while giving birth at local hospitals, some through coercion and others through complete deception. This supported the socialist feminist claim that oppression is experienced in countless ways

outside of just gender. As a result, women of all different backgrounds worked together to question their roles in the economy and at home and debate their reproductive rights.

As socialist feminism gained popularity, unions began to form across the nation to promote the issues that they believed in. The very first of these unions was the Boston Bread and Roses Organization. This group was known to advocate a number of different issues, including abortion and reproductive rights, child care, equal employment, laws against discrimination, and preventing violence against women. The Bread and Roses Organization is also credited with starting the Women's Center in Cambridge during 1972. To this day, the center holds the title of the longest running women's center in the United States.

Mary is Marxist feminist. Marxist feminism combines feminism with Marxism and argues that the inequality and oppression of women stem from capitalism and its system of private property. In fact, according to some, married women are treated as property. According to Mary and other Marxist feminists, women can only be freed from oppression when capitalism is overthrown.

Sandra is a socialist feminist. Socialist feminism takes elements from both radical feminism and Marxist feminism. Socialist feminism argues for the end of capitalist patriarchy, which it believes will reduce oppression and exploitation based not just upon sex but also race, age and religion. Unlike liberal feminism that is focused on individual rights, socialist feminists place an emphasis on an individual's overall relation to community.

Socialist feminism evolved from the ideas of Karl Marx, who blamed capitalism for promoting patriarchy by concentrating power in the hands of a small number of men. Socialist feminists believe that the traditional family is based upon a capitalist system, where women stay home and men work. As the main source of women's inequality, the system and traditional family can only be replaced by a socialist revolution that creates a government to meet the needs of the family.

Socialist feminism connects the oppression of women to Marxist ideas about exploitation, oppression and labor. Socialist feminists think unequal standing in both the workplace and the domestic sphere holds women down.[59] Socialist feminists see prostitution, domestic work, childcare and marriage as ways in which women are exploited by a patriarchal system that

devalues women and the substantial work they do. Socialist feminists focus their energies on broad change that affects society as a whole, rather than on an individual basis. They see the need to work alongside not just men, but all other groups, as they see the oppression of women as a part of a larger pattern that affects everyone involved in the capitalist system.

Marx felt when class oppression was overcome, gender oppression would vanish as well. According to some socialist feminists, this view of gender oppression as a sub-class of class oppression is naive and much of the work of socialist feminists has gone towards separating gender phenomena from class phenomena. Some contributors to socialist feminism have criticized these traditional Marxist ideas for being largely silent on gender oppression except to subsume it underneath broader class oppression. Other socialist feminists, many of whom belong to Radical Women and the Freedom Socialist Party, two long-lived American organizations, point to the classic Marxist writings of Frederick Engels and August Bebel as a powerful explanation of the link between gender oppression and class exploitation.

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century both Clara Zetkin and Eleanor Marx were against the demonization of men and supported a proletarian revolution that would overcome as many male-female inequalities as possible. As their movement already had the most radical demands of women's equality, most Marxist leaders, including Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollontai, counterposed Marxism against feminism, rather than trying to combine them.

Linda Napikoski stated the phrase "socialist feminism" was increasingly used during the 1970s to describe a mixed theoretical and practical approach to achieving women's equality. Socialist feminist theory analyzed the connection between the oppression of women and other oppression in society, such as racism and economic injustice.

Socialists had fought for decades to create a more equal society that did not exploit the poor and powerless in the ways capitalism did. Like Marxism, socialist feminism recognized the oppressive structure of capitalist society. Like radical feminism, socialist feminism recognized the fundamental oppression of women in patriarchal society. However, socialist feminists did not recognize gender and only gender as the exclusive basis of all oppression.

Socialist feminists wanted to integrate the recognition of sex discrimination with their work to achieve justice and equality for women, working classes, the poor and all humanity. Socialist feminism, which connected the oppression of women to other oppressions in society, became increasingly important in the feminist theory that crystallized into academic feminist thought during the 1970s.

Socialist feminism was often contrasted with cultural feminism, which focused on the unique nature of women and highlighted the need for woman-affirming culture. Cultural feminism was seen as *essentialist*: it recognized an essential nature of women that was unique to the female sex. Cultural feminists were sometimes criticized for being *separatist* if they tried to keep women's music, women's art and women's studies apart from mainstream culture.

The theory of socialist feminism, on the other hand, sought to avoid separating feminism from the rest of society. Socialist feminists in the 1970s preferred to integrate their struggle against women's oppression with the struggle against other injustice based on race, class or economic status.

However, socialist feminism was also distinct from liberal feminism, such as that of the National Organization for Women (NOW). The perception of the term "liberal" has changed over the years, but the liberal feminism of the women's liberation movement sought equality for women in all institutions of society, including government, law and education. Socialist feminists critiqued the idea that true equality was possible in a society built on inequality whose structure was fundamentally flawed. This criticism was similar to the feminist theory of radical feminists.

However, socialist feminism was also distinct from radical feminism because socialist feminists rejected the radical feminist notion that the sex discrimination women faced was the source of all of their oppression. Radical feminists, by definition, sought to get at the root of oppression in society in order to drastically change things. In a male-dominated patriarchal society, they saw that root as oppression of women. Socialist feminists were more likely to describe oppression based on gender as one piece of the struggle.

The critique of Marxism and conventional socialism by socialist feminists is that Marxism and socialism largely reduce women's inequality to something incidental and created

by economic inequality or the class system. Because the oppression of women predates the development of capitalism, socialist feminists argue that women's oppression cannot be created by class division. Socialist feminists also argue that without dismantling women's oppression, the capitalist hierarchical system cannot be dismantled. Socialism and Marxism are primarily about liberation in the public realm, especially the economic realm of life, and socialist feminism acknowledges a psychological and personal dimension to liberation that is not always present in Marxism and socialism. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, had argued that women's liberation would come primarily through economic equality.

Why Socialist Feminism

One answer is that reforming capitalism so that it is "kinder and gentler" is a dead end. Reforms are important for survival but they are always undermined or reversed. Never-ending attacks on reproductive rights and affirmative action and endless imperialist wars are just a few examples of the limits of reformism. Social justice advocates end up fighting the same battles over and over again instead of expanding democratic rights for excluded groups or preventing the *next war*.

Another answer is because you can't have one without the other. Equality for women cannot be achieved under capitalism while socialism cannot be attained without the participation and leadership of working and poor women in the struggle to win it. Socialist feminists believe that the only way to win the fight for women's rights is to connect it up with the larger global campaign for human liberation in all its forms.

Women are the most oppressed of every oppressed group. No one needs revolutionary transformation of society worse than they do and no other group has the capacity to unite the oppressed in a mighty, working class movement that addresses all the injustices suffered by the dispossessed under capitalism: racism, poverty, homophobia, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, ageism, and war.

The profit system survives on women's unpaid labor in the home and low-waged labor in market place. Their inequality is solidified like concrete in a perverse arrangement where owners and employers profit off of women's second-class status and misery. This is a radicalizing

experience and accounts for the tremendous role women play, particularly women of color and indigenous women, as leaders in the struggle for revolutionary change.

Both men and women have a stake in changing their unequal relationship. The subjugation of females lays the basis for ruling class exploitation of poor and working class males of all races, nationalities, abilities and sexual orientations. The profit system, and the oppression of women which keep it afloat, must be overthrown for women, children and men to be free of economic insecurity and discrimination. Working class men who are feminists know that when they fight for women's rights, they are making a stand for all the exploited--including themselves!

Socialist feminism would turn capitalism and the subjugation of women and all other underdogs upside down. First, because socialism replaces the current system of wealth for a few with a system that can meet the human needs of the majority. Secondly, because the fight for women's equality, with the lowest paid and most oppressed in the leadership, would guarantee everyone wins, because when those at the bottom of the economic ladder rise up, everyone moves up with them.

To the diehards that say capitalism and patriarchy will live forever, we point to the fact that humans have lived far longer in communal societies where men and women shared the role of leaders and where their different economic and social roles were both valued.

Frederick Engels set forth the theoretical basis for modern socialist feminism in his book *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. He explains that a communal, matriarchal social system preceded the rise of private property, class society, patriarchy, slavery and the state. He pointed to the primary role women played in the economic, social, cultural and political life of these communal societies and the egalitarian relationships that characterized them.

As a result of the overthrow of the matriarchy and the rise of private property and capitalism, women now bear the brunt of the poverty, suffering, deprivation, wars and environmental devastation the profit system creates.

As revolutionary socialist feminists we seek to free men and women of all forms of oppression and restore the egalitarianism of the past. We envision a highly technologically advanced socialist society where those who create wealth with their daily labor also make the decisions about what it should be used for, where democracy means workers' control of the state and the economy, where protecting the planet is first priority, where production of goods is for human needs and where internationalism is practiced among all peoples.

What socialist feminism is explained by Barbara Ehrenreich (1976) as follows.

At some level, perhaps not too well articulated, socialist feminism has been around for a long time. You are a woman in a capitalist society. You get pissed off: about the job, about the bills, about your husband (or ex), about the kids' school, the housework, being pretty, not being pretty, being looked at, not being look at (and either way, not listened to), etc. If you think about all these things and how they fit together and what has to be changed, and then you look around for some words to hold all these thoughts together in abbreviated form, you'd almost have to come up with "socialist feminism."

A lot of us came to socialist feminism in just that kind of way. We were searching for a word/term/phrase which would begin to express all of our concerns, all of our principles, in a way that neither "socialist" nor "feminist" seemed to. I have to admit that most socialist feminists I know are not too happy with the term "socialist feminist" either. On the one hand it is too long (I have no hopes for a hyphenated mass movement); on the other hand it is much too short for what is, after all, really socialist internationalist anti-racist, anti-heterosexist feminism.

The trouble with taking a new label of any kind is that it creates an instant aura of sectarianism. "Socialist feminism" becomes a challenge, a mystery, an issue in and of itself. We have speakers, conferences, articles on "socialist feminism" – though we know perfectly well that both "socialism" and "feminism" are too huge and too inclusive to be subjects for any sensible speech, conference, article, etc. People, including avowed socialist feminists, ask themselves anxiously, "What is socialist feminism?" There is a kind of expectation that it is (or is about to be at any moment, maybe in the next speech, conference, or article) a brilliant synthesis of world historical proportions – an evolutionary leap beyond Marx, Freud, and Wollstonecraft.

Or that it will turn out to be a nothing, a fad seized on by a few disgruntled feminists and female socialists, a temporary distraction.

A logical way to start is to look at socialism and feminism separately. How does a socialist, more precisely, a Marxist, look at the world? How does a feminist? To begin with, Marxism and feminism have an important thing in common: they are critical ways of looking at the world. Both rip away popular mythology and “common sense” wisdom and force us to look at experience in a new way. Both seek to understand the world – not in terms of static balances, symmetries, etc. (as in conventional social science) – but in terms of antagonisms. They lead to conclusions which are jarring and disturbing at the same time that they are liberating. There is no way to have a Marxist or feminist outlook and remain a spectator. To understand the reality laid bare by these analyses is to move into action to change it.

Marxism addresses itself to the class dynamics of capitalist society. Every social scientist knows that capitalist societies are characterized by more or less severe, systemic inequality. Marxism understands this inequality to arise from processes which are intrinsic to capitalism as an economic system. A minority of people (the capitalist class) own all the factories/energy sources/resources, etc. which everyone else depends on in order to live. The great majority (the working class) must work out of sheer necessity, under conditions set by the capitalists, for the wages the capitalists pay. Since the capitalists make their profits by paying less in wages than the value of what the workers actually produce, the relationship between the two classes is necessarily one of irreconcilable antagonism. The capitalist class owes its very existence to the continued exploitation of the working class. What maintains this system of class rule is, in the last analysis, force. The capitalist class controls (directly or indirectly) the means of organized violence represented by the state – police, jails, etc. Only by waging a revolutionary struggle aimed at the seizure of state power can the working class free itself, and, ultimately, all people.

Feminism addresses itself to another familiar inequality. All human societies are marked by some degree of inequality between the sexes. If we survey human societies at a glance, sweeping through history and across continents, we see that they have commonly been characterized by: the subjugation of women to male authority, both with the family and in the community in general; the objectification of women as a form of property; a sexual division of

labor in which women are confined to such activities as child raising, performing personal services for adult males, and specified (usually low prestige) forms of productive labor.

Feminists, struck by the near-universality of these things, have looked for explanations in the biological “givens” which underlie all human social existence. Men are physically stronger than women on the average, especially compared to pregnant women or women who are nursing babies. Furthermore, men have the power to make women pregnant. Thus, the forms that sexual inequality take – however various they may be from culture to culture – rest, in the last analysis, on what is clearly a physical advantage males hold over females. That is to say, they result ultimately on violence, or the threat of violence.

The ancient, biological root of male supremacy – the fact of male violence – is commonly obscured by the laws and conventions which regulate the relations between the sexes in any particular culture. But it is there, according to a feminist analysis. The possibility of male assault stands as a constant warning to “bad” (rebellious, aggressive) women, and drives “good” women into complicity with male supremacy. The reward for being “good” (“pretty,” submissive) is protection from random male violence and, in some cases, economic security.

Marxism rips away the myths about “democracy” and its “pluralism” to reveal a system of class rule that rests on forcible exploitation. Feminism cuts through myths about “instinct” and romantic love to expose male rule as a rule of force. Both analyses compel us to look at a fundamental injustice. The choice is to reach for the comfort of the myths or, as Marx put it, to work for a social order that does not require myths to sustain it.

It is possible to add up Marxism and feminism and call the sum “socialist feminism.” In fact, this is probably how most socialist feminists see it most of the time – as a kind of hybrid, pushing our feminism in socialist circles, our socialism in feminist circles. One trouble with leaving things like that, though, is that it keeps people wondering “Well, what is she really?” or demanding of us “What is the principal contradiction.” These kinds of questions, which sound so compelling and authoritative, often stop us in our tracks: “Make a choice!” “Be one or another!” But we know that there is a political consistency to socialist feminism. We are not hybrids or fencesitters.

To get to that political consistency we have to differentiate ourselves, as feminists, from other kinds of feminists, and, as Marxists, from other kinds of Marxists. We have to stake out a (pardon the terminology here) socialist feminist kind of feminism and a socialist feminist kind of socialism. Only then is there a possibility that things will “add up” to something more than an uneasy juxtaposition.

In her opinion most radical feminists and socialist feminists would agree with her capsule characterization of feminism as far as it goes. The trouble with radical feminism, from a socialist feminist point of view, is that it doesn't go any farther. It remains transfixed with the universality of male supremacy – things have never really changed; all social systems are patriarchies; imperialism, militarism, and capitalism are all simply expressions of innate male aggressiveness. And so on.

The problem with this, from a socialist feminist point of view, is not only that it leaves out men (and the possibility of reconciliation with them on a truly human and egalitarian basis) but that it leaves out an awful lot about women. For example, to discount a socialist country such as China as a “patriarchy” – as radical feminists do – is to ignore the real struggles and achievements of millions of women. Socialist feminists, while agreeing that there is something timeless and universal about women's oppression, have insisted that it takes different forms in different settings, and that the differences are of vital importance. There is a difference between a society in which sexism is expressed in the form of female infanticide and a society in which sexism takes the form of unequal representation on the Central Committee. And the difference is worth dying for.

One of the historical variations on the theme of sexism which ought to concern all feminists is the set of changes that came with the transition from an agrarian society to industrial capitalism. This is no academic issue. The social system which industrial capitalism replaced was in fact a patriarchal one, and I am using that term now in its original sense, to mean a system in which production is centered in the household and is presided over by the oldest male. The fact is that industrial capitalism came along and tore the rug out from under patriarchy. Production went into the factories and individuals broke off from the family to become “free” wage earners. To say that capitalism disrupted the patriarchal organization of production and

family life is not, of course, to say that capitalism abolished male supremacy! But it is to say that the particular forms of sex oppression we experience today are, to a significant degree, recent developments. A huge historical discontinuity lies between us and true patriarchy. If we are to understand our experience as women today, we must move to a consideration of capitalism as a system.

There are obviously other ways she could have gotten to the same point. she could have simply said that, as feminists, we are most interested in the most oppressed women – poor and working class women, third world women, etc., and for that reason we are led to a need to comprehend and confront capitalism. She could have said that we need to address ourselves to the class system simply because women are members of classes. But she is trying to bring out something else about our perspective as feminists: there is no way to understand sexism as it acts on our lives without putting it in the historical context of capitalism.

She thinks most socialist feminists would also agree with the capsule summary of Marxist theory as far as it goes. And the trouble again is that there are a lot of people who do not go any further. To these people, the only “real” and important things that go on in capitalist society are those things that relate to the productive process or the conventional political sphere. From such a point of view, every other part of experience and social existence – things having to do with education, sexuality, recreation, the family, art, music, housework (you name it) – is peripheral to the central dynamics of social change; it is part of the “superstructure” or “culture.”

She also stated socialist feminists are in a very different camp from what she is calling “mechanical Marxists.” We (along with many, many Marxists who are not feminists) see capitalism as a social and cultural totality. We understand that, in its search for markets, capitalism is driven to penetrate every nook and cranny of social existence. Especially in the phase of monopoly capitalism, the realm of consumption is every bit as important, just from an economic point of view, as the realm of production. So we cannot understand class struggle as something confined to issues of wages and hours, or confined only to workplace issues. Class struggle occurs in every arena where the interests of classes conflict, and that includes education, health, art, music, etc. We aim to transform not only the ownership of the means of production, but the totality of social existence.

As Marxists, we come to feminism from a completely different place than the mechanical Marxists. Because we see monopoly capitalism as a political/ economic/cultural totality, we have room within our Marxist framework for feminist issues which have nothing ostensibly to do with production or “politics,” issues that have to do with the family, health care, “private” life.

Furthermore, in our brand of Marxism, there is no “woman question” because we never compartmentalized women off to the “superstructure” or somewhere in the first place. Marxists of a mechanical bent continually ponder the issue of the unwaged woman (the housewife): Is she really a member of the working class? That is, does she really produce surplus value? We say, of course housewives are members of the working class – not because we have some elaborate proof that they really do produce surplus value – but because we understand a class as being composed of people, and as having a social existence quite apart from the capitalist-dominated realm of production. When we think of class in this way, then we see that in fact the women who seemed most peripheral, the housewives, are at the very heart of their class – raising children, holding together families, maintaining the cultural and social networks of the community.

We are coming out of a kind of feminism and a kind of Marxism whose interests quite naturally flow together. I think we are in a position now to see why it is that socialist feminism has been so mystified: The idea of socialist feminism is a great mystery or paradox, so long as what you mean by socialism is really what I have called “mechanical Marxism” and what you mean by feminism is an a historical kind of radical feminism. These things just don’t add up; they have nothing in common.

But if you put together another kind of socialism and another kind of feminism, you do get some common ground and that is one of the most important things about socialist feminism today. It is a space-free from the constrictions of a truncated kind of feminism and a truncated version of Marxism – in which we can develop the kind of politics that addresses the political/economic/cultural totality of monopoly capitalist society. We could only go so far with the available kinds of feminism, the conventional kind of Marxism, and then we had to break out to something that is not so restrictive and incomplete in its view of the world. We had to take a new name, “socialist feminism,” in order to assert our determination to comprehend the whole of our experience and to forge a politics that reflects the totality of that comprehension.

However, she doesn't want to leave socialist feminist theory as a "space" or a common ground. Things are beginning to grow in that "ground." We are closer to a synthesis in our understanding of sex and class, capitalism and male domination, than we were a few years ago. Here she will indicate only very sketchily one such line of thinking:

1. The Marxist/feminist understanding that class and sex domination rest ultimately on force is correct, and this remains the most devastating critique of sexist/capitalist society. But there is a lot to that "ultimately." In a day to day sense, most people acquiesce to sex and class domination without being held in line by the threat of violence, and often without even the threat of material deprivation.

2. It is very important, then, to figure out what it is, if not the direct application of force, that keeps things going. In the case of class, a great deal has been written already about why the US working class lacks militant class consciousness. Certainly ethnic divisions, especially the black/white division, are a key part of the answer. But I would argue, in addition to being divided, the working class has been socially atomized. Working class neighborhoods have been destroyed and are allowed to decay; life has become increasingly privatized and inward-looking; skills once possessed by the working class have been expropriated by the capitalist class; and capitalist controlled "mass culture" has edged out almost all indigenous working class culture and institutions. Instead of collectivity and self-reliance as a class, there is mutual isolation and collective dependency on the capitalist class.

3. The subjugation of women, in the ways which are characteristic of late capitalist society, has been key to this process of class atomization. To put it another way, the forces which have atomized working class life and promoted cultural/material dependence on the capitalist class are the same forces which have served to perpetuate the subjugation of women. It is women who are most isolated in what has become an increasingly privatized family existence (even when they work outside the home too). It is, in many key instances, women's skills (productive skills, healing, midwifery, etc.) which have been discredited or banned to make way for commodities. It is, above all, women who are encouraged to be utterly passive/uncritical/dependent (i.e. "feminine") in the face of the pervasive capitalist penetration of private life. Historically, late

capitalist penetration of working class life has singled out women as prime targets of pacification/"feminization" – because women are the culture-bearers of their class.

4. It follows that there is a fundamental interconnection between women's struggle and what is traditionally conceived as class struggle. Not all women's struggles have an inherently anti-capitalist thrust (particularly not those which seek only to advance the power and wealth of special groups of women), but all those which build collectivity and collective confidence among women are vitally important to the building of class consciousness. Conversely, not all class struggles have an inherently anti-sexist thrust (especially not those that cling to pre-industrial patriarchal values) but all those which seek to build the social and cultural autonomy of the working class are necessarily linked to the struggle for women's liberation.

This, in very rough outline, is one direction which socialist feminist analysis is taking. No one is expecting a synthesis to emerge which will collapse socialist and feminist struggle into the same thing. The capsule summaries I gave earlier retain their "ultimate" truth: there are crucial aspects of capitalist domination (such as racial oppression) which a purely feminist perspective simply cannot account for or deal with – without bizarre distortions, that is. There are crucial aspects of sex oppression (such as male violence within the family) which socialist thought has little insight into – again, not without a lot of stretching and distortion. Hence the need to continue to be socialists and feminists. But there is enough of a synthesis, both in what we think and what we do for us to begin to have a self-confident identity as socialist feminists.

The Basics of Socialist Feminism

Socialist feminism is a young feminist movement, born in the 1970's. But despite the three hundred-year age difference, socialist feminism retains many of the same goals as the first feminist movements. We will outline the major themes found within socialist feminism, including its analysis of women's oppression, its ideas for activism, and its similarities to other kinds of feminism, specifically its synthesis of Marxist and Radical feminism.

"How can you say Mrs. Henry Ford IV is really in the same class as a Guatemalan peasant woman? We socialist feminists see the problem as a combination of male domination and class exploitation - our fight is against both! Real liberation is impossible as long as power

and wealth in the world is monopolized by a tiny minority, and economic and social life is ruled by their lust for profits." -Introducing Feminism, Watkins, Reuda & Rodriguez

To understand socialist feminism, one must understand praxis. Praxis is a Marxist concept meaning the ability humans have to consciously change the environment in order to meet their needs. Socialist feminists, like Marxist feminists, hold that praxis is the one thing universal to all humans. Unlike Marxist feminists, socialist feminists hold that praxis has gender specific forms and extends to the private sphere of life. The private sphere of life is that of the home and the work that the woman (typically) does in giving birth to children, raising children, and maintaining the household.

Socialist feminists agree with radical feminists in the idea that gender roles need to be abolished. But they see gender and sexuality as social constructs both capable of transformation. While they acknowledge that biology does play a role in determining personality (as previously stated), anatomy does not confine or limit our capabilities as human beings on an emotional or a physical level.

Like Marxists, socialist feminists see capitalism as a major factor in women's oppression, as well as in the oppression of other minority groups. Unlike Marxist feminists, however, socialist feminists believe that capitalism is only one of many intertwined factors that contribute to women's oppression. Other factors include male dominance, racism, and imperialism. However, because women's work (within and outside of the home) is not as valued as that of their male counterparts, women are forced to remain dependent upon males. For example, although a woman who is both a wife and a mother works 20 hours a day within her home, she is not monetarily compensated, and is therefore unable to gain equal status with her husband, who works 9 hours a day and is paid. Socialist feminism provides an answer to the problem of women's poverty: the destruction of class distinctions.

Unlike Marxist feminist theory, socialist feminists believe that the home is not just a place of consumption, but of production as well. Women's work within the home, having and raising children, as well as supporting men by doing cooking, cleaning, and other forms of housework which permit men to work outside the home, are all forms of production because they

contribute to society at large. Production, according to socialist feminists, should not be measured in dollars, but rather in social worth.

The Goals of Socialist Feminism

"Put more emphasis on making alliances with other oppressed groups and classes ? anti-imperialist movements, workers? organizations, the political parties to the left. They [socialist feminists] were engaged in a permanent dialogue ? sometimes exhausting, sometimes exhilarating ? with the progressive men in these organizations about the meaning and importance of the feminist struggle, about the way gender oppression is reflected and reinforced within personal and family relationships ? within the very structure of liberal movements and parties." - Introducing Feminism, Watkins, Reuda & Rodriguez

Socialist feminists propose the complete eradication of all political, economic and social foundations of contemporary society. Specifically, education, work, sexuality and parenting must undergo thorough transformations. Sexual division of labor, which locks men and women into stereotypical occupational categories, must cease. Women should be permitted, respected and valued for all types of work within traditionally male as well as female fields, and adequately compensated for such work. They should be free from economic and gender specific constraints, even if it means reorganizing the family structure of sharing of child rearing responsibilities. They should be also be reunited with the fruits of their labor, by ending the alienation produced when they are forced to tailor their goals, personalities, and very lives to the wishes of men.

Alienation refers to relationships that are naturally interdependent but have been artificially separated or placed in opposition. Socialist feminists have adopted the Marxist concept of alienation to describe the situation of women in the world. Unlike Marxist feminists who only consider alienation in the workplace, socialist feminists also apply alienation to women's work in the home.

Socialist feminist activism differs from other forms of feminist activism in that it focuses a great deal on collaborating with other oppressed groups. Feminism has frequently been condemned as exclusionary representing only white heterosexual middle class women. But

socialist feminists are inclusive, however. They include all groups that suffer as a result of capitalism, male dominance, or discrimination in their fight.

According to Susan Davis, Deb Dobbin, Robin Kaufman, and Tobey Klass in their writing "Socialist Feminism: A Strategy for the Women's Movement" stated currently there are two ideological poles, representing the prevailing tendencies within the movement. One is the direction toward new lifestyles within a women's culture, emphasizing personal liberation and growth, and the relationship of women to women. Given our real need to break loose from the old patterns--socially, psychologically, and economically--and given the necessity for new patterns in the post revolutionary society, we understand, support and enjoy this tendency. However, when it is the sole emphasis, we see it leading more toward a kind of formless insulation rather than to a condition in which we can fight for and win power over our own lives.

The other direction is one which emphasizes a structural analysis of our society and its economic base. It focuses on the ways in which productive relations oppress us. This analysis is also correct, but its strategy, taken alone, can easily become, or appear to be, insensitive to the total lives of women. As socialist feminists, we share both the personal and the structural analysis. We see a combination of the two as essential if we are to become a lasting mass movement. We think that it is important to define ourselves as socialist feminists, and to start conscious organizing around this strategy. This must be done now because of the current state of our movement. We have reached a crucial point in our history. On the one hand, the strengths of our movement are obvious: it has become an important force of our time, and it has also succeeded in providing services and support for some women's immediate needs. Thousands of women see themselves as part of the movement; a vaguely defined "women's consciousness" has been widely diffused through rap groups, demonstrations, action projects, counter-institutional activity, and through the mass media. Women in the movement have a growing understanding of common oppression and the imperative of collective solutions. With the realization that what we saw as personal problems were in fact social ones, we have come to understand that the solutions must also be social ones. With the realization that all women lack control over their lives, we have come to understand that that control can only be gained if we act together. We have come to understand the specific needs of various groups of women and that different groups of women have different ways in which they will fight for control over their own lives.

On the other hand, the women's movement is currently divided. In most places it is broken into small groups which are hard to find, hard to join, and hard to understand politically. At the same time, conservative but organizationally clever entrepreneurs are attaching themselves to the movement, and are beginning to determine the politics of large numbers of people. If our movement is to survive, let alone flourish, it is time to begin to organize for power. We need to turn consciousness into action, choose priorities for our struggles, and win. To do this we need a strategy.

Our movement's strategy must grow from an understanding of the dynamics of power, with the realization that those who have power have a vested interest in preserving it and the institutional forms which maintain it. Wresting control of the institutions which now oppress us must be our central effort if women's liberation is to achieve its goals. To reach out to most women we must address their real needs and self-interests.

At this moment we think that it is important to argue for a strategy which will achieve the following three things: 1) it must win reforms that will objectively improve women's lives; 2) it must give women a sense of their own power, both potentially and in reality; and 3) it must alter existing relations of power. We argue here for socialist feminist organizations. We are not arguing for any one specific organization but for the successful development of organizations so that we may be able to learn from experience and bring our movement to its potential strength.

To make this argument, it has been designed as follows:

1). Socialist Feminism--the concept and what it draws from each parent tradition. 2). Power--the basis for power in this society, and our potential as women to gain power. An applied example of our strategy. 3). Consciousness--the importance of consciousness for the development of the women's movement, its limitations, and its place in a socialist feminist ideology. 4). Current issues and questions facing our movement--A socialist feminist approach to respond to and develop a context for our programs and concerns. 5). Organization--the importance of building organizations for the women's liberation movement and some thoughts on organizational forms.

Consciousness-raising is a process by which women come to understand the nature of reality so that they may change it. One's consciousness is related to one's objective conditions. It

is the subtle interplay between the two (consciousness and conditions) which we emphasize in this section.

Consciousness is a word that has been used very loosely and has meant many things: the development of a positive self-image, individual change and growth, new emotional and sexual relationships with other women, or any of these coupled with the more general notion of a women's culture. It also means an understanding of how power is used in society and the experience of changing that society

The conception of consciousness-raising has been an extremely significant contribution of the women's movement. The whole notion of support and sisterhood has arisen as a result of women's realization of their prescribed roles and attitudes toward one another. Women have come both to feel less isolated through consciousness-raising and to learn that women's isolation is a social phenomenon. We have come to understand more about the incredible problems which women confront in daily life and to respect the solutions we have been forced to make for survival. Consciousness has therefore been both a source of strength to women and a source of personal analysis. We have learned, for example, some sense of how power is used because we can see how it functions in individual relationships

Consciousness is one's awareness of her own feelings about her situation and how the world functions. What excites us about women's liberation consciousness is that we think it is the most useful description of reality for most women. This is the key to a socialist feminist understanding of consciousness. We believe that we see a basic reality, and it is this true picture of how things are and how they got that way that, primarily, we have to offer. We are not suggesting one of many ways that things might be working now--we offer a description of the underlying relationships. This understanding makes us more effective. It is useful to women so that they can act and change what they understand. Socialist feminist consciousness is of such value because it is useful, it is true.

Of course there is a great interplay between objective conditions--the various material and social arrangements of our lives--and consciousness. With material changes such as children, a mate, a home, one often becomes more circumspect because such a person must be able to

provide for others (by law and social pressure). Or, a sister is not treated equitably (in job, school, social situations) or denied rights she had come to expect and suddenly the women's movement is no longer just "them." In everyday ways, objective conditions affect our minds.

Change may also come through receiving information which touches our crucial values (values which may ordinarily function to maintain us where we are) and jolts us. It may be of women dying from illegal abortions or of My Lai massacres. Information changes our consciousness (somewhat ahead of our conditions) by putting our lives into a new context. Usually, we think, this change happens in ways consistent with women's pasts rather than through absolute, abrupt breaks from it.

Most often, a change in specific conditions and consciousness occur simultaneously, part of a process developing over months, if not a lifetime. Our material lives change and our thoughts about it and ourselves change. (Thus, Freud is so popular in relating all events to childhood because we are, of course, the same people or had the same origins as our "old" self). One situation or series of situations may be a catalyst to a new perception of reality, but this is often a culmination of other events.

In our movement we think it is important to emphasize the obvious about consciousness. We all have consciousness. We all have contradictions in our own "level" or "levels" of consciousness. Certain factors of our lives may mean that we emphasize certain things we see to be true; and ignore, or deny, or just agree to live with others. Our movement needs to offer women feasible alternatives. These new alternatives can help close the contradictions with which they live. (The same may be said about ourselves).

Here it is important that what we offer is a view of reality. For example, women often cannot see who their enemy is because he is not right on the scene. So, often people vent their anger on a relatively powerless agent who is carrying out another's will (e.g., the waitress) or cannot function well in the conditions but who does not have the power (alone) to change (teacher, mother). What we have that makes us attractive, is that we see the roots. That is the meaning of the word "radical."

So what does our conception of consciousness have to offer? It allows women to generalize from their specific situation or series of situations to see patterns. This provides a picture of reality that will allow them to function better because the pieces fit. But we can provide more than a pattern: we identify causes for events. Only if we understand these causes will we know how to change those events (not repeat or be overwhelmed by them). It provides a systematic way to develop our ideas from ideology to strategy, to program and tactics, because it identifies things in relation to their importance in reaching our goals.

We must understand consciousness raising in relation to objective conditions. Women cannot have "higher consciousness" by trying harder. There are real limitations on women. Just presenting alternatives does not often make them adequate or real to women. We must always relate to the lives of women, in the concrete form.

The most wonderful thing that a consciousness-raising group does is to help us see that problems we once felt were personal are social. We must continue to see how we are not so different from most women. We react to so many of the same objective conditions (from the pill, economic job scarcity, more youth in college, etc). This helps to keep things in perspective. For example, it is not women's liberation that is making problems for the nuclear family. In part, we are an outgrowth of many of its problems. In part, we affect its future and the alternatives offered. So there is the constant interplay of objective and subjective forces. Popularized women's liberation consciousness itself (as we all know) is not what causes social change.

We began our paper with a three-point guideline to strategy: 1) win real concrete reforms that meet women's needs; 2) give women a sense of their own power; 3) alter the relations of power. Our understanding of consciousness allows us to understand the real (root) needs of women, and the ways in which our powerlessness affects us and gives us the desire to alter relations of power.

It unites talk and action, constantly, describing a place for emphasizing each. It helps us set priorities in terms of a concrete situation. (Thus we move away from abstractly "pure" issues, but see each issue in a specific situation as one that may or may not demand our attention,

depending on how it relates to the lives of the women we are able to address and other strategic considerations.

It also make us fairly tolerant of what choices women make with their lives because we see how bound rip conscious decisions are with immediate situations. We have a great belief in the almost infinite perfectability of people (given changes in social institutions and generations of change in consciousness). But we are cautious about the extent of personal perfection. We know no one can be liberated in this society, no matter what their consciousness. We are bound in networks of limitations, immediate, specific and affecting our whole lives.

Thus, consciousness is not abstract (though it may at any one point be unclear). It does not come from an individual's mind (though intellectual focus develops it). It is not necessarily reflected in all personal actions of an individual, but is in social actions. A socialist feminist consciousness is certainly not a natural or spontaneous process that will always happen when a group of women come together. As events move quickly to clarify social forces (as declarations of war, arrests, economic hard times, increased divorce rate, etc. often move events), so our consciousness is clarified. Consciousness is a key to power, not only in our individual lives, but as a social force coming into its own and able to work on its own behalf.

Many things have moved us to believe in women's liberation. Talking to other women, we came to realize our oppression by understanding the nature of our upbringing and of our lives as, women. However, the changes we think will be most permanent in us are those made by participating in a variety of activities, which, through our involvement, lead us to further understanding and change. In the process of struggling to change our oppression, we begin to understand both the specific forms of oppression and how they are related to one another.

We find that ideology guided only by reflection and discussion loses touch with reality and-is not accepted by most women. Further, if our movement is to continue to expand and to move forward to change our oppression as women, we must unite in a variety of activities which will build our power base. This in turn further develops our ideology and our understanding of the oppression of women.

The method of consciousness-raising used most frequently in the women's movement has been the rap group. The fact of group participation has been very important in changing women's feelings of isolation and individuality. It has made it easier for us to understand the commonality of interest among all women and what is necessary for change. The rap group format is one in which everyone can contribute. Women can develop skills through understanding one another's experience and dealing with the feelings that experience has created. But because consciousness and conditions are intertwined, rap groups by themselves may be a dead end.

They can lead to a concentration on the improvement of ideas or one's self with no eye toward action. The purism of endless refining and redefining should not be mistaken for success. A good analysis is not equal to action. Consciousness must not become an end in itself and an inhibitor to seizing power. We are arguing neither for an uncritical turn of mind nor for the blissful ignorance of all but the most narrow issues for the many. We are arguing that ideology must be integrated into the on-going life of the movement, and that this is best done in relation to and with testing, by concrete changes resulting from actions.

The rap group format may present another obstacle to the full development of the movement. Discovering more and more examples of the effects of oppression on personal life can make the task of social and personal change seem impossible. It is not difficult to reach the stage where any work toward liberation seems irrelevant because early socialization practices cannot be changed at once. Direct action supplements rap groups. It provides opportunities to develop and use new skills while bringing about change. In this context, both rap groups and the development of a socialist feminist analysis can proceed without the dangers of purism or hopelessness.

The full development of women's capabilities may be hampered by the very things in consciousness-raising which at first seem to stimulate so much growth. Women come together as sisters on the basis of shared weakness and common problems. As women grow stronger, they themselves may become frightened; sometimes the strength of one may divide the others from her. Thus sisterhood may be lost as strength is gained.

To make more concrete what we mean by socialist feminism, in this section we address a few issues currently facing the women's movement. For each of these issues we sketch what we see as a socialist feminist context. The issues include independent women's organizations separatism, class organizing, counter-culture, lesbianism and vanguards.

With the isolation and unorganized state of the women's movement in a number of areas of the country, many women who might agree with ideas presented here are not presently working as part of the independent women's movement. Many women have filtered back into mixed organizations or left the women's movement, feeling that it rejected their skills.

Many women in mixed organizations who know they are for women's liberation are caught in the bind of either feeling guilty or hostile to the independent women's movement (because they feel that the movement condemns them for the choice they made). Our concerns, we expect, are shared by many women in mixed organizations. We hope emphasizing the need for an independent women's movement also helps develop ways for working with women and men in mixed organizations.

We argue for developing organizations and having organizational pride. This is a point many act as if we had "overcome." We argue for developing leaders and organizers responsible to such organizations and through them to us in the movement. A few years ago it was not "in" to be for organizers. Now leaders are "out." We argue for a leadership that is responsible (again, not so obvious to some) and useful to all of us. There are so many more points, but these should provide some for argument and discussion.

All women's fates are bound with that of the independent women's movement. The movement's advances will concretely affect the lives of all other women. So too, individual women's advances and defeats, multiplied, will help shape the movement.

Other reasons for women working with women have been said often, and still are true. Bias with any group with common interests, once those interests are identified, much is shared and a common perspective can be developed more readily. It is easier to follow our own agenda. (At least it lessens the likelihood of forgetting our own self-interest, which is so often submerged

in other organizations and institutions). Of course, there are situations in which organizational problems develop among women. We find women are just nicer to work with than men.

But the most basic argument for the independent women's movement and organizations is that the relations of power are unequal between women and men. As long as this is true, men will maintain control unless we have separate organizations to identify our needs and strengths. Unequals, treated superficially as equals, will remain unequals. This will be true unless women come together on the basis of self-respect and separate organizations or caucuses.

We argue this partly in the interest of ever maintaining democratic and effective mixed organizations. Women must be united (in caucuses or separate women's groups) to act on our own program. Otherwise, feeling our ineffectiveness, we will focus solely on attacking chauvinism in organizations in a more and more personalized form. Without a strong caucus through which women can be strong, they suffer--for example, being told they are "not political" or to submerge their desire to fight on women's concerns. Organizations also suffer, unable to proceed, having to deal with internal problems of chauvinism at every step. Alternatively, they will not deal with chauvinism at all.

As socialist feminists, we argue for using the principles of power realities to guide democracy in the organization. Women, in mixed organizations, would fight for and win the program they wanted and know they had won it. This would begin to alter structurally the relations of power in the mixed organization through common struggles in action. At the same time, we must remember our greatest enemies are those in or serving the ruling class.

Objectively, men as a group have vested interests opposed to those of women as a group. We will, for example, cut into their jobs, challenge their position of comfort in the family, and take personal power away from them. In the short-run, and in some ways, men are an enemy.

Why work with men at all? At many points, our interests and the interests of men are shared. We commonly are united in our class position against such things as bad health care, insufficient jobs, long hours and a powerlessness to affect priority decisions of our society. Also, at points, sexism oppresses men. At these points, we can join in common struggle (e.g., they are

trained to kill and be killed, have tenderness drilled -out of them). Even then, we must be able to organize separately so that we may come together.

In addition, women have historic and emotional bonds to men. When men and women come together, it is out of the forces of social reality. Those social bonds are not destroyed by ideological argument alone, but only when that social reality changes. In many cases, women have no real choice but marriage for survival, self-respect and warmth or love. We must look at the lives of most women with fewer assumptions to discover what their real alternatives are and in what is their happiness. Our perspective for our struggle must not deny to these women the sources of support they have found in the past (possibly through men or children).

There has sometimes been a weakening of the skills men have to offer to the movement, by excessive guilt-tripping when men were told to give up their chauvinism. True, the struggle against chauvinism is a constant one. But chauvinism is all around us, constantly conditioning us, and will be most effectively overcome through attacking its institutional roots, through women united against it. We assume men (and we) will reflect chauvinism. Too often our actions contradict our knowledge that originally brought US together--you cannot overcome social problems with personal solutions. Thus a "position" on men should be tactical: it varies with the real circumstances. A position on men is not our program. Sexism, not men, is our political enemy.

Separatism has two meanings now in the movement. One is an ideological position arguing for the separate development of men and women as fully as possible. Another is a tactical position, arguing for separate organizations or life alternatives. We too argue for separate organizations as a tactical decision. However, we argue against an ideological stance of separatism.

It is easy to see how the argument for the independent women's movement could lead to an ideological argument for separatism (or how the two arguments are related). We do find strength in separatist models. They show us concretely, how much we can gain from each other as women. But for reasons previously said we do not believe separatism will solve our problems. Also, because ideological separatism does not have the social basis for attraction to the majority

of women, it has turned the struggle to one only within the movement. It moves toward more and more purity, dividing us from our allies rather than uniting us on common ground and developing new common ground on which we can unite.

Ironically, this is much the same position that women in mixed organizations, without strong caucuses, find themselves in. (That is, they turn their struggle to one within the organization-- fighting chauvinism--not to program.)

More basically, under certain circumstances, working with men is feasible, desirable and necessary to achieve our vision. Separatism as personal practice is a matter at choice, as political position is illusory.

In the name of socialism, arguments have been made against the independent women's movement that did justice neither to feminism nor to socialism. Such arguments were often part of attempts to develop a class analysis of American society and saw women's liberation as a way to bring women into "the movement." Many in the women's movement have responded negatively to the opportunism implied in this using of women's liberation. Although it is now generally accepted that the fight against sexism is a main goal, there are still times when the perspective of women's liberation is challenged for legitimacy from this quarter.

Sometimes the challenge comes in the form that our primary fight must be against racism. Since the women's movement is primarily white, this would mean we need to change struggles. Raising the need to fight racism abstractly only reaffirms the "purity" of those who raise it. We argue that struggles against racism will be meaningful on the basis of common self-interest between black and white groups.

On many issues, whites and blacks may not be able to unite because our relations of power are unequal. However, when social forces touch us commonly in some ways, we can build programs to overcome social divisions. We must not deride the support we do have because it does not include all women right now.

At other times the argument is one of "giving up privilege." To some extent this is another abstract purism. More importantly, this is not the image we want to project, nor will it be

successful. Women will join us because we win rights for them. No one joins in order to lose something that they need. Rights will be established as they are fought for and won, not because those with privileges and power give them up.

A third challenge to women's liberation has postulated that only productive, paid working (or, more narrowly, industrial working) women are revolutionary force. There have been some interesting but defensive responses to this showing that housework is productive. But we feel the argument and the defense have been too narrow. There are many contradictions in society. Many different kinds of efforts, directed at many different targets, have included so many more women in our movement. Of course, only employed workers can withhold labor necessary for corporations to continue. But the general strike has never won any victories when it wasn't combined with the general political mobilization of all exploited classes. While working for it, organizations of unpaid female labor and community organizing efforts are building the social force we will need for that revolution and revolutionizing future social relations.

The women's movement has brought forth a women's culture with the development of women's poetry, music, art, history, women's centers in the cultural realm, and more practically oriented skills such as auto repair and karate. This culture has provided a place for our creativity to be expressed and enabled us to have more independence and self-confidence in areas where we have been denied knowledge and opportunity for expression in the past.

In addition, it has helped change many women's lives. By providing an example of our vision, women's culture has helped develop a consciousness of how things could and should be better (which helps us understand how we are oppressed now).

At the same time, feelings of frustration and isolation among other things have led many women to seek only cultural alternatives--personal lifestyles of liberation. Many women have chosen to commit themselves entirely to development of a counter culture, dissociating themselves from any action or organizations and frequently moving from the city to the country. For its personal usefulness, we do not argue against it for those who can. But because of its limitation, we challenge this as a political program.

As socialist feminists, we are helping build an extended women's culture but also believe that it should be available for all women. This will fully be possible only if we challenge institutions which have power over us so that we might make it available to all. Our culture should be built into the kind of society for which we are fighting. Currently, our culture is only available to a small minority of women. Women must join together to struggle for power in order to bring about our vision for all women.

As the women's movement developed, the gay movement, too, has grown. The gay movement has more forcefully brought the issue of sexuality into the political arena with an analysis of the oppression suffered by gay people in our society. Hating the conditions that shunt us and loving women with whom we find new strength and new room to be weak, many of us come into lesbian relationships. The gay liberation movement has brought people together collectively to bring an end to that oppression. Gay or straight lives are joined in that these struggles affect us as women.

Lesbians, as outcasts in society because they have stepped out of the prescribed roles for women, have long been persecuted. In lesbians' fights against sexism, all feminists stand to gain. Similarly, since all lesbians are women, lesbians stand to gain from the struggles of feminists. We must join together since our interests are intertwined.

This is not to deny the need for separate lesbian groups or caucuses. Heterosexual bias is so strong that it persists unless lesbians are organized separately to argue for a lesbian perspective. The organizational form may be caucuses or entirely separate groups; but where our interests are ultimately the same, we should fight together for we can then be stronger and gain more power.

In some places, it appears that to be in the women's movement, one must be gay. Sometimes, in fact, it is argued that lesbians should be the vanguard of the women's movement. We do not believe that power for women will be won by a primary focus (for the whole movement) on gayness. We do not believe that a primary focus on any particular contradiction will lead to revolution.

A vanguard has two common meanings. One is a social force in the front of political struggle. The other is a conscious leadership such as a political party provides for certain movements. At different moments, strong forces in the movement have argued that certain groups should be the vanguard (black, working, gay, etc.). Many of these arguments have been so oppressive that some women have reacted against any idea of vanguard.

Yet both functions for vanguards are important at certain points. At times, our movement may be able to use and will need a vanguard, a leading and integrating force. Out of respect developed through past leadership in struggles, a vanguard can synthesize a movement's energies and help to focus it.

A vanguard of conscious, responsible leadership can help us develop the best use of the resources and the varying interests that we will attract. It does not further and further define the pure line so that we attract fewer and fewer women. It does not win its respect by merely identifying itself as a leader. Many previous attempts at vanguard leadership failed, resting on guilt, rhetoric, and self-imposition.

When we are truly strong enough, able to develop program from our independent sectors--in women's, gay, black, medical, educational, along geographic and work lines, overlapping and also leaving spaces--then we will especially need an integrating force, a political party. It will incorporate and build on our priorities of socialist feminism because we will have shaped this vanguard of the people's liberation movement.

In order to implement the strategy outlined in this paper, women's liberation organizations are needed. Through the strength of organizations, power can be won and the women who participate in them can gain a sense of their own power, a new self-respect, and a form for ensuring the continuation of our movement. Only organizations can be the carrier of victories and the repository of past successes.

Currently, the women's liberation movement is broken into small groups in most places and thus is hard to find, hard to join. Women's liberation has not received recognition for even the few victories we have won up to now, because there is no organized form to articulate our

successes. With organization, women's liberation can be in the arena along with other groups, struggling for our own victories.

We fear that the women's liberation movement may die. How can we survive struggling for five, ten or more years without organizations larger than ourselves to carry on? More conservative efforts will be able to claim our victories and attract women and resources unless we offer our own organizational alternative. They will set the tone and the agenda for the movement and it will no longer be ours.

As a movement, we have tried to understand why early feminists died out, sold out, or lost out in history. Concerned lest we repeat their mistakes, we have spent much time saying we should expand our class and racial base. But perhaps a fate similar to the early feminists awaits us because 1) we have not concretely identified the interests of women and fought in common for real gains on that interest; and 2) we have not developed organizations that would fight around that interest. If we can do these things, we should be able to overcome the limitations of the earlier women's movement and actively recruit women to our movement.

In this writing we are not arguing for any one specific organization, although in the future we would hope a socialist feminist organization might be possible. Rather, we are arguing for an organizational conception which would provide a form for working on the range of problems women face--abortion, child care, health, job discrimination (i.e. "women's issues") as well as all issues which affect our lives as women: taxes, housing, the war, welfare, etc. As those issues affect us, we need forms that belong to us, through which we can respond and reach other women, and which will insure that the solutions won reflect our interests.

The kind of organization we propose reflects our confidence in this strategy, with alliances made on the basis of mutual self-interest and equal power among groups. Sometimes we have participated in coalitions out of a sense of guilt or because we did not have our own work. Often in the women's movement we face requests for our participation in everyone else's program. In a socialist feminist organization, such alliances would only be made as they fit into our own strategy.

As women, we have had many bad experiences with organizations which impeded our personal growth and political progress. Many women, reacting to the way they have been oppressed by such structures, reject all explicit structures. We have found this unrealistic because the structures survive implicitly and continue to affect us while we try to ignore them or live in the spaces allowed us.

The form and structures for organization will vary depending on the type of group being formed. For large, mass organizations, more structure is necessary in order to be able to integrate new members, and provide varying levels of responsibility so that those with less time can also participate. Such organizations, which are designed to achieve specific goals, need structures also in order to facilitate the development of strategy and the implementation of decisions.

A reason for flexibility in organizational form is that women of different styles may feel comfortable in different situations. For example, those with a college background may see more need for philosophical discussion. Some with jobs, family and other commitments may feel greatest priority on starting and ending meetings on time. At times the decision may have to be for the medium amount of comfort for everyone rather than the perfect atmosphere for any.

Within this context, there are several specific organizational ideas that we think are important in building organizations that serve us. We need specific forms clearly stated through which women can see where leadership lies and how to develop it and make it accountable to them. Below are structural elements we think are necessary for developing a mass organization:

1. explicit structure and decision-making vehicle
2. bevels of involvement to allow women to make more or less of a commitment depending on interest and/or time.
3. division of labor, reviewed systematically and designed to help less skilled women gain skills.
4. leadership responsible to the organization
5. work and involvement having some relationship to decision making
6. information dissemination throughout the organization.

There has been much discussion in the women's movement about elitism and leadership. We have been innovative and learned from experiments tried in different parts of the country. The principle of "if you don't know, learn; if you do know, teach" has helped many of us develop and spread our movement.

However, we have seen leadership patterns emerge in every situation. The solution is not to destroy leadership. Rather, we must make leaders responsible to organizations and to the members. In addition, leadership can be an effective catalyst, a stimulator to advance the movement. Elitism can be perpetuated only when we do not train each other in what we know.

We believe in political debate and in voting as a means of distinguishing between alternatives and deciding how to proceed. Operating on the basis of consensus means necessarily that we cannot move beyond the lowest common denominator of agreement. Our movement would never have existed if we really followed notions of consensus in American society. Moreover, consensus often hides real disagreement because there is no structured way for opposition to have a voice, as in a vote. Further, women in the minority on a particular issue can be oppressed by a consensus approach because their views cannot be seen as a clear, different position or altering. An Such a minority position may be forced into agreement with the majority.

We believe political debate is crucial for maintaining the viability of our movement. We can have political debate without endangering our strong feeling of sisterhood for each other. Sometimes we will win and at other times we will lose; but political debate and struggle provides stimulation and challenges US to develop our ideas and positions.

Conflicting viewpoints, in fact, are healthy in any organization and should not be submerged because of a fear of difference. But for debate to be worthwhile, it needs to be tied to clear function within the organization. While engaging in that debate, we must continue to be clear in identifying the real enemy we are fighting. We can structure debate within the organization so it helps us learn, but it is not our sole function.

Beside the three basic feminism, it is also known some others as follows.

9.4 Black Feminism

Black feminist theory emerged from 1980 onwards. It challenged perspectives and practices among white feminists that marginalised or excluded Black women. Black feminists called on white feminists to take differences and inequalities between women seriously, to recognise the impact of racism on Black women's lives and to challenge racism within the Women's Movement.

Black feminist research and theory makes the experiences and perspectives of Black women central. Black feminists generally oppose assumptions of a common sisterhood among women and do not define men as the oppressor. They point out that black men and women must work together politically in the fight against racism. Many Black feminists in the UK and USA are anti-imperialist and have an international perspective.

Black feminism argues that sexism, class oppression, and racism are inextricably bound together. Forms of feminism that strive to overcome sexism and class oppression but ignore race can discriminate against many people, including women, through racial bias. The Combahee River Collective argued in 1974 that the liberation of black women entails freedom for all people, since it would require the end of racism, sexism, and class oppression. One of the theories that evolved out of this movement was Alice Walker's Womanism. It emerged after the early feminist movements that were led specifically by white women who advocated social changes such as woman's suffrage. These movements were largely white middle-class movements and had generally ignored oppression based on racism and classism. Alice Walker and other Womanists pointed out that black women experienced a different and more intense kind of oppression from that of white women.

Angela Davis was one of the first people who articulated an argument centered around the intersection of race, gender, and class in her book, *Women, Race, and Class*. Kimberle Crenshaw, a prominent feminist law theorist, gave the idea the name Intersectionality while discussing identity politics in her essay, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color".

9.5 Postcolonial Feminism

Postcolonial feminists argue that oppression relating to the colonial experience, particularly racial, class, and ethnic oppression, has marginalized women in postcolonial societies. They challenge the assumption that gender oppression is the primary force of patriarchy. Postcolonial feminists object to portrayals of women of non-Western societies as passive and voiceless victims and the portrayal of Western women as modern, educated and empowered.

Postcolonial feminism emerged from the gendered history of colonialism: colonial powers often imposed Western norms on colonized regions. In the 1940s and 1950s, after the formation of the United Nations, former colonies were monitored by the West for what was considered "social progress". The status of women in the developing world has been monitored by organizations such as the United Nations and as a result traditional practices and roles taken up by women—sometimes seen as distasteful by Western standards—could be considered a form of rebellion against colonial oppression. Postcolonial feminists today struggle to fight gender oppression within their own cultural models of society rather than through those imposed by the Western colonizers.

Postcolonial feminism is critical of Western forms of feminism, notably radical feminism and liberal feminism and their universalization of female experience. Postcolonial feminists argue that cultures impacted by colonialism are often vastly different and should be treated as such. Colonial oppression may result in the glorification of pre-colonial culture, which, in cultures with traditions of power stratification along gender lines, could mean the acceptance of, or refusal to deal with, inherent issues of gender inequality. Postcolonial feminists can be described as feminists who have reacted against both universalizing tendencies in Western feminist thought and a lack of attention to gender issues in mainstream postcolonial thought.

Third-world feminism has been described as a group of feminist theories developed by feminists who acquired their views and took part in feminist politics in so-called third-world countries. Although women from the third world have been engaged in the feminist movement, Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Sarojini Sahoo criticize Western feminism on the grounds that it is ethnocentric and does not take into account the unique experiences of women from third-world countries or the existence of feminisms indigenous to third-world countries. According to

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, women in the third world feel that Western feminism bases its understanding of women on "internal racism, classism and homophobia". This discourse is strongly related to African feminism and postcolonial feminism. Its development is also associated with concepts such as black feminism, womanism, "Africana womanism", "motherism", "Stiwanism", "negofeminism", chicana feminism, and "femalism"

9.6 Multiracial Feminism

Multiracial feminism (also known as "women of color" feminism) offers a standpoint theory and analysis of the lives and experiences of women of color. The theory emerged in the 1990s and was developed by Dr. Maxine Baca Zinn, a Chicana feminist and Dr. Bonnie Thornton Dill, a sociology expert on African American women and family.

9.7 Libertarian Feminism

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Classical liberal or libertarian feminism conceives of freedom as freedom from coercive interference. It holds that women, as well as men, have a right to such freedom due to their status as self-owners."

There are several categories under the theory of libertarian feminism, or kinds of feminism that are linked to libertarian ideologies. Anarcha-feminism (also called anarchist feminism or anarcho-feminism) combines feminist and anarchist beliefs, embodying classical libertarianism rather than contemporary conservative libertarianism. Anarcha-feminists view patriarchy as a manifestation of hierarchy, believing that the fight against patriarchy is an essential part of the class struggle and the anarchist struggle against the state. Anarcha-feminists such as Susan Brown see the anarchist struggle as a necessary component of the feminist struggle. In Brown's words, "anarchism is a political philosophy that opposes all relationships of power, it is inherently feminist". Recently, Wendy McElroy has defined a position (which she labels "feminism" or "individualist feminism") that combines feminism with anarcho-capitalism or contemporary conservative libertarianism, arguing that a pro-capitalist, anti-state position is compatible with an emphasis on equal rights and empowerment for women. Individualist anarchist-feminism has grown from the US-based individualist anarchism movement.

Individualist feminism is typically defined as a feminism in opposition to what writers such as Wendy McElroy and Christina Hoff Sommers term, political or gender feminism. However, there are some differences within the discussion of individualist feminism. While some individualist feminists like McElroy oppose government interference into the choices women make with their bodies because such interference creates a coercive hierarchy (such as patriarchy), other feminists such as Christina Hoff Sommers hold that feminism's political role is simply to ensure that everyone's, including women's, right against coercive interference is respected. Sommers is described as a "socially conservative equity feminist" by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Critics have called her an anti-feminist.

Since the 1980s, standpoint feminists have argued that feminism should examine how women's experience of inequality relates to that of racism, homophobia, classism and colonization. In the late 1980s and 1990s postmodern feminists argued that gender roles are socially constructed, and that it is impossible to generalize women's experiences across cultures and histories.

CHAPTER X

TYPES OF FEMINISM (PART 2)

10.1 Post-structural and postmodern Feminism

Post-structural feminism, also referred to as French feminism, uses the insights of various epistemological movements, including psychoanalysis, linguistics, political theory (Marxist and post-Marxist theory), race theory, literary theory, and other intellectual currents for feminist concerns. Many post-structural feminists maintain that difference is one of the most powerful tools that females possess in their struggle with patriarchal domination, and that to equate the feminist movement only with equality is to deny women a plethora of options because equality is still defined from the masculine or patriarchal perspective.

Postmodern feminism is an approach to feminist theory that incorporates postmodern and post-structuralist theory. The largest departure from other branches of feminism is the argument that gender is constructed through language. The most notable proponent of this argument is Judith Butler. In her 1990 book, *Gender Trouble*, she draws on and critiques the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. Butler criticizes the distinction drawn by previous feminisms between biological sex and socially constructed gender. She says that this does not allow for a sufficient criticism of essentialism. For Butler "woman" is a debatable category, complicated by class, ethnicity, sexuality, and other facets of identity. She states that gender is performative. This argument leads to the conclusion that there is no single cause for women's subordination and no single approach towards dealing with the issue.

In *A Cyborg Manifesto* Donna Haraway criticizes traditional notions of feminism, particularly its emphasis on identity, rather than affinity. She uses the metaphor of a cyborg in order to construct a postmodern feminism that moves beyond dualisms and the limitations of traditional gender, feminism, and politics. Haraway's cyborg is an attempt to break away from Oedipal narratives and Christian origin-myths like Genesis. She writes: "The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust."

A major branch in postmodern feminist thought has emerged from the contemporary psychoanalytic French feminism. Other postmodern feminist works highlight stereotypical

gender roles, only to portray them as parodies of the original beliefs. The history of feminism is not important in these writings - only what is going to be done about it. The history is dismissed and used to depict how ridiculous past beliefs were. Modern feminist theory has been extensively criticized as being predominantly, though not exclusively, associated with Western middle class academia. Mary Joe Frug, a postmodernist feminist, criticized mainstream feminism as being too narrowly focused and inattentive to related issues of race and class.

10.2 Eco-feminism

Eco-feminism came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. Eco-feminists make connections between men's oppression of women and their exploitation of Nature and argue that women have a central role to play in the environmental movement. They point out that in Western thought, women have been associated with nature and emotion and the body while men have been associated with culture, reason and the mind. Those aspects of life associated with men have always been valued more. They also point out that female terms are often used to describe Nature - Mother Earth, virgin forest etc.

Some eco-feminists see women's reproductive and nurturing capacities as giving women superior insight into how humans can live in harmony with nature. Other eco-feminists argue that it is women's low status and social roles that make them more aware of threats to the environment eg dumping of toxic waste, degradation of fertile land through intensive farming & pesticides.

“Ecofeminism is an activist and academic movement that sees critical connections between the domination of nature and the exploitation of women. Ecofeminist activism grew during the 1980s and 1990s among women from the anti-nuclear, environmental, and lesbian-feminist movements. The “Women and Life on Earth: Ecofeminism in the Eighties” conference held at Amherst (1980) was the first in a series of ecofeminist conferences, inspiring the growth of ecofeminist organizations and actions...” (by Lois Ann Lorentzen, University of San Francisco, and Hether Eaton, Saint Paul University Press, 2002).

"Ecofeminism is a movement that sees a connection between the exploitation and degradation of the natural world and the subordination and oppression of women. It emerged in the mid-1970s alongside second-wave feminism and the green movement. Ecofeminism brings together elements of the feminist and green movements, while at the same time offering a challenge to both. It takes from the green movement a concern about the impact of human activities on the non-human world and from feminism the view of humanity as gendered in ways that subordinate, exploit and oppress women."-- From the introduction to "Feminism & Ecology" by Mary Mellor, New York University Press, 1997)

"The capitalist-patriarchal perspective interprets difference as hierarchical and uniformity as a prerequisite for equality. Our aim is to go beyond this narrow perspective and to express our diversity and, in different ways, address the inherent inequalities in world structures which permit the North to dominate the South, men to dominate women, and the frenetic plunder of ever more resources for ever more unequally distributed economic gain to dominate nature...

"...everywhere, women were the first to protest against environmental destruction. As activists in the ecology movements, it became clear to us that science and technology were not gender neutral; and in common with many other women, we began to see that the relationship of exploitative dominance between man and nature, (shaped by reductionist modern science since the 16th century) and the exploitative and oppressive relationship between men and women and prevails in most patriarchal societies, even modern industrial ones, were closely connected...

"If the final outcome of the present world system is a general threat to life on planet earth, then it is crucial to resuscitate and nurture the impulse and determination to survive, inherent in all living things..."

"Ecofeminism, a 'new term for an ancient wisdom' grew out of various social movements - the feminist, peace and ecology movements - in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Though the term was first used by Françoise D'Eaubonne it became popular only in the context of numerous protests and activities against environmental destruction, sparked-off initially by recurring ecological disasters. The meltdown at Three Mile Island prompted large numbers of women in the USA to come together in the first ecofeminist conference - 'Women and Life on Earth: A

Conference on Eco-Feminism in the Eighties' - in March 1980, at Amherst. At this conference the connections between feminism and militarization, healing and ecology were explored. As Ynestra King, one of the Conference organizers, wrote:

Ecofeminism is about connectedness and wholeness of theory and practice. It asserts the special strength and integrity of every living thing. For us the snail darter is to be considered side by side with a community's need for water, the porpoise side by side with appetite for tuna, and the creatures it may fall on with Skylab. We are a woman-identified movement and we believe we have a special work to do in these imperilled times. We see the devastation of the earth and her beings by the corporate warriors, and the threat of nuclear annihilation by the military warriors, as feminist concerns. It is the masculinist mentality which would deny us our right to our own bodies and our own sexuality, and which depends on multiple systems of dominance and state power to have its way.' "Wherever women acted against ecological destruction or/and the threat of atomic annihilation, they immediately became aware of the connection between patriarchal violence against women, other people and nature, and that: In defying this patriarchy we are loyal to future generations and to life and this planet itself. We have a deep and particular understanding of this both through our natures and our experience as women."...

Ecofeminism links ecology with feminism. Ecofeminists see the domination of women as stemming from the same ideologies that bring about the domination of the environment. Patriarchal systems, where men own and control the land, are seen as responsible for the oppression of women and destruction of the natural environment. Ecofeminists argue that the men in power control the land, and therefore they are able to exploit it for their own profit and success. Ecofeminists argue that in this situation, women are exploited by men in power for their own profit, success, and pleasure. Ecofeminists argue that women and the environment are both exploited as passive pawns in the race to domination. Ecofeminists argue that those people in power are able to take advantage of them distinctly because they are seen as passive and rather helpless. Ecofeminism connects the exploitation and domination of women with that of the environment. As a way of repairing social and ecological injustices, ecofeminists feel that women must work towards creating a healthy environment and ending the destruction of the lands that most women rely on to provide for their families.

Ecofeminism argues that there is a connection between women and nature that comes from their shared history of oppression by a patriarchal Western society. Vandana Shiva claims that women have a special connection to the environment through their daily interactions with it that has been ignored. She says that "women in subsistence economies, producing and reproducing wealth in partnership with nature, have been experts in their own right of holistic and ecological knowledge of nature's processes. But these alternative modes of knowing, which are oriented to the social benefits and sustenance needs are not recognized by the capitalist reductionist paradigm, because it fails to perceive the interconnectedness of nature, or the connection of women's lives, work and knowledge with the creation of wealth."

However, feminist and social ecologist Janet Biehl has criticized ecofeminism for focusing too much on a mystical connection between women and nature and not enough on the actual conditions of women.

The feminist movement has effected change in Western society, including women's suffrage; greater access to education; more nearly equitable pay with men; the right to initiate divorce proceedings and "no fault" divorce; and the right of women to make individual decisions regarding pregnancy (including access to contraceptives and abortion); as well as the right to own property.

From the 1960s on the women's liberation movement campaigned for women's rights, including the same pay as men, equal rights in law, and the freedom to plan their families. Their efforts were met with mixed results. Issues commonly associated with notions of women's rights include, though are not limited to: the right to bodily integrity and autonomy; to vote (universal suffrage); to hold public office; to work; to fair wages or equal pay; to own property; to education; to serve in the military; to enter into legal contracts; and to have marital, parental and religious rights.

In the UK a public groundswell of opinion in favour of legal equality gained pace, partly through the extensive employment of women in men's traditional roles during both world wars. By the 1960s the legislative process was being readied, tracing through MP Willie Hamilton's select committee report, his Equal Pay for Equal Work Bill, the creation of a Sex Discrimination

Board, Lady Sear's draft sex anti-discrimination bill, a government Green Paper of 1973, until 1975 when the first British Sex Discrimination Act, an Equal Pay Act, and an Equal Opportunities Commission came into force. With encouragement from the UK government, the other countries of the EEC soon followed suit with an agreement to ensure that discrimination laws would be phased out across the European Community.

In the USA, the US National Organization for Women (NOW) was created in 1966 with the purpose of bringing about equality for all women. NOW was one important group that fought for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). This amendment stated that "equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex." But there was disagreement on how the proposed amendment would be understood. Supporters believed it would guarantee women equal treatment. But critics feared it might deny women the right be financially supported by their husbands. The amendment died in 1982 because not enough states had ratified it. ERAs have been included in subsequent Congresses, but have still failed to be ratified.

In the final three decades of the 20th century, Western women knew a new freedom through birth control, which enabled women to plan their adult lives, often making way for both career and family. The movement had been started in the 1910s by US pioneering social reformer Margaret Sanger and in the UK and internationally by Marie Stopes.

The United Nations Human Development Report 2004 estimated that when both paid employment and unpaid household tasks are accounted for, on average women work more than men. In rural areas of selected developing countries women performed an average of 20% more work than men, or an additional 102 minutes per day. In the OECD countries surveyed, on average women performed 5% more work than men, or 20 minutes per day. At the UN's Pan Pacific Southeast Asia Women's Association 21st International Conference in 2001 it was stated that "in the world as a whole, women comprise 51% of the population, do 66% of the work, receive 10% of the income and own less than one percent of the property".

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is an international convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

Described as an international bill of rights for women, it came into force on 3 September 1981. Several countries have ratified the Convention subject to certain declarations, reservations and objections. Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Qatar, Nauru, Palau, Tonga and the United States have not ratified CEDAW. Expecting a U.S. Senate vote, NOW has encouraged President Obama to remove U.S. reservations and objections added in 2002 before the vote.

Gender-neutral language is a description of language usages which are aimed at minimizing assumptions regarding the biological sex of human referents. The advocacy of gender-neutral language reflects, at least, two different agendas: one aims to clarify the inclusion of both sexes or genders (gender-inclusive language); the other proposes that gender, as a category, is rarely worth marking in language (gender-neutral language). Gender-neutral language is sometimes described as non-sexist language by advocates and politically-correct language by opponents.

The increased entry of women into the workplace beginning in the twentieth century has affected gender roles and the division of labor within households. Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild in *The Second Shift* and *The Time Bind* presents evidence that in two-career couples, men and women, on average, spend about equal amounts of time working, but women still spend more time on housework. Feminist writer Cathy Young responds to Hochschild's assertions by arguing that in some cases, women may prevent the equal participation of men in housework and parenting.

Feminist criticisms of men's contributions to child care and domestic labor in the Western middle class are typically centered around the idea that it is unfair for women to be expected to perform more than half of a household's domestic work and child care when both members of the relationship also work outside the home. Several studies provide statistical evidence that the financial income of married men does not affect their rate of attending to household duties.

In *Dubious Conceptions*, Kristin Luker discusses the effect of feminism on teenage women's choices to bear children, both in and out of wedlock. She says that as childbearing out of wedlock has become more socially acceptable, young women, especially poor young women, while not bearing children at a higher rate than in the 1950s, now see less of a reason to get

married before having a child. Her explanation for this is that the economic prospects for poor men are slim, hence poor women have a low chance of finding a husband who will be able to provide reliable financial support.

Although research suggests that to an extent, both women and men perceive feminism to be in conflict with romance, studies of undergraduates and older adults have shown that feminism has positive impacts on relationship health for women and sexual satisfaction for men, and found no support for negative stereotypes of feminists.

Feminist theology is a movement that reconsiders the traditions, practices, scriptures, and theologies of religions from a feminist perspective. Some of the goals of feminist theology include increasing the role of women among the clergy and religious authorities, reinterpreting male-dominated imagery and language about God, determining women's place in relation to career and motherhood, and studying images of women in the religion's sacred texts.

Christian feminism is a branch of feminist theology which seeks to interpret and understand Christianity in light of the equality of women and men. Because this equality has been historically ignored, Christian feminists believe their contributions are necessary for a complete understanding of Christianity. While there is no standard set of beliefs among Christian feminists, most agree that God does not discriminate on the basis of biologically-determined characteristics such as sex. Their major issues are the ordination of women, male dominance in Christian marriage, and claims of moral deficiency and inferiority of abilities of women compared to men. They also are concerned with the balance of parenting between mothers and fathers and the overall treatment of women in the church.

Islamic feminism is concerned with the role of women in Islam and aims for the full equality of all Muslims, regardless of gender, in public and private life. Islamic feminists advocate women's rights, gender equality, and social justice grounded in an Islamic framework. Although rooted in Islam, the movement's pioneers have also utilized secular and Western feminist discourses and recognize the role of Islamic feminism as part of an integrated global feminist movement. Advocates of the movement seek to highlight the deeply rooted teachings of equality in the Quran and encourage a questioning of the patriarchal interpretation of Islamic

teaching through the Quran, hadith (sayings of Muhammad), and sharia (law) towards the creation of a more equal and just society.

Jewish feminism is a movement that seeks to improve the religious, legal, and social status of women within Judaism and to open up new opportunities for religious experience and leadership for Jewish women. Feminist movements, with varying approaches and successes, have opened up within all major branches of Judaism. In its modern form, the movement can be traced to the early 1970s in the United States. According to Judith Plaskow, who has focused on feminism in Reform Judaism, the main issues for early Jewish feminists in these movements were the exclusion from the all-male prayer group or minyan, the exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot, and women's inability to function as witnesses and to initiate divorce.

The Dianic Wicca or Wiccan feminism is a female focused, Goddess-centered Wiccan sect; also known as a feminist religion that teaches witchcraft as every woman's right. It is also one sect of the many practiced in Wicca.

Feminist theology is a movement found in several religions to reconsider the traditions, practices, scriptures, and theologies of those religions from a feminist perspective. Some of the goals of feminist theology include increasing the role of women among the clergy and religious authorities, reinterpreting male-dominated imagery and language about God, determining women's place in relation to career and motherhood, and studying images of women in the religion's sacred texts. In Wicca "the Goddess" is a deity of prime importance, along with her consort the Horned God. In the earliest Wiccan publications she is described as a tribal goddess of the witch community, neither omnipotent nor universal, and it was recognised that there was a greater "Prime Mover", although the witches did not concern themselves much with this being.

Gender-based inquiries into and conceptualization of architecture have also come about in the past fifteen years or so. Piyush Mathur coined the term "archigenderic" in his 1998 article in the British journal *Women's Writing*. Claiming that "architectural planning has an inextricable link with the defining and regulation of gender roles, responsibilities, rights, and limitations," Mathur came up with that term "to explore...the meaning of 'architecture' in terms of gender" and "to explore the meaning of "gender" in terms of architecture"

Women's writing came to exist as a separate category of scholarly interest relatively recently. In the West, second-wave feminism prompted a general reevaluation of women's historical contributions, and various academic sub-disciplines, such as Women's history (or herstory) and women's writing, developed in response to the belief that women's lives and contributions have been underrepresented as areas of scholarly interest. Virginia Balisn et al. characterize the growth in interest since 1970 in women's writing as "powerful". Much of this early period of feminist literary scholarship was given over to the rediscovery and reclamation of texts written by women. Studies such as Dale Spender's *Mothers of the Novel* (1986) and Jane Spencer's *The Rise of the Woman Novelist* (1986) were ground-breaking in their insistence that women have always been writing. Commensurate with this growth in scholarly interest, various presses began the task of reissuing long-out-of-print texts. Virago Press began to publish its large list of nineteenth and early-twentieth-century novels in 1975 and became one of the first commercial presses to join in the project of reclamation. In the 1980s Pandora Press, responsible for publishing Spender's study, issued a companion line of eighteenth-century novels written by women. More recently, Broadview Press has begun to issue eighteenth- and nineteenth-century works, many hitherto out of print and the University of Kentucky has a series of republications of early women's novels. There has been commensurate growth in the area of biographical dictionaries of women writers due to a perception, according to one editor, that "most of our women are not represented in the 'standard' reference books in the field".

Another early pioneer of Feminist writing is Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose most notable work was *The Yellow Wallpaper*.

In the 1960s the genre of science fiction combined its sensationalism with political and technological critiques of society. With the advent of feminism, questioning women's roles became fair game to this "subversive, mind expanding genre". Two early texts are Ursula K. Le Guin's *The Left Hand of Darkness* (1969) and Joanna Russ' *The Female Man* (1970). They serve to highlight the socially constructed nature of gender roles by creating utopias that do away with gender. Both authors were also pioneers in feminist criticism of science fiction in the 1960s and 70s, in essays collected in *The Language of the Night* (Le Guin, 1979) and *How To Suppress Women's Writing* (Russ, 1983). Another major work of feminist science fiction has been *Kindred* by Octavia Butler.

Riot grrrl (or riot grrl) is an underground feminist punk movement that started in the 1990s and is often associated with third-wave feminism (it is sometimes seen as its starting point). It was Grounded in the DIY philosophy of punk values. Riot girls took an anti-corporate stance of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Riot girl's emphasis on universal female identity and separatism often appears more closely allied with second-wave feminism than with the third wave. Riot grrrl bands often address issues such as rape, domestic abuse, sexuality, and female empowerment. Some bands associated with the movement are: Bikini Kill, Bratmobile, Excuse 17, Free Kitten, Heavens To Betsy, Huggy Bear, L7, and Team Dresch. In addition to a music scene, riot grrrl is also a subculture; zines, the DIY ethic, art, political action, and activism are part of the movement. Riot grrrls hold meetings, start chapters, and support and organize women in music.

The riot grrrl movement sprang out of Olympia, Washington and Washington, D.C. in the early 1990s. It sought to give women the power to control their voices and artistic expressions. Riot grrrls took a growling double or triple r, placing it in the word girl as a way to take back the derogatory use of the term.

The Riot Grrrl's links to social and political issues are where the beginnings of third-wave feminism can be seen. The music and zine writings are strong examples of "cultural politics in action, with strong women giving voice to important social issues though an empowered, a female oriented community, many people link the emergence of the third-wave feminism to this time". The movement encouraged and made "adolescent girls' standpoints central," allowing them to express themselves fully.

The "Feminist Sex Wars" is a term for the acrimonious debates within the feminist movement in the late 1970s through the 1980s around the issues of feminism, sexuality, sexual representation, pornography, sadomasochism, the role of transwomen in the lesbian community, and other sexual issues. The debate pitted anti-pornography feminism against sex-positive feminism, and parts of the feminist movement were deeply divided by these debates.

Anti-pornography feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Robin Morgan and Dorchen Leidholdt, put pornography at the center of a feminist explanation of

women's oppression. Some feminists, such as Diana Russell, Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Susan Brownmiller, Dorchon Leidholdt, Ariel Levy, and Robin Morgan, argue that pornography is degrading to women, and complicit in violence against women both in its production (where, they charge, abuse and exploitation of women performing in pornography is rampant) and in its consumption (where, they charge, pornography eroticizes the domination, humiliation, and coercion of women, and reinforces sexual and cultural attitudes that are complicit in rape and sexual harassment).

Beginning in the late 1970s, anti-pornography radical feminists formed organizations such as Women Against Pornography that provided educational events, including slide-shows, speeches, and guided tours of the sex industry in Times Square, in order to raise awareness of the content of pornography and the sexual subculture in pornography shops and live sex shows. Andrea Dworkin and Robin Morgan began articulating a vehemently anti-porn stance based in radical feminism beginning in 1974, and anti-porn feminist groups, such as Women Against Pornography and similar organizations, became highly active in various US cities during the late 1970s.

Sex-positive feminism is a movement that was formed in order to address issues of women's sexual pleasure, freedom of expression, sex work, and inclusive gender identities. Ellen Willis' 1981 essay, "Lust Horizons: Is the Women's Movement Pro-Sex?" is the origin of the term, "pro-sex feminism"; the more commonly-used variant, "sex positive feminism" arose soon after. Although some sex-positive feminists, such as Betty Dodson, were active in the early 1970s, much of sex-positive feminism largely began in the late 1970s and 1980s as a response to the increasing emphasis in radical feminism on anti-pornography activism. Sex-positive feminists are also strongly opposed to radical feminist calls for legislation against pornography, a strategy they decried as censorship, and something that could, they argued, be used by social conservatives to censor the sexual expression of women, gay people, and other sexual minorities. The initial period of intense debate and acrimony between sex-positive and anti-pornography feminists during the early 1980s is often referred to as the Feminist Sex Wars. Other sex-positive feminists became involved not in opposition to other feminists, but in direct response to what they saw as patriarchal control of sexuality.

Since the early twentieth century some feminists have allied with socialism. In 1907 there was an International Conference of Socialist Women in Stuttgart where suffrage was described as a tool of class struggle. Clara Zetkin of the Social Democratic Party of Germany called for women's suffrage to build a "socialist order, the only one that allows for a radical solution to the women's question".

In Britain, the women's movement was allied with the Labour party. In America, Betty Friedan emerged from a radical background to take command of the organized movement. Radical Women, founded in 1967 in Seattle is the oldest (and still active) socialist feminist organization in the U.S. During the Spanish Civil War, Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria) led the Communist Party of Spain. Although she supported equal rights for women, she opposed women fighting on the front and clashed with the anarcho-feminist Mujeres Libres.

Revolutions in Latin America brought changes in women's status in countries such as Nicaragua where Feminist ideology during the Sandinista Revolution was largely responsible for improvements in the quality of life for women but fell short of achieving a social and ideological change.

Scholars have argued that Nazi Germany and the other fascist states of the 1930s and 1940s illustrates the disastrous consequences for society of a state ideology that, in glorifying traditional images of women, becomes anti-feminist. In Germany after the rise of Nazism in 1933, there was a rapid dissolution of the political rights and economic opportunities that feminists had fought for during the prewar period and to some extent during the 1920s. In Franco's Spain, the right wing Catholic conservatives undid the work of feminists during the Republic. Fascist society was hierarchical with an emphasis and idealization of virility, with women maintaining a largely subordinate position to men.

Some feminists are critical of traditional scientific discourse, arguing that the field has historically been biased towards a masculine perspective. Evelyn Fox Keller argues that the rhetoric of science reflects a masculine perspective, and she questions the idea of scientific objectivity.

Many feminist scholars rely on qualitative research methods that emphasize women's subjective, individual experiences. According to communication scholars Thomas R. Lindlof and Bryan C. Taylor, incorporating a feminist approach to qualitative research involves treating research participants as equals who are just as much an authority as the researcher. Objectivity is eschewed in favor of open self-reflexivity and the agenda of helping women. Also part of the feminist research agenda is uncovering ways that power inequities are created and/or reinforced in society and/or in scientific and academic institutions. Lindlof and Taylor also explain that a feminist approach to research often involves nontraditional forms of presentation.

Primatologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy notes the prevalence of masculine-coined stereotypes and theories, such as the non-sexual female, despite "the accumulation of abundant openly available evidence contradicting it". Some natural and social scientists have examined feminist ideas using scientific methods.

Modern feminist science challenges the biological essentialist view of gender, however it is increasingly interested in the study of biological sex differences and their effect on human behavior. For example, Anne Fausto-Sterling's book *Myths of Gender* explores the assumptions embodied in scientific research that purports to support a biologically essentialist view of gender. Her second book, *Sexing the Body* discussed the alleged possibility of more than two true biological sexes. This possibility only exists in yet-unknown extraterrestrial biospheres, as no ratios of true gametes to polar cells other than 4:0 and 1:3 (male and female, respectively) are produced on Earth. However, in *The Female Brain*, Louann Brizendine argues that brain differences between the sexes are a biological reality with significant implications for sex-specific functional differences. Steven Rhoads' book *Taking Sex Differences Seriously* illustrates sex-dependent differences across a wide scope.

Carol Tavris, in *The Mismeasure of Woman*, uses psychology and sociology to critique theories that use biological reductionism to explain differences between men and women. She argues rather than using evidence of innate gender difference there is an over-changing hypothesis to justify inequality and perpetuate stereotypes.

Sarah Kember - drawing from numerous areas such as evolutionary biology, sociobiology, artificial intelligence, and cybernetics in development with a new evolutionism - discusses the biologization of technology. She notes how feminists and sociologists have become suspect of evolutionary psychology, particularly inasmuch as sociobiology is subjected to complexity in order to strengthen sexual difference as immutable through pre-existing cultural value judgments about human nature and natural selection. Where feminist theory is criticized for its "false beliefs about human nature," Kember then argues in conclusion that "feminism is in the interesting position of needing to do more biology and evolutionary theory in order not to simply oppose their renewed hegemony, but in order to understand the conditions that make this possible, and to have a say in the construction of new ideas and artefacts."

The relationship between men and feminism has been complex. Men have taken part in significant responses to feminism in each 'wave' of the movement. There have been positive and negative reactions and responses, depending on the individual man and the social context of the time. These responses have varied from pro-feminism to masculism to anti-feminism. In the twenty-first century new reactions to feminist ideologies have emerged including a generation of male scholars involved in gender studies, and also men's rights activists who promote male equality (including equal treatment in family, divorce and anti-discrimination law). Historically a number of men have engaged with feminism. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham demanded equal rights for women in the eighteenth century. In 1866, philosopher John Stuart Mill (author of "The Subjection of Women") presented a women's petition to the British parliament; and supported an amendment to the 1867 Reform Bill. Others have lobbied and campaigned against feminism. Today, academics like Michael Flood, Michael Messner and Michael Kimmel are involved with men's studies and pro-feminism.

A number of feminist writers maintain that identifying as a feminist is the strongest stand men can take in the struggle against sexism. They have argued that men should be allowed, or even be encouraged, to participate in the feminist movement. Other female feminists argue that men cannot be feminists simply because they are not women. They maintain that men are granted inherent privileges that prevent them from identifying with feminist struggles, thus making it impossible for them to identify with feminists. Fidelma Ashe has approached the issue of male feminism by arguing that traditional feminist views of male experience and of "men

doing feminism" have been monolithic. She explores the multiple political discourses and practices of pro-feminist politics, and evaluates each strand through an interrogation based upon its effect on feminist politics.

A more recent examination of the subject is presented by author and academic Shira Tarrant. In *Men and Feminism* (Seal Press, May 2009), the California State University, Long Beach professor highlights critical debates about masculinity and gender, the history of men in feminism, and men's roles in preventing violence and sexual assault. Through critical analysis and first-person stories by feminist men, Tarrant addresses the question of why men should care about feminism in the first place and lays the foundation for a larger discussion about feminism as an all-encompassing, human issue.

Pro-feminism is the support of feminism without implying that the supporter is a member of the feminist movement. The term is most often used in reference to men who are actively supportive of feminism and of efforts to bring about gender equality. The activities of pro-feminist men's groups include anti-violence work with boys and young men in schools, offering sexual harassment workshops in workplaces, running community education campaigns, and counseling male perpetrators of violence. Pro-feminist men also are involved in men's health, activism against pornography including anti-pornography legislation, men's studies, and the development of gender equity curricula in schools. This work is sometimes in collaboration with feminists and women's services, such as domestic violence and rape crisis centers. Some activists of both genders will not refer to men as "feminists" at all, and will refer to all pro-feminist men as "pro-feminists".

Anti-feminism is opposition to feminism in some or all of its forms. Writers such as Camille Paglia, Christina Hoff Sommers, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese have been labeled "anti-feminists" by feminists. Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge argue that in this way the term "anti-feminist" is used to silence academic debate about feminism. Paul Nathanson and Katherine K. Young's books *Spreading Misandry* and *Legalizing Misandry* explore what they argue is feminist-inspired misandry. Christina Hoff-Sommers argues feminist misandry leads directly to misogyny by what she calls "establishment feminists" against (the majority of) women who love men in *Who Stole Feminism: How Women Have Betrayed*

Women. Marriage rights advocates criticize feminists like Sheila Cronan who take the view that marriage constitutes slavery for women, and that freedom for women cannot be won without the abolition of marriage.

CHAPTER XI

FEMINIST SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (PART 1)

Gender differences exist in nearly every social phenomena. From the moment of birth, gender expectations influence how boys and girls are treated. In fact, gender expectations may begin before birth as parents and grandparents pick out pink or blue clothes and toys and decorate the baby's room with stereotyped gender colors. Also, since the first day of a baby's life, research shows that girls are handled more gently than boys. Girls are expected to be sweet and want to cuddle whereas boys are handled more roughly and are given greater independence.

Sociologists make a clear distinction between the terms *sex* and *gender*. Sex refers to one's biological identity of being male or female while gender refers to the socially learned expectations and behaviors associated with being male or female. Sex is biologically assigned while gender is culturally learned.

The cultural origin of gender becomes especially apparent when we look at other cultures. In Western industrialized societies such as the United States, people tend to think of masculinity and femininity in dichotomous terms, with men and women distinctly different and opposites. Other cultures, however, challenge this assumption and have less distinct views of masculinity and femininity. For example, historically there was a category of people in the Navajo culture called berdaches, who were anatomically normal men but who were defined as a third gender considered to fall between male and female. Berdaches married other ordinary men (not Berdaches), although neither was considered homosexual, as they would be in today's Western culture. Looking at gender sociologically reveals the social and cultural dimensions of something

that is often defined as biologically fixed. Gender is not biologically fixed at all, but rather is culturally learned and is something that can and often does change over time.

11.1 Nature VS Nurture in Gender Identity

There is a lot of debate about how much of a person's gender identity, among other things, is due to their biological makeup (nature) and how much is due to their social surroundings and the way they are brought up (nurture). From a sociological perspective, biology alone does not determine gender identity, but rather it is a mixture of biology and socialization.

Gender socialization is the process by which men and women learn the expectations associated with their sex. Gender socialization affects all aspects of daily life and society, including one's self-concept, social and political attitudes, and perceptions and relationships about other people. Family, peers, schooling, religious training, mass media, and popular culture are just a few of the agents through which gender socialization happens. It is reinforced whenever gender-linked behaviors receive approval or disapproval from these influences.

One result of gender socialization is the formation of gender identity, which is one's definition of oneself as a man or woman. Gender identity shapes how we think about others and ourselves and also influences our behaviors. For example, gender differences exist in the likelihood of drug and alcohol abuse, violent behavior, depression, and aggressive driving. Gender identity also has an especially strong effect on our feelings about our appearance and our body image, especially for females.

Social inequality results from a society organized by hierarchies of class, race, and gender that broker access to resources and rights in ways that make their distribution unequal. It can manifest in a variety of ways, like income and wealth inequality, unequal access to education and cultural resources, and differential treatment by the police and judicial system, among others. Social inequality goes hand in hand with social stratification.

Social inequality is characterized by the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social positions or statuses within a group or society. It contains structured and recurrent patterns of unequal distributions of goods, wealth, opportunities, rewards, and punishments. Racism, for example, is understood to be a phenomenon whereby access to rights and resources is unfairly distributed across racial lines. In the context of the U.S., people of color typically experience racism, which benefits white people by conferring on them white privilege, which allows them greater access to rights and resources than other Americans.

There are two main ways to measure social inequality: inequality of conditions, and inequality of opportunities. Inequality of conditions refers to the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and material goods. Housing, for example, is an inequality of conditions with the homeless and those living in housing projects sitting at the bottom of the hierarchy while those living in multi-million dollar mansions sit at the top. Another example is at the level of whole communities, where some are poor, unstable, and plagued by violence, while others are invested in by business and government so that they thrive and provide safe, secure, and happy conditions for their inhabitants.

Inequality of opportunities refers to the unequal distribution of life chances across individuals. This is reflected in measures such as level of education, health status, and treatment by the criminal justice system. For example, studies have shown that college and university professors are more likely to ignore emails from women and people of color than they are to ignore those from white men, which privileges the educational outcomes of white men by channeling a biased amount of mentoring and educational resources to them.

Discrimination at individual, community, and institutional levels is a major part of the process of reproducing social inequalities of race, class, gender, and sexuality. For example, women are systematically paid less than men for doing the same work, and sociologists have conclusively demonstrated that racism is built into the very foundation of our society, and is present in all of our social institutions.

There are two main views of social inequality within sociology. One view aligns with the functionalist theory and the other aligns with conflict theory.

Functionalist theorists believe that inequality is inevitable and desirable and plays an important function in society. Important positions in society require more training and thus should receive more rewards. Social inequality and social stratification, according to this view, lead to a meritocracy based on ability.

Conflict theorists, on the other hand, view inequality as resulting from groups with power dominating less powerful groups. They believe that social inequality prevents and hinders societal progress as those in power repress the powerless people in order to maintain the status quo. In today's world, this work of domination is achieved primarily through the power of ideology--our thoughts, values, beliefs, world views, norms, and expectations--through a process known as cultural hegemony.

Sociologically, we can study social inequality as a social problem that encompasses three dimensions: structural conditions, ideological supports, and social reforms.

Structural conditions include things that can be objectively measured and that contribute to social inequality. Sociologists study how things like educational attainment, wealth, poverty, occupations, and power lead to the social inequality between individuals and groups of people.

Ideological supports include ideas and assumptions that support the social inequality present in a society. Sociologists examine how things such as formal laws, public policies, and dominant values both lead to social inequality, and help sustain it. For example, consider this discussion of the role that words and the ideas attached to them play in this process.

Social reforms are things such as organized resistance, protest groups, and social movements. Sociologists study how these social reforms help shape or change social inequality that exists in a society, as well as their origins, impact, and long-term effects. Today, social media plays a large role in social reform campaigns, and was harnessed in 2014 by British actor Emma Watson, on behalf of the UN, to launch a campaign for gender equality called #HeForShe.

Over the last 40 years, feminist analysis has made a major contribution to and has changed social theory, making sociologists aware of issues that were previously ignored. Feminism is also associated with changes in society – especially in North America and

Western Europe, but also in other regions of the world. Many aspects of what were considered to be “private life,” associated with male/female relations in household, family, and other social relationships have been transformed; many parts of society have experienced changes as a result of increased involvement of women in public life. Feminists and others argue that there is still a long road ahead before the goal of equality of males and females is achieved, but there can be no doubts that major advances have occurred toward such equality – examples include legislation and employment.

While it has been women and men, through their social actions and interaction that have changed social relationships, feminist writers and theorists have contributed to these social changes and to the development of attitudes and views more supportive of equality. As a demonstration of how social theory can be socially engaged, feminist theory has often been exemplary and, at least through the 1990s (see Lovell, Ch. 12 for shifts in emphasis), never strayed far from practical social issues faced by women in their involvement in the social world. The feminist writers of the 1960s were part of feminist groups and political and social agitation. Currently, many feminist writers are involved in or closely associated with women’s groups or social reform activities.

A section on feminist social theory would probably not have been included in a course in sociological theory a generation ago. However, feminist social theory has made major contributions not just to feminism but also to social theory in general. By focussing on the differences between biological and social, on the meaning of the social, on how a person’s experience affects her understanding of the social world, and on how males and females relate to each other, feminist theory has forced sociologists to reexamine and revise their social theories. Among the issues that have entered into sociological discussion are the sociology of bodies, understandings of power, sexual violence, patriarchy, and sexuality. Each of these were ignored or were minor sociological issues – now they are often key in discussions of contemporary sociology. Turner notes that feminists have raised radical questions about “social roles, gender identities and biological sex characteristics” so that sociologists have developed new understandings and analysis of “the relationship between society and culture, public and private, and between society and nature” (Turner, 2003: 304).

Feminisms of the second wave refers to the feminist ideas and movement that emerged in the 1960s and had its greatest initial impact in the 1970s. The chapter “Feminisms Transformed” refers to the “linguistic turn” in feminism of the 1990s (Lovell, p. 300), and the accompanying divide between academic and grass-roots feminism. For the most part, we will be concerned with chapter 11 and the themes and controversies that emerged in the second wave of feminism. The first wave refers to the feminist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the suffragettes, the struggle for the vote and for formal equality in Western Europe and North America.

Lovell’s discussion examines diverse feminist approaches and contradictions within feminist theory and practice – I will attempt to explain these in conjunction with an examination of feminist approaches. In particular, we will examine the following feminist perspectives:

- Issues of equality, inequality, difference, inclusion, meanings of woman, and sex and gender. These include a discussion of “liberal” feminism.
- Marxist feminist approaches – problems with Marxian social theory from a feminist perspective and how modifications of a Marxist approach can be constructed.
- Issues related to sexuality, patriarchy, violence against women, maternal feminism, and biology and bodies. A short discussion of the linguistic turn will be included.

Lovell also examines connections of feminist theory to other sociological theory, although she concentrates too much on psychoanalytic, post-structural, and post-modern approaches. She also examines connections of feminism to the social world, although these connections are not so well explained – for example, there is little on political connections or actual studies of the situation of women. The example of young women’s investment in body (Lovell, p. 342) is insightful and reminiscent of rational choice theory. For much of these two chapters, Lovell concentrates on contradictions in and limitations for feminist approaches – in my view, a more straightforward presentation of the details of the specific feminist approaches would have been more useful. A book that I have found useful is *Feminist Political Theory* by Valerie Bryson. While Bryson concentrates on political issues, her discussion of these parallels much of social theory and her discussion of feminist theory is useful for sociologists.

11.2 Problems with Earlier Social Theory

The classical social theorists and twentieth century social theorists through the 1970s generally ignored women or had misleading analysis of issues related to women. A detailed analysis of the approach the classical social theorists took toward women and issues related to male/female relations is contained in *Natural Women, Cultured Men: A Feminist Perspective on Sociological Theory* by Rosalind Sydie of the University of Alberta. A short summary of a few of the problem areas in earlier sociological perspectives is presented here.

a. Women Ignored.

One general line of criticism of feminists is that women are absent from the social analyses and social world of sociology. The language and analysis of classical sociologists is that of men, male activities and experiences, and the parts of society dominated by males. Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were typical of nineteenth century European writers who assumed that the social world was primarily the public world of male activities – the labour force, city life, and politics.

One aspect of the long history of modern, urban, industrial society was the development of a separation between the public and private spheres. These had not always been separated in traditional societies, although there was usually a sex-based division of labour, often associated with a patriarchal system of male dominance. With the development of capitalism, cities, and industry, a public sphere dominated by men and male activities developed and expanded. Women generally became restricted to the private sphere of household and family, and had limited involvement in political, economic, or even public social life. While some women were involved in more public activities, in the nineteenth century there were movements to restrict the participation of women in public life – for example, factory legislation and the family wage.

In order to understand some of the difficulties women faced in this era, some of the details of the situation of women should be considered. First, women in late nineteenth century England were not recognized as individuals in either the legal or the liberal theoretical

sense. Men still held formal power over the rest of the family, and women were mostly excluded from the public sphere. Mill and Taylor, along with some early United States feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, argued that the equality of women required full citizenship for women. This would include giving women enfranchisement. After 1865, when Mill was in the English Parliament, he fought for women's suffrage. He also fought "to amend the laws that gave husbands control over their wives' money and property." He also supported the campaign for birth control information to be available, and was active in other campaigns that were aimed at assisting women and children. (Eisenstein, 128).

While there was feminist agitation in the nineteenth century, formal equality for women did not come until much later. In Canada, women did not have the right to vote in federal elections until 1918, although the franchise was extended to women two years earlier in the Prairie provinces. Quebec women did not receive the vote in provincial elections until 1940. Property ownership also rested with men through most of the nineteenth century, with changes that allowed property purchasers to become owner, regardless of sex, coming between 1872 and 1940. "By 1897 in English Canada and 1931 in Quebec, a wife employed outside the home was allowed to retain her wages" (Burt, 214). Also note that in Canada it was not until the 1969 amendments to the Criminal Code that sales of contraceptives became legal, or that abortions became legal. See "Social justice: no safe harbour" by Margaret Conrad, *Globe and Mail*, March 10, 2003.

In Canada, there is now formal equality in most areas of social life, with women and men having the same legal rights. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1982 Constitution Act states that "every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability" (Section 15). Section 28 states that "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." Many feminists would argue though that this is only formal equality, not true equality.

In terms of how sociology considered public and private, recall that the classical social theories emerged in Europe as a way of explaining the society that emerged as part of the modern era. This was primarily the public sphere of social life. Since sociologists were concerned with explaining its emergence, characteristics, and forms of development, little

attention was paid to the private sphere – the sphere more likely to be occupied by women. As a result, early sociological theory paid little attention to this part of social life. While the sociological analysis of the classical sociologists can be applied to both women and men, by ignoring a large part of the social world, early sociologists had little or no theory of gender relations, sexuality, or male/female inequalities – essential aspects of contemporary social theory. In addition, by not analyzing the private part of the social world, early sociology may not have developed an adequate understanding of all parts of the social world.

b. Definitions of Sociology and the Social World.

Each social theory has a definition of what is social or what is the scope of the social theory. For Goffman this was the interaction order and for Mead it was the study of the relationship among mind, self, and society. It was the classical sociologists who first defined the field of sociology. Each of these writers developed a definition of the social world, even if only implicitly, and proceeded to analyze it. For feminists and contemporary sociologists, a major problem is that the classical definitions of the social world exclude large parts of human action and interaction. Many of the excluded portions of the social world are those that were typically occupied by women and children, with classical writers showing little interest in or analysis of institutions such as the household, family, or community where women's experiences have often been centred.

The emphasis on labor and the commodity for Marx, and the division of labor for Marx and Durkheim, provide an example of this. We will examine some of the difficulties associated with Marx's approach next day – following is a short discussion of Durkheim and the division of labor.

Durkheim, concentrating on the division of labor, and its implications for social development and social solidarity, develops a similar approach. That is, it is the division of tasks in the public economy that characterizes the division of labor. Since women did not generally participate in the labor force in Durkheim's day, this eliminates women from the division of labor. To the extent that the division of labor forms the basis for morality and organic solidarity in modern society, it is primarily the activity of men that create this solidarity. It is difficult to see how women's activities contribute to organic solidarity. Since the proper study of sociology

is social facts, but women are absent from the creation of social facts, women are not the proper subject of sociology.

Another way that classical sociologists define the social world is through their categories and concepts. For Marx, class and class struggle, exploitation and surplus labor, and accumulation and crises have little to do with what women experience or do, since they refer to activities in the economy and the labor force. Durkheim's social facts could include women, but they generally do not. Similarly, Weber's class, status, and party, domination, authority, bureaucracy, and rationality are all part of a public sphere in which women play little part.

Classical sociologists recognized patriarchy as a social and political system that involved the exercise of power by males over females, family, children, and household. But their conception of patriarchy was somewhat different than that of feminist analyses of patriarchy. Feminists emphasize rule by males over females but include issues such as violence, control of sexuality, and other forms of domination by males and oppression of females. Classical sociologists, especially Weber, considered it to be a part of political power and traditional authority involving control by a senior male over other males as well as females. Classical sociologists also appear to have considered it as emerging from natural differences between men and women, whereas feminists consider it more socially constructed.

In summary, the social world of the classical sociologists generally excluded the actions of women. As a result, sociology as a discipline did not have much to say about women. While each of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim did have some comments on women and family, these were generally limited comments and their sociological models would be little different if women did not exist.

11.3 Feminist Approaches

a. Central Issues and Approaches of Feminist Theory

Issues identified by Lovell (302-4) include women's experience; equality, inequality, and difference; patriarchy and domination; bodies and biological differences between men and women; sexuality, and violence.

Feminist theory examines women in the social world and addresses issues of concern to women, focusing on these from the perspective, experiences, and viewpoint of women. It cuts across conventional academic disciplines (e.g. feminist history, geography, literature, science) and develops ideas and approaches that are useful in a wide variety of these disciplines. Not only have feminists critiqued conventional methodological approaches, they have developed new methods – placing more emphasis on the experiences of women and new forms of knowledge. As noted earlier, feminism is closely engaged with the social world – feminist theorists tend to be women who theorize about their own experiences and interaction, it is concerned with the everyday lives and experiences of women and their social interactions, and it is often connected to women’s groups, social reform, and broad social and political movements, organizations, and institutions. As a method of conducting social analysis, social research, and social theorizing, feminist theoretical perspectives provide worthwhile models and examples for sociology and other academic endeavors.

b. Difference

In the first pages of chapter 11, Lovell highlights issues of difference and diversity that make it difficult to speak of a common situation and set of experiences for women. As a result “‘woman’ and ‘women’ ... are not unitary categories” (Lovell, 302). While the second wave of feminism often argued that there were common experiences of women and similar social position of women with respect to men in society, Lovell argues that there are a number of differences. Some of these sexual and gender differences; differences by race, ethnicity, and class; sexuality; and difference as a general concept (Lovell, 301). This makes it difficult to deal with issues of equality in a manner acceptable to all women, feminists may not speak for all women, and generalizations concerning all women may be trivial or false (Lovell, 305). For example, Lovell notes how feminism has sometimes been labeled as bourgeois or middle class and has been attacked as representing privilege of women in these groups (302-3).

While these attacks have sometimes been a smokescreen to discredit some feminists, these are difficult issues that feminists must address. Lovell shows how more recent feminist approaches have emphasized the importance of building alliances across difference, although this requires “genuine dialog and mutual exchange between those who are unlike” (Lovell, 304). Further, some emphasize local and interpersonal issues, rather than focus exclusively on

societal level political issues such as equal rights. In considering these, Lovell argues that gender, class, and race are not “discrete and cumulative forms of oppression” (Lovell, 304) but are constructed in relation to each other in particular ways.

Perhaps the first concern of feminist sociology is to recognize women as full-fledged social actors in the social world. While women were always part of the social world, theoretical perspectives often did not recognize them as such. In some cases, earlier theoretical perspectives can be modified or extended so that women are recognized as such, in other cases it may not be possible to do so, thus requiring that these perspectives be rebuilt or that their limitations be recognized. For example, it would seem possible to introduce feminist theory into symbolic interaction perspectives in a way that would enrich these. Theories such as Parsons’s model of the family or the instrumental and expressive appear to be much more limited and perhaps incapable of basic revision.

c. Sex and gender

A second overriding concern of feminist sociology is to recognize the difference between biology and the social – the difference usually associated with sex (as biologically ascribed) and gender (as socially constructed). Lovell notes that “the distinction between sex and gender initially provided a firm plank for both Marxist and radical feminists ... the social construction of femininity” (p. 308). She also notes how “women’s biological functions have over and over again been used to rationalize and legitimate” (308) the social status of women. A large part of feminist theory and research has been devoted to explaining how the status, role, and position of women in the social world was socially constructed, and was not natural or unchangeable. This involved studies of the different experiences of women in different times and places, showing the great variety of ways that societies dealt with male/female relationships, resulting in the view that gender differences were much more variable and malleable than biological differences. For feminists, biological realities may be relatively unchangeable, but “what is constructed in social relations and in culture is more readily reconstructed” (308).

Such an approach is consistent with a sociological approach – where social construction is always emphasized over biological explanations. It is also consistent with liberal or equal rights approaches to feminism. Those approaches tended to argue that the mind/body split that accorded rationality and mind to males and nature and body to females were incorrect. That is,

feminists argued that both males and females have bodies that differ, but similar minds and capabilities. They argued that it was a male view that women were more connected to nature and the body, and male domination and power over females meant the relegation of females to the private sphere. But these were socially constructed views of gender by powerful males who perpetuated such differences through laws, exclusion of females, and domination of personal relationships. Feminists thus argued that females were as capable and rational as males, and there should be equality between males and females in all aspects of life, both in the public and private spheres. That is, the social construction of gender was the problem, not some inherent biological difference between men and women.

But Lovell notes that it has not been easy to completely ignore biological realities and radical feminism has reintroduced the body and biological characteristics. While these are in quite different ways than in nineteenth century writings, it has become clear that the division between sex and gender is not clear-cut, nor so useful for feminist analysis as once thought. Lovell argues that there are several problems with this distinction.

First, Lovell notes that if feminists found oppression of women to be very widespread across time and place, “biology must have *something* to do with it” (p. 309). Anthropological and sociological evidence found great difference of experiences, role, and situation of women in different societies, so this was strong evidence for the difference between sex and gender. But feminists also made the argument that the situation of women tended to be inferior in most, if not all societies. But what does this say about social construction of gender? Does such social construction always lead to male domination and female subordination? If this is the case, then it is difficult to argue that there is not some biological aspect to this power differential. Systems of patriarchy may be a means of explaining this, but how do these systems of patriarchy emerge? (We will examine analyses of patriarchy next week).

Second, while gender may be socially constructed, so are class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality, as third world women, minority women, lesbians, and others have made clear. Differences between sex and gender often did not make this apparent, and did not consider the diverse ways that these may be interconnected. As a result, a simple sex/gender distinction may not capture the variety of experiences and situations of women. Lovell notes how this meant that some women were reluctant to become feminists, or were in outright opposition to

feminism. Some of these viewed feminism as an ideology of privileged, middle-class, white females.

Third, how are feminists to deal with biological realities? Lovell (309-310) argues that radical feminists adopted a variety of responses. Another approach was to argue for freeing women from childbirth through “a revolution in the technology and social relations of reproduction, in which the womb would be by-passed in favor of new technologies” (Lovell, 310). While this may be in the realm of science fiction, it has been argued by feminists such as Shulamith Firestone. A more conventional approach has been to argue that women should not be bound by biological realities, but participate more fully in all activities. Where these require accommodations, such as leave for childbirth, laws, policies, and organizations should restructure labor force and other activities so that full participation for women can occur. While some of this has occurred, the current structure of career and public life will require more change if this is to occur, and it may be difficult to achieve full equality with just this approach.

Fourth, Lovell argues that Marxist analysis provided an explanation of social construction of relations of reproduction, rooted in material reality. But she also notes that issues of violence against women in their personal and family life was difficult to explain within the Marxian model (310). While capitalism might well use women in an oppressive manner, why should “the sexual domination of women, and the extent of male violence against them” (310) be so great and so widespread – there appears to be no explanation for this within a strictly Marxian framework of class relationships.

Finally, an argument not mentioned by Lovell is the emphasis by women and some feminists on the superior and positive characteristics of women. The alleged expressive, caring, maternal, nurturing, and conflict resolving characteristics of females are missing from instrumental, utilitarian, rational, and aggressive males. But if there is to be equality, and women and men are the same, which of these characteristics is to emerge. Would the equal female adopt the supposed male characteristics. Historically, feminists often argued that women could bring their more positive expressive characteristics to public life and social relationship, thus producing a more caring and human society. But if this is so, which of these characteristics emerges from biological sex differences and which are socially constructed gender differences?

While the distinctions between sex and gender has been extremely useful from a feminist and sociological perspective, the above arguments show that it is not without its own difficulties

and contradictions. The aim of the above arguments is not to abandon this conceptual distinction as to note how it may need to become more carefully used and modified in improving social theory. In terms of several of these issues, there will be changes in the social construction of gender as women participate more fully in all aspects of life, as men change their forms of participation, and as social relationships change – social theory should attempt to understand and explain these.

11.4 Feminism and Marxism

Lovell (306) argues that Marxism emerged as a major sociological paradigm at the same time as feminism emerged. There were also strong parallels between Marxism and feminism – among these were that both were concerned with inequality, domination, and oppression, both had an emphasis on social change through group organization and political pressure, both had a methodology combining theory and practice, and both had an historical approach. Further, Marxism seemed receptive to feminism, since some Marxists had been concerned with oppression of women and both were attempting to change society.

At the same time, there were limits to these parallels and some aspects of feminism were poorly dealt with by Marxists – issues of “human reproduction and sexuality ... [were] outside the sphere of the social” (306), Marxists often argued that forms of difference other than economic were secondary, and individually and collectively male Marxists were reluctant to change their personal lives, give up male privilege, or become more equal in personal and work relationships.

The following notes survey a number of issues connected to Marxism and feminism. First are some of the reasons why the Marxist model has difficulty with feminist concepts and approaches, and this is followed with a discussion of some attempts to introduce feminist concepts and perspectives into Marxian models.

a. Origin of the family.

As part of its analysis, Marxism provides an historical and materialist explanation of the emergence of family, patriarchy, and the situation of women and men. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, published by Friedrich Engels in 1884, is the classic work

dealing with these issues. Engels argued that the establishment of private property in land, tools, and livestock created the possibility for men to exercise control over the means of production. In order to ensure legitimacy of heirs and control private property, men established a patrilineal and patriarchal form of society – enforcing compulsory monogamy on women and devaluing their work and value in society. This development, which occurred in distant history, at the time of the development of agriculture, relegated women to an inferior position in society, dominated by men. This system of patriarchy maintained itself over the centuries and when capitalism emerged, capitalism found such a system useful for its new form of social organization, characterized by exploitation of workers by employers as the source of capital accumulation.

The strong point of the Marxist approach is that it provided a material explanation for the emergence and maintenance of a system of patriarchy. For many Marxists, this has made oppression on the basis of sex derivative from the development of a social surplus and the institution of private property, thus providing an economic explanation for this form of oppression. Unlike liberal feminist approaches, equality of men and women cannot be achieved within capitalism, it requires the abolition of private property and establishment of a socialist system.

The weak points of Engels's argument is that it does not appear to be historically accurate and assumes a natural division of labor between men and women. It has the implication that the elimination of private property will end patriarchy, and some Marxists use this to argue that struggles by women to achieve equality are secondary to struggles by the working class to change society, and may even divert attention from the primary contradiction between capital and labor.

b. Marxian economics

Marx looks on human labor as potentially creative and this creative potential distinguishes humans from other animals. His critique of private property and capitalism is that this essence of humanity and creativity is taken away from laborers in the production process because of the existence of private property and exploitation. Marx's political economic model begins with the commodity and exchange, with the value of commodities being in direct proportion to the amount of human labor embodied in producing them. While commodities exchange at their value, surplus value emerges from extra or surplus labor, extracted from

workers by employers. This occurs because the commodity labor power (ability or capacity of humans to work) is a unique commodity with the capability of producing more value than the value of labor power itself. Employers purchase labor power at its value (wage paid to worker), but employ it to produce extra value, beyond that sufficient to pay the wage. This surplus value extracted from workers is ultimately turned into profits for capitalists and used to accumulate capital. This expansion of monetary and physical capital also means the extension of the exploitative capital/labor social relationships central to capitalism.

In this model, exploitation emerges as commodities are produced, and it is those workers who are employed at jobs in the production process who are exploited in that surplus labor is extracted from them. As a result, labor exercised in society but not directly engaged in production of commodities, and this includes the labor of many women and all household labor, is not exploited. Only if workers are employed and work at jobs where surplus value is extracted are exploited and become a source of capital accumulation. Since many women are not directly employed in these situations, women's labor might not be exploited or alienated in the same way as that of men's, since their labor is not subject to the forces that occur in the labor force.

Marx's analysis of capitalism and the social relationships of capitalism is almost entirely that of the public economy and the creation of products – goods and services – for purposes of exchange. Commodities have value to the extent that they are exchanged, and it is only those goods and services that are exchanged on the market that form part of Marx's analysis of capitalism. From this analysis of the commodity, exploitation, surplus value, and capital accumulation, Marx explains aspects of capitalism such as class structures, cycles of expansion and contraction in the economy, the tendency toward a falling rate of profit, and other contradictions of capitalism. The central, contradictory social relationship of capitalism is the capital-labour relationship – it is this which ultimately leads toward the creation of a class-conscious proletariat. This proletariat eliminates the capitalist class and establishes socialism – common ownership of the means of production. It is under this system that workers are able to begin realizing their human potential and, according to Engels, the conditions for the creation of equality between males and females.

From a feminist perspective, there are a number of problems with this analysis. Among these are (i) the emphasis on exchange value, (ii) the claim that all value and surplus value

emerge from the process of production, and (iii) the neglect of household, family, and reproduction (Lovell, 306-7). These three interrelated issues are reviewed here.

(i) Ignores use-value.

Marx spends little time analyzing use values, taking these for granted. Commodities must have use value in order to have exchange value (price) and be exchanged, otherwise no one would purchase them. But this does not mean that all use values are exchange values. Goods and services produced in the household for personal and family use have use value but are not ordinarily exchanged. In addition, volunteer work or work for organizations that do not sell their goods or services (churches, political parties), has the same characteristic. Given that these forms of work, and the useful goods and services that result from them do not have exchange value, there is a tendency to undervalue them in society, and this is the case for both Marxian and much conventional economic analysis. Official statistics of economic production also ignore most of the goods and services not sold on markets.

Since men tend to produce exchange values and women have tended to produce goods and services with use values only, this means that much of women's labour is not valued in capitalism or in Marx's model of capitalism. For purposes of explaining exploitation, surplus value, the dynamics of capitalism, and social relationships in capitalism, it appears irrelevant. It leads to the seemingly contradictory view that those whose work is not paid are not exploited, but this is one of the implications of the Marxian model. While Marxists might consider women oppressed in their relationship with men and in the household, technically speaking they are not exploited and their work has little or nothing to do with production of surplus value.

(ii) Value from production only.

A related issue is that work outside production is not recognized as creating value. While Marx recognizes human labor as creative and Marxian analysis purports to be an examination of work of humans, it is only an analysis of paid work. If it is private property and exploitation that distorts human labor, then alienation and exploitation exist only for paid labor. Most Marxian analyses of work begin with work in general but quickly become analysis of paid work in jobs, where workers are hired to produce commodities for exchange.

One issue of importance for women that emerges from this is unequal pay. In many jobs, women have been paid less than men for equivalent work. In the Marxian model, the value of labour power is the cost of production of this capacity to work. It seems difficult to argue that this cost would differ for male and female labor power. That is, the cost of producing labor power is the value of the commodities necessary for generational and daily subsistence. While it might cost a little more to maintain male than female labor, given that men tend to have larger bodies, there cannot be much difference in these costs. As a result, it is not clear why women should be paid less than men for equivalent work – but this has often been the case and the Marxian model would not appear to have an explanation for this differential.

(ii) Reproductive labor.

Emerging from the last issue is a set of issues concerning the neglect of reproductive labor in the Marxian model. As noted above, the Marxian analysis initially appears to consider all human labor, but only labor exchanged for a wage is relevant to the model. Family, household, reproduction, the supply of labor, and the survival of laborers outside the formal labor market are generally taken for granted by Marx. While he devotes some discussion to the value of labor power, Marx does not have much of a theory of population or of the supply of labor. In Marx's time, women played little role in the public economy, and Marx develops no theory of how women, family, and household contribute to the value of labor power as a commodity. In essence, then, Marx's social world is the commodity, commodity exchange, the labor market, and accumulation.

Lovell notes that Marx placed "human reproduction and sexuality outside the sphere of the social" (306) and Marx argued that the reproduction of the labor force can left to the "laborer's instincts of self-preservation and of propagation" (quoted in Lovell, 306). While Marxist feminists have developed analysis of the economic aspect of household and family, Lovell notes that the family is where sexual oppression, violence against women, control and regulation of sexuality, and sexual domination are located (307). Within the Marxian model itself, it is difficult to see how these issues could all be reduced to economic factors, so how can they be addressed.

A related implication is that aspects of the dominant and contradictory social relationship of capital and labor may be inadequately explained. Family and household activities may affect

this relationship in ways that are outside the sphere of production itself. For example, class consciousness has a group aspect to it. If the working class involved the families of male workers, that is, women, children, disabled, retired, then the situation of these latter is also relevant to the forms and strength of class consciousness. This becomes clear in the history of strikes and other forms of class struggle, where having strong support of all is key to the success of workers.

Having noted the above, socialists and Marxists over the last one hundred years incorporated various struggles by women into their political programs. Trade unionists who were closely connected to socialist political movements often attempted to improve the situation of women workers.

At the same time, Marxists did not make the struggles of women central to their approach, and feminists often argue that Marxists downgraded the struggles of women, because these struggles are considered a diversion from the more important class struggle. In any case, Marxists have emphasized economic bases and solutions for women's oppression. As a result, they have generally regarded the class struggle as primary, and feminist issues as important primarily in how or whether they contribute to the class struggle. Some Marxist feminists consider sex and gender inequalities to be secondary in importance to class inequality and oppression, and contradictions related to reproduction and gender relations play a secondary role in explaining social change. Other Marxist feminists may look on class and gender inequalities as dual systems of oppression, with both being very powerful and independent systems. Marxist feminists often argue that class and gender inequalities reinforce each other and create groups that are doubly oppressed. In addition, as Tong notes (p. 40), work shapes consciousness, and women's work shapes her status and self-image. Woman's position within the family may help explain the problem of developing working class consciousness. As with exchange relationships in general in capitalism, underlying these seemingly equal exchange relationships are power relationships. Various relationships, such as those between males and females, relationships in the family, prostitution, surrogate mother hood, etc. may appear to express equality, but because of the underlying unequal power relations conceal great inequalities.

c. Examples of some contemporary Marxist feminist approach

Out of the Marxian and the feminist tradition, there are a number of approaches to the analysis of women and of sex and gender inequalities. These are represented by various social and political movements, organizations, and theorists.

i. Inequality.

Class structures are primary in determining the main social classes, the main forms of struggle within societies, and the life experiences of people in these classes. But secondary forms of inequality and oppression occur within each class, and these may take the form of racial and ethnic inequalities, or gender inequalities. These secondary forms could have an economic basis, where women and other oppressed groups do not have an economic basis for equality. That is, they may be prevented from owning property and do not have a means of producing a livelihood apart from their husbands or fathers. But in the economic model of Marx, at least in *Capital*, it is not clear why women would not have access to property – that is, the explanation of this comes from outside the model of capitalism.

Marxist feminists argue that “*within* any class, women are less advantaged than men in their access to material goods, power, status, and possibilities for self-actualization. The causes of this inequality lie in the organization of capitalism itself.” (Ritzer, pp. 468-9) Bourgeois women may be wealthy, but usually are secondary to their husbands in terms of power. These women “provide emotional, social, and sexual services for the men in their class.” They are well rewarded for this, often are not able to develop an independent source of livelihood or power. Middle class women may be well off, but often lack property or labor force experience, and if divorced, could find themselves in poverty.

The position of working class women is likely to be mixed, depending on whether or not they participate in the paid labor force, and then on their economic position within the labor force. If the latter is adequate to support her and her children, she may be able to have some independence. More likely though, the working class woman has little income, responsibility for household tasks, and is inferior socially and in terms of power and independence to her husband. This may allow a male wage earner to exercise “personal power, compensation for his actual powerlessness in society. She is in other words, ‘the slave of a slave.’” (Ritzer, 469).

For women within the labor force, this work is often as alienating as that of men, or perhaps more alienating. Women are often paid less, and tend to be in subordinate

positions. There are relatively few cases where women within the work force are managers or are in dominant positions within a hierarchy. For women who are not in the work force, alienation occurs in a different form, that of powerlessness, with women being required to serve others. (Based on Code, p. 39).

ii. Family wage.

Marxist feminists have attempted to develop explanations for the relatively lower pay of women than men. (See notes above on the similar costs of the value of male and female labour power). Throughout much of the twentieth century, the family responsibilities of women and their economic dependency on the earnings of their husband meant that their wages were depressed relative to wages of men. Many men, trade unions, and even employers argued that the wages for males needed to be living wages or family wages – sufficient to support a family. That is, the male wages should be sufficient to meet the daily and generational reproductive costs of the family and labor force. The corollary of this is that women’s wages did not need to be so great, because they were at least partially supported by their husbands. Single females were expected to work only temporarily, until marriage, so did not need high wages either. As a result, the dependency of women on men, and the attempt to pursue a high wage strategy for men, may have led to relatively low wages for women. To some extent, this may have been a byproduct of trade union approaches to male wages.

iii. Reserve army of labor.

Marx argued that the reserve army of unemployed workers was always replenished by capitalism, thus exercising downward pressure on the wages of workers in the labor force. It was the maintenance and reconstruction of this reserve army that prevented workers from gaining wages exceeding the value of their labor power. If workers were able to boost wages during a time of economic expansion, one of the effects of this was to slow capital accumulation, thus causing an economic slowdown, unemployment, and replenishment of the reserve army.

One part of the reserve army is women – for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most women were in the home and worked in the labor force only

periodically. Of course, poor women and women from disadvantaged groups had to work in the labor force to provide a minimal level of income for themselves and their families. In wartime, or in other periods or places of labor shortages, women could be drawn into the labor force as needed. Since the primary attachment of these women was to the home and family, not paid labor, these women did not need to be paid as much as men. In addition, having these women available meant that they could be used to prevent male wages from rising too much.

While the reserve army of labor argument may have explained some of the operations of the labor force through the 1950s, following that women entered the labor force in large numbers and have not left the labor force. This was one of the great social changes of the latter part of the twentieth century – altering the structure of the labor force, family, home, and male/female relationships. One part of the reserve army of labor is the latent reserve – people who have not yet been drawn into the paid labor force. One Marxist argument is that women formed a part of the latent labor reserve, one that could be drawn into the labor force as needed. This may help explain some of the inequality and lower pay of women in the labor force.

iv. Household and Family.

Some Marxists view the household as an institution that functions to support capitalism – permitting or even encouraging exploitation. That is, by creating and recreating sexual inequalities, and keeping women in the home with responsibility for family subsistence, emotional support and reproduction, the family is an institution used by capitalism to assist in the exploitation of labor and maintenance of stability within a system of class oppression and inequality. As noted earlier, it can be argued that since women are concerned with maintenance of household and family, they act as a conservative force on the development of working class consciousness. Some other aspects of this are as follows.

Consumers.

Households and families are good consuming units within modern capitalism. Each household is a separate consuming units, with separate needs. While these consuming units need not be organized on a family basis, or with sexual inequalities, in order to perform this role in society, in fact they are very well adapted to maintaining and expanding purchases.

In social and political terms, this role can also play a conservatizing force with respect to class struggles. Women's lower wages and the difficulty of supporting a family, can be used by employers as a means of undermining trade union struggles. Since the responsibility of women is to maintain the household, this can have a conservatizing effect. Where there is a need for change, women are often isolated by separation into private households, and organizing to create change can be difficult.

Labor Force.

So long as women have primary responsibility for reproduction (physical and socialization) and household and family maintenance, women constitute a cheap form of labor, a reserve army of labor. They have been a latent reserve over the last forty years, some are a short term reserve over the economic cycle, and women are a labor reserve in a generational sense. That is, the expectation that women will not be as committed to many jobs as men, with time taken off for childbearing, child care, care of elderly parents, etc., allows employers to pay women less than men. And this also presents both employers and men with an argument that women should be paid somewhat less, or advance somewhat less quickly in their careers. The lower status of women within society also allows women to be paid less, since some wages and salaries are structured on status considerations.

Surplus Value.

Household and family act to create cheap labor that can be used in the expansion of surplus value. That is, much of the necessary labor required by society to maintain and reproduce the population and labor force is carried out as unpaid labor by women working in the home. Workers come to the labor force at no cost to employers, and if employers had to pay the full cost of reproducing their work force, wages would be considerably greater than they currently are. Where wages are family wages, so that the male wage is large enough to support the whole family, there is still much unpaid work in the home, and if employers paid for this, there would be a considerable redistribution of income from males to females. As a result, there is indirect exploitation of female labor. The work of women in the household permits the extraction of surplus value and while men are directly exploited, women are exploited in an indirect manner by not being paid for the value of the labor that produces surplus value.

Unproductive Labor and Exploitation.

The unpaid labor performed by women for men can really be regarded as unpaid labor performed for capitalists. In the classical Marxian framework, such labor is unproductive. Marxist feminists argue that reproductive and household labor is productive of surplus value, and should be compensated in some manner. This has led some to argue that women should be paid wages for housework, rather than arguing that male/female inequalities are overcome only through women entering the paid labor force.

Others have argued that men exploit women in an economic sense, and men extract surplus value from women. Some Marxists (Tong,66-69) argue that the family must be abolished and that paying wages for housework will just preserve the traditional inequalities. What is necessary is more socialization of household work, with women being fully able to participate in the public sphere. Potentially, under communism, the division between public and private would disappear, and this could form the basis for sex and gender equalities.

v. Women as Class.

Another line of argument that some feminists have adopted is that women are a class, or a sexual class as opposed to the common Marxist view of a social or economic class. Eisenstein considers women as a sexual class because they “constitute the basic and necessary activities of society: reproduction, child rearing, nurturing, consuming, domestic laboring, *and* wage-earning. Women are a sexual class because *what they do as women* – the activities they are responsible for in society, the labor that they perform – is essential and necessary to the operation of society as it presently exists.” (Eisenstein, 146). This consideration of women as a sexual class is based on a common position within the mode of production and reproduction, and a common position with respect to another sexual class, that is, males. This means a different set of interests, and also at least some opposed interests to those of males. Eisenstein argues that patriarchy is somewhat different than capitalism as a system, where the bourgeoisie is organized and must be opposed. Rather than struggling against men, the struggle of women is against patriarchy, and its expressions. The latter may be found in the market, in the state, in the family, etc. For Eisenstein, sexual class consciousness must be formed through social movements like

the suffrage movement or feminist movements. The manner in which feminist struggles over the last thirty years have proceeded has developed this sexual class consciousness.

This argument was paralleled by French materialist feminism (see Lovell, p. 335) on women as class. Christine Delphy, a French feminist, argues that women are a class relative to the relations of production (and reproduction). “Because they perform unpaid housework all women share a common economic position” and “as a category of human beings *destined by birth* to become a member of this class, they constitute a caste” (Bryson, 199). Delphy argues that men exploit women’s labor through the labor/marriage contract. This “domestic exploitation takes place outside the capitalist mode of production ... this is not simply derived from class struggle and capitalism, but it has an independent material basis in women’s unpaid domestic labor” (Bryson, p. 199). Lovell notes how this leads to men exploiting women, not just in economic terms, but “also the sexual and reproductive bodies of women” (p. 335). It is the gender differentiated system of power that produces this.

From this, some Marxist and other feminists have argued there are dual systems or a capitalist patriarchy. Modern society is clearly characterized by capitalism as an economic and material force; it is also characterized by patriarchy, a system of domination of women by men. While some argue that one of these can be reduced to the other, a dual systems approach argues that each of these are “dynamic forces at work in history, which must therefore be understood in terms of both class and gender struggle” (Bryson, p. 243). Hartmann argues that the two may build on each other but they may be in conflict with each other – for example, the past fifty years where patriarchal privileges for males may have been undercut by the strong growth in demand for women’s work in the paid labor force. Each of the two systems has a certain autonomy and set of forces and structures that maintain the system. Marx outlined the forces that maintained and expanded capitalism. Feminists have presented various arguments concerning the causes and forces associated with patriarchy.

CHAPTER XII

FEMINIST SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (PART 2)

Winkle in *Feminist Sociological Theory (Vol. II)* stated Feminist sociological theory is both an academic and a political approach to the study of society. It is critical and didactic; it analyzes and informs. It is inseparable from method. Feminist sociology emerged as a response

to the missing gender in classical sociology, setting forth an agenda for academic and social change. Because feminism is interdisciplinary in nature, feminist sociological theory has pulled in observations and approaches from political science, literature, geography, anthropology, and probably most importantly, philosophy. It has been excluded and marginalized, and probably never really understood by most sociologists.

The sociological and feminist foundations of feminist sociological theory and its effect on the discipline of sociology. The starting point is a consideration of the way that sociology has been centered on the male, informed by male perspectives, and dominated by men until relatively recently. Although women have been active participants since its inception, their voices and perspectives were marginalized in the discipline during most of the 19th and 20th centuries. Feminists argue that without gender as a central analytic category, social life – work, family, the economy, politics, education, religion – cannot be adequately studied.

The definition of feminism has expanded from an early notion of simply challenging women's subordination to men and arguing for their equal rights, to seeing and understanding the social world from the vantage points of women, to changing systems of oppression based on western masculinist relations of ruling. And the definition of feminism is always changing, never static, never unitary, always subject to the specific understandings of the theorist. At the same time, there is a constant effort to find unity in the differences, a unity that can encompass all people who are affected by gender regimes, however they are manifested. It is the work of the feminist sociological theorist to grapple with these contradictions.

Classical Sociology

In the writings about women, sex, and gender in the classical era, for the writers typically thought to be the 'fathers' of sociology – Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel – women were either almost completely ignored, or briefly discussed and then dismissed, or located within specific social locations such as the family. Drawing from the reinforcing the 19th century doctrine of two spheres, with woman as the private reproductive 'body', taking care of the home and hearth, and man as the public rational, political, and noble 'mind' living in the larger world of commerce and politics, Auguste Comte argued that women's mission was to humanize men,

who were alienated and sexually unstable. For Comte, marriage was the positivist discipline of the undisciplined, for which it was necessary for the feminine to be subordinated to the masculine, proving that 'equality of the sexes, of which so much is said, is incompatible with all social existence'.

For Durkheim, too, women were needed to control the passions of men, and the site for this was the family. Paradoxically, Durkheim saw women as 'more primitive' but also necessary for their civilizing and stabilizing effect on men. For men, suicide rates were higher among the unmarried, while it was the married woman, over her unmarried sister, who was more likely to kill herself. Durkheim asked, 'Must one of the sexes necessarily be sacrificed, and is the solution only to choose the lesser of the two evils.' Apparently so. Similarly, Simmel saw woman as undifferentiated, unified, 'at home' within herself, but man was differentiated, because of the division of labor, and his 'home' was beyond himself, resulting in a dualistic nature for men, but not for women. In order to solve that split, men had to live more creatively than women.

Max Weber's view of women was more complex, perhaps because of his marriage to the social theorist Marianne Weber. His understanding of the role of women was grounded in his theories of rationalization: Rationalization and secularization displace the older social hierarchies. Far from idealizing the public/private split, Weber both critiqued the older patriarchal household, where women were subordinated to men, and analyzed the changed domestic relations attendant upon the modern rationalization process, replacing status with contract. Thus, Weber believed that women's status as oppressed member of a patriarchal household is replaced by her lower bargaining power in the contractual marriage, but this reduced power is due mostly to the remnant of the old patriarchal system, although he was not immune from the current thinking that men were both physically and intellectually stronger than women.

But how did Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber become the personification of classical sociology? R.W. Connell suggests that the 'fathers' of 'classical' sociology were not really 'classical' until Talcott Parsons and other mid-20th century sociologists made them so. The contributions of the women were pointedly ignored. Nowhere is this elision more poignant than in the case of Harriet Martineau, who not only translated August Comte's Positive Philosophy, but made it readable through her editing and condensation. In fact, Martineau's own

sociological works, *Society in America* and *How to Observe Morals and Manners*, predated Comte's by two decades.

Furthermore, late 19th and early 20th century sociological theory was far less systemized than it would become later in the century, with much of the emphasis on a colonialist project, according to Connell. Positivism, with its emphasis on value-neutral theory-testing, was not the only approach to social knowledge in the classical era. In fact, feminist sociologists proposed a different approach to sociology, but until relatively recently their contributions were largely submerged. Theories about and by women are in a constant state of rediscovery, as women have lacked control over the institutionalized knowledge about them. Thus, there is amnesia or active erasure of the scholarly work of feminists, and each generation must continually reinvent the discipline and rediscover forgotten thinkers.

These forgotten sociologists were more likely to think of sociology in terms of its applicability toward ameliorating the social ills of the day. Far from 'value-free', they saw the purpose of sociology as fostering the social values of equality and dignity for all. In England, Beatrice Potter Webb (1858-1943) was the co-author, along with her husband Sidney Webb, of various works that formed the conceptual basis for the British welfare state that emerged after World War I. Marianne Weber (1870-1954), a German, was married to Max Weber, and was a feminist sociologist-activist in her own right, writing nine books, including *Marriage, Motherhood, and the Law*, in which she studied the extent to which the change in society's rationality from tradition to modernity altered the legal position of women. She served as one of the first elected German women in a state assembly and the president of the Federation of German Women's Organizations. In Russia, Alexandra Kollontai (1873-1952) was a leading intellectual in the Bolshevik Revolution, and one of the few who insisted on paying attention to the situation of women: she later was virtually exiled to work as an ambassador to Norway, Mexico, and Sweden. Ellen Key (1849-1926) was a Swedish social theorist who advocated a maternalist approach to women's equality, suffrage, children's education, and peace. Her writings were influential beyond Scandinavia, with interest in her work as far away as the United States and Japan.

In the United States, Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935), Ida B. Wells-Barnett (1862-1931), Anna Julia Cooper (1858-1964), Mary Church Terrell (1863-1954), Sophonisba Breckinridge (1886-1948), Jane Addams (1860-1935), Florence Kelly (1859-1932), Edith

Abbott (1876-1957), and Grace Abott (1878-1939) all worked to combine intellectual sociological endeavors with public service to advance the interests of women and other marginalized and oppressed people, notably immigrants and African Americans. Gilman was a leading intellectual, publishing over 2000 articles, poems, and fiction, as well as six works of social theory and her widely read *Women and Economics* (1908). She had a radical vision of completely changing men's and women's roles, the structure and purpose of the family, the economic system, and the system of governance to advance women's economic independence and political power.

Scholars of feminism have frequently argued that in the early 20th century, there were two major strands of feminist activism—those feminists who emphasized women's economic independence, such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Marianne Weber, and Alexandra Kollontai, and those with a more maternalist bent, exemplified by Ellen Key and these two strands informed the sociological analyses and policy outcomes urged by their proponents. For women's economic independence to become a reality, women needed to be active participants in the wage economy, and arrangements for childcare and birth control were uppermost in the minds of the activist-scholars, while maternalist feminism focused on women's nurturing and relational characteristics, and argued for social policies that allowed women to remain home with children or occupations that made the most of what was seen as women's natural caring personality.

During the Great Depression, feminists redirected their considerable skills to helping to create social programs and policies that would alleviate the hardships brought by massive unemployment and low wages. There was less academic theorizing, and more applied work. It is during this time that the groundwork was laid for the beginnings of the Swedish welfare state with its population policies and the United States' Social Security Act, and in both countries, feminist sociologies developed during the previous decades played an important role.

With the conclusion of the Second World War, feminism in the West appeared to be dead. Most European countries had granted suffrage to women in the interwar years, with the exception of Australia, New Zealand, Finland and Norway, where women achieved the vote before 1914, and France, Belgium, Italy, Romania, and Yugoslavia, where women had to wait until after the War (and in the case of Switzerland, not until 1971, and Liechtenstein, 1984). During and after the War, more pressing issues had taken center stage. In the countries immediately affected by warfare, rebuilding the country's infrastructure and populations were of

vital concern, and in those spared war damage, the focus of most women was on family. The baby boom was in full swing in Western countries ushering in the housewife epoch, with its ideological emphasis on women's role as wife and mother, whether or not women were actually in the labor force. In those countries more heavily affected by the war women's roles were more complex, with the public sentiment of a need to return to 'normalcy' and the ideal of the stay-at-home mother and wife, but complicated by a shortage of male workers in countries desperately in need of reconstruction.

During this period, Parsonian functionalism held sway in U.S. universities, and to lesser extent in Europe. But whether functionalist or not, the dominant way of thinking about gender in post-war sociology was guided by the sex roles paradigm.

That did not mean, however, that women had ceased being active in the labor force or that feminist academic work had come to a standstill. The Swedish sociologist Alva Myrdal, who had been instrumental in crafting Sweden's response to its population decline during the Great Depression of the 1930s, paid particular attention toward facilitating women's combined roles as mother and worker, working in collaboration with the German sociologist, Viola Klein, in their book *Women's Two Roles*. In the United States, Russian Jewish immigrant Mirra Komarovsky battled the Parsonian hegemony, investigating the influence of gender expectations on middle class women and blue collar men.

In France, Simone de Beauvoir published *The Second Sex* in 1949, setting out an existentialist perspective on women: One is not born a woman; one becomes a woman. Although primarily a philosophical text, sociologists found her notion of woman as the 'Other' enormously useful in adding depth and texture to their analyses, and providing a starting point for other feminists by suggesting feminism's two primary goals: (1) Women need to act as authentic subjects choosing their own histories and (2) society must be changed to make this possible.

In the social ferment of the 1960s, feminism gained new life in the public consciousness. In the United States, it arose in the context of the Civil Rights Movement to secure citizenship rights to African Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities, the antinuclear and ecology movements, and the protests against the U.S. war in Vietnam, as women became conscious of the contradiction of working as subservient helpmeets to male leaders in liberation movements. The same was true in Australasia, which saw the rise of several movements for the rights of marginalized peoples – aboriginal, immigrant, gay and lesbian – including women. Similarly, in

Sweden and Great Britain, where women's issues were ignored by male labor leaders, the obvious lack of provisions for women's work and participation –notably childcare, divorce, contraception, and laws against homosexuals – spurred women' activism.

The baby boomers were coming of age. The mothers of the children born in the 1940s and 1950s were now free of childrearing duties and ready to claim an identity that went beyond wife and mother, and their daughters were putting off marriage and motherhood, and going to college at a rate that far exceeded any preceding generation.

In sociology, these new generations of feminists, reacting to the dominant functionalist sociologies of the 1950s, began what would become a arguably successful campaign to change the face of sociology. Women had been outsiders in sociology, as they had been in the rest of the academy, and even the knowledge system created by the dominant functionalist/positivist paradigm seemed to excluded women's experiences. In fact, whenever women appeared at all in sociology, it was in the sociology of the family. Searching for a new way to understand the world, women turned to sources outside mainstream sociology for inspiration, Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan, in particular.

The feminist movement in sociology was shaped by the radical, socialist/Marxist, and liberal feminism of the day, and these, in turn, emerged from and critiqued the larger paradigms in which they were embedded. Liberal feminists, with strong roots in the classical liberal and pluralist traditions, argued for equal rights and a level playing field, and critiqued but did not reject institutions that tended to discriminate against women, explaining that with relatively minor reforms, women could achieve equality through their own efforts. Liberal feminist sociologists, then, stressed investigating barriers to equality and socialization into gender roles, and were more likely to argue that most differences between men and women were superficial at best.

Radical feminists, like others in the contemporary counter-cultural movement, tended to reject all institutions as oppressive, but unlike 'hippies' and others who rejected the dominant society, saw sex oppression as the primary and most basic structure that led to all other oppressions and exploitation. Radical feminists, more than socialist or liberal feminists, were more likely to create organizations that excluded men. In response to patriarchy's appropriation and exploitation of the female body, radical feminist sociologists focused their attentions on it, in particular, rape, incest, health care, and sexuality.

Marxist or socialist feminism arose within and as a critique of Marxism, and like Marxism, saw as the primary source of oppression an economic system that created systems of exploitation. Among socialist feminists, there was a real concern for race and class issues, including welfare rights. The primary debates within this approach were the relationships between, for example, sexism and racism, and patriarchy and capitalism. These sociologists investigated economics, labor markets, households, and the state.

Each of these perspectives also enriched the way we thought about 'sex' and 'gender'. In the 1950s and 1960s, most sociologists had thought in terms of 'sex roles'. But this new generation of sociologists also thought about gender as an institution, an axis of stratification, and even as a performance. Even biological differences came to be seen as having an aspect of social construction.

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
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